The Transatlantic Agenda: Speech by Foreign Minister Joschka Fischer

Foreign Minister Fischer delivered this speech at the 37th Munich Conference on Security Policy, February 3, 2001.

If Europe presents itself today as a continent of freedom, peace and security, this is partly the result of a far-sighted US foreign policy. Without the presence of the United States in Europe, without its decades-long commitment to a free, democratic Europe, the historic project of European unification would never have come to fruition. And Germany's reunification would certainly not have come about if the US had not championed the Germans' right to self-determination so unreservedly and forthrightly. To this day the US is present in Europe, it is a "European power." And this should remain so in future. This is of such fundamental political importance because Germany's dual -European and transatlantic - anchorage is and remains in our interests.

The transatlantic relationship is changing, and change it must if it is to maintain its vitality. Against the background of the major changes in world politics following the end of the Cold War, we must readjust our aims, interests and priorities. We are being forced to do so by globalization and the emergence of new security risks. However, we should not regard these changes as merely problems but, rather, as a creative opportunity which our countries could only have dreamt of during the ice age of the Cold War.

Today, the US enjoys unprecedented global influence and the responsibility that goes with it. We are intrigued by the debate in the US on how America should best deal with this responsibility, because it is of paramount importance to us all. However, the old continent Europe has also changed dramatically during the last ten years due to the end of the Cold War and of the division of Europe. And with eastward enlargement and the deepening of the EU's political integration it will be undergoing even more dramatic change over the years ahead.

Ultimately, we will have a European Union which is united not just economically but also politically. Such a united Europe able to take effective political action will offer the US the chance for a genuine global partnership, something which no individual European partner could ever do.

The idea that Europe could take leave of its American partner after the demise of the Soviet Union is a great mistake. The bloody wars in the Balkans taught us a bitter lesson. The democratic self-liberation of the Serbian people would not have been possible without the support of America and Europe, as well as NATO's resolute stand. However, even after the transition to democracy in Belgrade, America's commitment to the alliance and the Stability Pact remains indispensable if South-Eastern Europe is to have the prospect of a peaceful future in Europe. A policy of patience is required here which will only succeed if we work together. Europe will remain dependent on the US for its security. And, conversely, a peaceful, prospering Europe is in the fundamental interests of the US.

The European Union has learned from its experiences in Kosovo that it must have its own effective security and defense policy. This is also a consequence of European integration which thus takes on a completely new dimension.

Effectively combining civilian and military instruments will be a hallmark of the EU in the 21st century. The ESDP will incorporate its new instruments of military crisis management into its tried and tested comprehensive framework of conflict prevention and civilian crisis management. The EU will thus in future have at its disposal all means of exerting political influence ranging from the early diagnosis of emerging conflicts to the use of military means. If we use what is currently being put together in Brussels in the right way, a new mechanism for flexible, integrated and comprehensive crisis management will evolve. The use of force will always be merely the last resort.

The US has repeatedly called for the "European pillar" of the alliance to be strengthened. This is precisely the goal of the ESDP. It has been conceived to complement rather than to rival NATO. It is intended to make the alliance more balanced and thus even stronger. We know that the success of the European Security and Defense Policy hinges on it being transparent to the US and compatible with NATO. We want to use NATO, so that its assets are also available to the EU. Conversely, the new capabilities which a credible ESDP requires will also be available to NATO. Therefore, we will increase the benefits rather than duplicate institutions and capabilities, and produce new strength through synergy and integration rather than mutual weakening. Moreover, the EU accession candidates and, in particular, those European NATO allies which are not EU member states will have more consultation and codecision rights than non-members have ever been offered by any other international organization.

Ladies and Gentlemen,

At the end of the Cold War stood the great transatlantic vision of a "Europe whole and free." The completion of this historic project remains our most important common goal. How far have we come? With the accession of Poland, Hungary and the Czech Republic the Atlantic alliance has taken a significant step towards overcoming the division of Europe once and for all. The new members have assumed an important and responsible role in NATO's involvement in South-Eastern Europe.They have proved to be a valuable addition to the alliance and a boon for European security.

The alliance will remain open to new members on the basis of the decision taken by the Washington summit to keep the alliance's doors open. We have always made it clear that the right to freely decide to commit to an alliance must apply to all European states. We cannot accept a veto from any third party. However, it is in the interests of both the alliance and the candidate countries not to overtax NATO's ability to admit new members, its efficiency and cohesion.

