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Speech by Joschka Fischer, Federal Minister for Foreign Affairs,
Ladies and gentlemen, This was a really impressive welcome in the British press. I read in The Times that I plan "a short, provocative speech" today. Well, first the good news for you: my speech will not be provocative. And now the bad news: the speech will not be short. So relax, be patient, don't worry, be happy. First of all, let me thank you very much for honouring me with the German-British 2000 Award. When I gave my Humboldt speech last May, I was prepared for a good deal, but I definitely did not expect to receive an award for it in Britain. That seemed hardly likely, considering the headlines in the British press. Given your bold decision to honour "the most dangerous man in Europe" for such a speech, it is obvious that the famous British understatement is still very much alive. Let me once again thank you all, especially Lord Hurd, very much and also Thomas Kielinger for his kind words. I was not surprised that my Humboldt speech provoked controversy. But I had not anticipated it to launch such a broad, Europe-wide debate. That really exceeded my wildest expectations. I am especially glad to see Britain taking an active part in this debate, namely with Prime Minister Tony Blair's important and far-sighted speech in Warsaw. Europe needs Britain's contribution. Apparently the time was ripe for such a debate. With fifty years of European integration behind us and facing a radically different environment, everywhere in Europe people were feeling a strong need for renewed reflection and passionate debate on what European integration is all about and where it should be heading. In the wake of the Second World War, European integration emerged as an entirely new way of shaping relations between the countries of Europe. Integration, the step-by-step aligning of national interests, radically changed European history for the better. That is why integration is the most important lesson to be drawn from this past "century of extremes". And by integration - this I want to make clear right away - I do not mean everything should be taken over by a superstate. I shall go into more detail on that later on. The European Union has evolved in a dynamic and balanced process along two main axes, enlarging and deepening. Now that the EU is embarking on the biggest ever enlargement, it is crucial that the balance between these two axes remain intact. An EU of 27 or more members will hardly function merely as a common market. Enlargement will generate strong pressure for deeper integration, pressure that is bound to alter the current status quo within the Union. If that does not happen, the EU will inevitably be more and more paralyzed. We are approaching a decisive crossroads: do we continue down the path of integration or will we allow the EU's capacity to act to erode? It is the growing awareness of this dilemma that fuels the debate. Over recent months this growing pressure has already, irrespective of national differences, produced a Europe-wide convergence of views on a number of key issues concerning Europe's future. Almost no one denies any more the need for progress towards a closer union as a necessary consequence of enlargement. It is also generally agreed that the competences of Europe's institutions need to be clearly defined as do the respective competences of Europe and its member states, and that explicit recognition should be given to the shared values on which Europe rests. This consensus is a major step forwards, a step that would have been almost inconceivable a few months ago. On many European issues there will be much debate over the next few years. That is to be welcomed, because it shows European democracy is in the making. What exactly the European Union will look like in 10 or 15 years' time no one can predict. The key thing, however, is that we gradually arrive at a new consensus on the essence, the goals of European integration, and also on the responsibility we share at this critical juncture. Ladies and gentlemen, the European Union is confronted today with a unique, unprecedented challenge. It needs to successfully carry through three mega-projects - all at one and the same time. First of all, enlargement. For the countries of Western Europe this is a historic responsibility, yet we also have a manifest interest in ensuring that, through the EU, democracy and the market economy take firm root in Eastern Europe. Once the Cold War was over, the EU had to open up towards the East. Anything else would have undermined and ultimately destroyed the whole idea of European integration. We only have to look at the four wars of succession in Yugoslavia to see where that might lead. With an EU remaining limited to Western Europe, the continent would be split in two: integration in the West, and in the East the old balance-of-power politics with all its insecurities and dangers of nationalism. And sooner or later these traditional lines of conflict in Eastern Europe would inevitably spill over into the EU itself. In Helsinki we decided in concrete terms on enlargement. And in Nice we reached an agreement that fulfils the historic task we had set ourselves, making the EU fit for enlargement. The importance of the Nice summit is that it paves the way both for enlargement and for the so-called post-Nice process, the deepening of the Union. We should not underestimate what has been achieved in Nice, even though some would have liked to see more progress in certain