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Executive Summary
Continuing Germany's effort to reach out to the new administration of
US President George W. Bush, Wolfgang Ischinger, State Secretary of the
German Foreign Office, outlined the top issues on which Berlin and Washington
should work together in the coming years. "Our objectives are clear,"
Ischinger said. "We want a politically and economically integrated
European Union which makes Europe stable on the inside and able to act
on the outside. European unification and the transatlantic partnership
are not two alternatives, but rather, two complementary processes."
Speaking at a symposium co-sponsored by the Aspen Institute in Berlin
in Janurary, he touched on the European Union's rapid-reaction force,
US plans for a national missile defense, burden-sharing in the Balkans
and increased European involvement in the Middle East Peace Process, among
other points.
The top issues facing decision makers in Germany and the US include:
European Security and Defense Policy -- The European Union's establishment
of a rapid-reaction military force should not be viewed by Washington
as competing with NATO or the US on security matters.
Engagement in the Balkans -- In the name of burden-sharing, Europe and
the United States should together continue their engagement in the Balkans
and should end this engagement together as well.
Strategic stability, proliferation and disarmament -- Germany would like
Washington to be open to comprehensive consultations on the US plans for
a national missile defense. Germany places particular emphasis on maintaining
mechanisms for nuclear arms control and disarmament, avoiding a new arms
race, and maintaining the Alliance.
NATO enlargement -- The eastward opening of NATO should also be the subject
of comprehensive talks.
Relations with Russia, China and the Middle East -- While relations with
Russia have long been on the transatlantic agenda, the need to discuss
policies toward China has increased. On the Middle East, Germany would
like the new administration in Washington to support the direct involvement
of Europe in the peace process.
Economy, environment and development -- Dialogue on European-US economic
issues should be expanded to include the vision for a free-trade area
across the Atlantic.
A translation of Ischinger's entire speech follows.
Translation:
Europe and the US:
What we expect from the new US Administration
Introductory talk by Wolfgang Ischinger,
State Secretary of the Federal Foreign Office,
at the Symposium of the Development and Peace Foundation
in association with the Aspen Institute Berlin,
26 January 2001
A week ago in Washington, George W. Bush was inaugurated as the 43rd
President of the United States. Here in Germany, we followed this transition
carefully because we have had very close links with the US for more than
fifty years now through the friendship of our peoples, the partnership
in the North Atlantic Alliance, but above all through our shared values
and interests.
In Cold War days, the partnership with the US was first and foremost a
strategic necessity for the Federal Republic of Germany. But from day
one, it was also much more, it was the expression of Germany's conscious
decision to belong at long last to the community of free nations in the
West. This is probably the central lesson we have drawn from the horrific
experiences in the first half of the 20th century.
The growing together of Europe after the Second World War is a historic
achievement for Europeans, a great success story. But it is also the fruit
of far-sighted American foreign policy. Today, ten years after German
reunification, which the then US leadership, the father of the current
President, was instrumental in bringing about, we can safely say that
we further developed the partnership with America and that Germany has
taken on new international responsibility. Together, we Europeans and
Americans helped end the bloody conflict in the former Yugoslavia. Together,
we made the Alliance into an effective instrument to transfer stability
to the East in the nineties. Together with the US, we managed to further
open up global markets within the WTO. Together, we want to reform the
United Nations to enable it to cope with the challenges it will face in
the new century. Together, we are committed to a more crisis-proof global
monetary and financial system. And together, we have to answer new global
questions, on climate protection, on disarmament and in many other fields.
The objectives, challenges and priorities of our relations have shifted
somewhat, yet one thing remains unchanged. Alongside the commitment to
the ongoing process of European unification, the transatlantic partnership
continues to be the second pillar of German foreign policy. The Federal
Government is following in the footsteps of previous governments by pursuing
a transatlantic policy and further developing priorities which have proved
their worth in difficult times and, also in the face of new tasks, will
be just as relevant in the future.
While a clear commitment to partnership on both sides of the Atlantic
cannot prevent differences in opinion cropping up, a solid partnership
has nothing to fear from constructive debate on issues. Our very ability
to find compromises and shared solutions even in cases of diverging opinions
proves the value of the German-American friendship.
Having made these general comments, allow me to address some expectations
and wishes to the new US Administration from Berlin and also from Europe.
I have six points to make although I would like to emphasize that these
points are merely examples rather than the whole story.
1. Support of the European Security and Defense Policy (ESDP)
We expect America to continue its commitment in Europe and keep defining
itself as a "European power". Europe needs the US. To quote
Joschka Fischer: "The great transatlantic security project of building
a lasting order of peace in Europe is still far from finished". It
is gratifying that the process of European integration has benefited from
far-sighted and unwavering support from Washington over the decades. At
the same time, the Americans have time and again called for the European
pillar of the North Atlantic Alliance to be strengthened.
The European Security and Defense Policy will be furthering this very
goal by creating the framework for the European Union to work together
with the US in both political and military terms on conflict prevention
and crisis management under appropriate burden-sharing arrangements. We
therefore hope America will continue to support this historic project
as we complete the process of European integration.
We hope Washington does not misinterpret the ESDP as a potential European
rival to NATO. The answer to the question whether the EU could politically
oppose the US with its own military decision-making structures - and what
consequences this could have for NATO - is "no". The opposite
is true. Since the ESDP strengthens the European pillar of NATO and NATO
depends on two vital pillars, the ESDP is making an essential contribution
to the future viability of the Alliance. For the European Alliance partners
and especially for the Federal Republic of Germany, the North Atlantic
Alliance remains the linchpin of our national defense, period. However,
Europe wants to be able to act in times of crisis when the US, for whatever
reason, does not want to be involved with its own military capabilities,
nothing more and nothing less. I do not see a risk of a strategic US-European
dispute on this issue. Nor should we conjure up such a risk.