This sensitive question of the continued opening up of NATO requires intensive consultations and careful consideration within the Alliance. We believe there is much to be said for continuing the current course of a moderate, wise and circumspect policy of opening up.

However, the question of a European order of peace is not a matter for NATO alone. The eastward enlargement of the European Union is a contribution towards Euro-Atlantic security whose significance cannot be overestimated and yet does not always seem to be fully appreciated by all in the US.

Let us not forget that EU eastward enlargement is an investment in a long-term preventive security and peace policy which will have a greater and more lasting influence on the internal stability of these states and societies than the opening up of NATO. The standards the EU represents already have an impact on neighboring countries and have helped defuse many conflicts that in the past might well have ended in bloodshed. And there is another reason why it is vital to see the connection between the enlargement of NATO and that of the EU. For the next round of EU enlargement will also have a security policy dimension. An enlarged EU with 27 member states will also create a much more positive security environment in Europe.

The connection with the EU is also important when discussing the fair distribution of the burdens of our common security within the alliance. Here, too, we need the full picture and not just the traditional Defense policy segment, all the more so because our resources are limited. The EU is spending billions every year to promote the development of civil societies in the candidate countries and to help with the process of adapting to EU competition, environmental and social standards. In the period from 1990 to 2006, it will allocate a total of 136 billion euros to Central, Eastern and South-Eastern Europe, including the CIS states - truly a European Marshall Plan. Nor need Europeans be ashamed of either their civilian or military commitmentin the Balkans. At present the EU members in NATO have over 40,000 troops there - four times more than the US.

In everything that the EU and NATO do to enhance European security we seek partnership with a Russia in the process of democratization. Here lies one of the major transatlantic tasks in the 21st century. A country with Russia's history, size and importance must play a significant role in shaping European security. A democratic, market-oriented and modern Russia, fully integrated into the network of European security, is in the fundamental interests of both the US and the states of the European Union. Therefore, we must continue to do everything in our power to convince Russia that NATO is not directed against Russia, that this is not about hegemony or spheres of influence but merely about enhancing security, something which will benefit not least Russia at its western border. Security cooperation must thus be further developed, particularly in the NATO-Russia Council.

Ladies and Gentlemen,

The new US Administration has announced that it intends to pursue its policy of developing a national missile defense system, indeed that it wants to develop even further-reaching versions aimed at protecting troops posted abroad, as well as friendly allies. We want to sit down together and soberly analyze and examine with an open mind the conclusions to be drawn. NATO is the forum in which we can appropriately assess this and look for the right solution.

The question of a missile defense system is first and foremost a matter for the US to decide, but the international consequences will be far-reaching. We therefore gladly accept the offer made by the US to carefully consider with them the manifold implications of the development, construction and deployment of a missile defense system for the Alliance's security and for the future of international disarmament and arms control.

From the German government's standpoint there are three fundamental issues:

Firstly, the security and cohesion of the Atlantic alliance must be maintained and, where possible, strengthened.

Secondly, a new arms race must be prevented and further disarmament steps initiated.

Thirdly, the dense network of disarmament and non-proliferation treaties must be preserved, strengthened and expanded.
We welcome the growing awareness in the United States that major nuclear-weapon states must not be made to feel that a missile defense system is directed against them. The arguments put forward recently by Russia must therefore be carefully examined. A new arms race, for instance in Asia or in space, or an acceleration in the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction would create less rather than more security worldwide. Of course it must also be remembered in this connection that an arms project of this magnitude has a political impact long before it is implemented.

The German government will therefore work actively towards bringing about further determined nuclear disarmament steps accompanied by political initiatives aimed at the non-proliferation of weapons of mass destruction. Europe will make its contribution towards this, but it is above all the US and Russia which bear a major share of the responsibility. For us as a non-nuclear-weapon state, preventing proliferation through political instruments and, above all, international treaties will remain a cornerstone of our security.

The relationship between NATO and the EU, the completion of a pan-European order of peace and the outstanding issues surrounding a potential missile defense system - these are the major security issues which will dominate the transatlantic agenda in the coming years. Within NATO, we share the same interests in nearly all major issues. However, differing opinions are a natural part of any alliance. But if we continue to rely on mutual understanding and frank consultations in the spirit of transatlantic partnership, then we should succeed in reaching joint decisions on these questions, which are so important to us all.

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