areas. The Nice accords go well beyond the Treaty of Amsterdam, and what was achieved at the end of these very difficult negotiations we owe in no small measure to the efforts of the French Presidency. Nice was a success for Europe. Now enlargement must be made a practical reality at the earliest possible date. That will rightly be a main focus of the Swedish Presidency. Germany and Britain will work closely together over the months ahead to make as much headway as possible on the difficult chapters that are still to be negotiated. Secondly, Europe must respond to the challenge of globalization in a comprehensive way. Whether we are talking about preventing wars, arms control, development assistance, effective help for refugees, global warming, regulating global financial markets or trade matters: on such issues no European country, not even the biggest, can have real influence unless they join forces. Now that the original goals of European integration, securing peace and prosperity within the Union itself, have been accomplished, it is these issues that will lend new momentum to European integration in the 21st century. At this point let me address a possible misunderstanding. European integration is not some kind of alternative to close transatlantic partnership: the fact is, Europe needs both. The US decision after the war to remain in Europe, along with the historical integration project of the great French statesmen Robert Schuman and Jean Monnet, was a turning-point that changed Europe's destiny for the better. Now, after the Cold War, over, we still view the United States and our close and immutable Euro-Atlantic partnership in NATO as indispensable for the maintenance of European security and the search for effective responses to the global challenges. The stronger and more united Europe is, the more active it can be as a US partner and ally in the 21st century. That is also the view of the United States, which is why the Americans have always endorsed European integration. My third and decisive point is that, at the same time as tackling enlargement and the new challenges, we must deepen the European Union. The EU must radically reform its decision-making mechanisms so that a union of 25 or more members remains able not only to act but also to convince the citizens of its member states of the legitimacy of its actions. Recent events have clearly demonstrated that we are already up against the limits here. There needs to be greater clarity about who is responsible for what within the Union. And these responsibilities should, where necessary, be reorganized. That should happen at two levels: horizontally, between the different European institutions, and vertically, between Europe and the member states. The most important issue is to clearly define the tasks of the EU and the member states. It was decided in Nice that this should be clarified at the next intergovernmental conference in 2004. The Union already has the principle of subsidiarity, according to which it is only responsible for those matters that absolutely require to be dealt with at European level, all else should remain a matter for the nation states. This principle serves as an important point of reference, but its operational value is limited when it comes to determining in practical terms who should be responsible for what. Some people were surprised when I emphasised the importance of the nation state in my Humboldt speech – but I would like to make this point again today. The idea that European integration means the end of Europe's nation states derives from a strange misconception that integration is some kind of zero-sum game. The truth is, integration is in its essence a win-win formula. With its cultural and democratic traditions, the nation state is the primary source of identity for the citizens of all European countries and will remain so for the foreseeable future. For culture, language and tradition it will continue to be the principal framework. Of course, people have numerous sources of identity - a football club, the town they live in, the region they come from, also Europe - but only the nation state can credibly lend full democratic legitimacy to European decisions. It follows then that European integration has to take along the member states. Only if their own national institutions are neither undermined nor likely to disappear altogether, will European integration come about. The nightmare of British eurosceptics, the so-called "superstate", a new sovereign that would abolish the old nation states along with their democratic governments - is therefore nothing but a synthetic construct that has nothing whatsoever to do with European reality. But let me be clear on one thing: in key areas of common interest we cannot get by without "Europe". "Almost every major nation has been obliged by the pressure of the post-war world to pool significant areas of sovereignty so as to create more effective political units" - that insight we owe to Margaret Thatcher, commenting on the British referendum on Europe in 1975. Although at that time - a period of my life I have to remember right now in vivid detail - we had little in common as far as politics goes - on this particular point I find myself in complete agreement with Lady Thatcher. Definition of competences should be a two-way street. It should neither tilt the balance towards renationalization nor towards intergovernmental cooperation, even if in specific cases a retransfer of competences may on occasion be objectively appropriate. The principle of integration is the outstanding achievement of 20th-century European history. To "roll back" integration would be a fatal mistake. Renationalization would mean not only that Europe would lose its capacity to act. It would in fact also immediately confront us once again with the old problem of coalition-building and renewed intra-European tensions. Europe would revert to balance-of-power politics and playing off one against another. That surely cannot be in anyone's interest. The purpose of the post-Nice process is to spell out clearly what falls within "Europe’s" competence and what falls within the competence of the member states. The Union of the future will have strong European institutions fully capable of taking European decisions but building at the same time on strong member states. The EU is never going to be a state, let alone some kind of superstate. No one - in Germany, France or anywhere else in Europe - wants a centralized super-bureaucracy with anonymous actors and structures totally remote from the ordinary citizen. The union we want is the exact opposite of such a superstate. Traditional constitutional and international law provides no model for what we see emerging in Europe today. Terms that have evolved in a national context seldom fit when it comes to Europe. Since we all have very different constitutional histories, the terms we use often have a rather different connotation for others - sometimes they even mean the exact opposite. A good example is the German f-word, which for us implies decentralization and for you rather suggests centralization. I have tried very hard to come up with a better alternative, but so far without success. So here in London permit me therefore in all due form to ask for your indulgence and understanding. Ladies and gentlemen, the rather reserved attitude many people - also in Germany! - have towards "Brussels" is due mainly to the fact that European decisions lack transparency, efficiency and accountability. In other words, there is a democratic deficit. And the greater "Europe's" impact becomes, the less willing our citizens will be to tolerate this. With enlargement and the extension of majority voting to new areas, the democratic deficit is likely to become ever more acute. The issue of the Union's democratic legitimacy is becoming the main focus of our debate. In his impressive book "Democracy in Europe", Larry Siedentop argues that "reconnecting the European project with national political cultures and national political classes must be the priority". That is indeed exactly what is needed, especially when new institutional solutions are at issue. Ladies and gentlemen, Let me now turn briefly to the euro - even if on this topic a German can hardly say anything at all here in London without producing big headlines the next day. As we see it, the introduction of the euro has been a success. The fundamentals of the EU economy are sound, the course has been set for growth, innovation, deregulation and more jobs. The euro is today more stable than the Deutschmark was during the nineties. Only the dollar exchange-rate has been unsatisfactory, but the signs are that normalization is now on the way. We have no reason to regret our decision in favour of the euro. I do not intend to comment here on the question of Britain joining the euro. That is your decision and yours alone, a matter for none but the British people and Parliament to decide. On this issue a non-Brit has no right to give you advice. And you will probably be familiar with our views on the subject anyway. Ladies and gentlemen, Policy on Europe has always been one of the most important and often also most difficult themes in German-British relations. Over the past 50 years our countries have both come a long way. Today Britain, too, sees its future inside Europe. Of course that does not mean we now agree on each and every question. Important differences will remain, for example regarding our willingness to take further steps towards integration, in our legal traditions and respective political cultures, which are the product of our different national histories. So the German-British Forum will not run out of topics to talk about. While such cultural and historical factors will continue to shape our actions, the key point is that, compared to the past, our interests are now much more closely aligned as far as Europe is concerned. We share a common desire to see an EU capable of action and to see freedom and democracy firmly rooted in neighbouring regions: those are the main reasons why we both want to take European integration forward. It is only logical then that on key European issues such as enlargement and a common security and defence policy our positions are broadly similar. Ladies and gentlemen, let me repeat: my Humboldt University speech was not a call for a European superstate. The EU is an entity sui generis. The European nation states will continue to exist within the Union. But only if we succeed in building an economically and politically integrated Europe with reformed institutions, with the means to act, a Europe that its citizens can understand and that enjoys democratic legitimacy in their eyes, will this European project, this enlarged Europe of 27 or more member states , have a real future. And only then will Europe be able, both on our continent and in the world at large, to play the important role that we all want it to play in building freedom, peace and prosperity in the 21st century. |
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