2. Conflict prevention, crisis management and burden-sharing: joint engagement
in the Balkans
Anyone wishing to protect the North Atlantic Alliance from possible splits
will have an interest in Europe and America together continuing and wrapping
up their engagement in the Balkans which they started together: in together,
out together. I am pleased about comments by members of the new US Administration
at the Senate hearings which show that Washington is well aware of the
shared commitments in the Alliance. But I would not think much of a basic
system of burden-sharing under which the US wage war where necessary while
the European members of NATO do the cleaning-up afterwards, as this seems
to go against the solidarity and coherence of the Alliance. Do not misunderstand
me: this of course does not rule out the US and Europe doing all they
can together in the Alliance to further reduce KFOR and SFOR force levels,
whenever political developments and the security situation in the region
permit such a move.
The concept of burden-sharing is however not just relevant regarding relations
between the European and the American military presence in the Balkans.
Rather, it is also relevant in the case of non-military contributions
to the creation of a pan-European area of stability and particularly to
the reconstruction of South-Eastern Europe under the Stability Pact. On
the other side of the Atlantic, it is perhaps not yet widely known that
if the statistics in both categories are compared, Europe comes out better.
- With more than 40,000 troops, the EU members of NATO now have four times
as many soldiers in the Balkans as the US. As far as the percentages are
concerned, the ratio has considerably shifted in favor of the Europeans
since 1996 when they provided 60% of troops compared to today's 70%; conversely,
the US share has dropped from almost 40% to under 20%.
Of course, no one will deny that there are shortfalls in some military
fields on the European side, shortfalls which became clear during the
Kosovo conflict and which we are now working to overcome: strategic air
transport, satellite reconnaissance, communications, to name but a few.
I believe the ESDP project will make it easier for us in the coming years
to fill these "ability gaps" on the European side. In this respect,
the ESDP is not a burden but a boon for NATO's ability to act as a whole.
- In the civilian sphere, the European Union's political and material
expenditure on EU Eastern enlargement is often overlooked. But in actual
fact, no other project since the Marshall Plan 50 years previously has
aimed for the political and military stabilization and the economic and
social modernization of an entire region with the injection of such massive
financial resources. In other words, the European Union is dramatically
relieving the burden of the world power America with this historic project
which has freed Central and Eastern Europe from conflict and increased
its prosperity and will continue to do so. This is appropriate burden-sharing
in its truest, i.e. political, sense.
But Europe is also leading the field on the Stability Pact for South-Eastern
Europe. More than three quarters of civilian reconstruction aid for Kosovo
comes from the EU. The EU provides 74% of the budget for the UN mission
in Kosovo, compared with 12% paid by the US.
On key issues, therefore, we can enter the next round of the classic
transatlantic debate on burden-sharing with great confidence.
3. Strategic stability, proliferation and disarmament
What do we expect?
As regards NMD, we would like the new American Administration to be prepared
to engage in comprehensive consultations in the Alliance before taking
an ultimate decision. Let me quote the Federal Minister for Foreign Affairs
once more, who said in the German Bundestag last year: "It would
be a fallacy and thus a political error to deny the United States the
right to take steps it considers urgently necessary to guarantee its security.
This is a national decision for the US, but it has far-reaching international
consequences. We can therefore expect the US to take due account of the
various implications its decision on NMD will have for the other members
of the Alliance.
For the German Government, three central points must be kept in mind:
- Firstly, the dense network of mechanisms for nuclear arms control and
disarmament must be maintained and strengthened.
- Secondly, avoiding a new arms race is imperative.
- Thirdly, the cohesion of the Alliance has to be safeguarded."
End quote.
Of course, we in the Alliance have to continue examining together the
current and future risks and threat scenarios, not just with a view to
America, but also to Europe. Given that extraordinarily complex questions
of strategy, disarmament, foreign policy, technology, non-proliferation
policy and national budget priorities are at stake, the Alliance needs
time for this. Happily, Washington does not seem inclined to take a hasty
decision either, particularly in view of unresolved technological questions.
This is in line with our desire for comprehensive consultations. In this
way, I think it ought to be possible to prevent the NMD debate splitting
the Alliance.
I would also like to express another wish to America in the field of disarmament
policy. We hope the new Administration will not take a final negative
decision on the ratification of the Comprehensive Nuclear Test-Ban Treaty
(CTBT). For Germany as a non-nuclear-weapon state, the entry into force
of the Test-Ban Treaty remains an important goal. It is good news that
the new US Defense Secretary has announced he will consider the positive
stance of General Shalikashvili, the former Chairman of the Joint Chiefs
of Staff, when examining the matter. Perhaps the Treaty can be tabled
in Congress after all before the end of this legislative period.
4. NATO enlargement
The question of how the Alliance will continue its open-door policy towards
Central and Eastern European countries is of the same strategic importance
as the NMD issue. But we do not have to find a definitive answer today.
Thus, the Federal Government has not yet finalized its position given
the many candidates lining up to join. To my mind, it would be appropriate
initially to gear the discussion to the three questions we used as a basis
during the first enlargement round four years ago.
- Firstly, would accession to the Alliance be a security policy gain
for the candidate concerned?
- Secondly, would this accession mean a security policy gain for NATO?
- Thirdly, would this accession also strengthen security and stability
in Europe as a whole?
The Federal Government remains committed to the Alliance's open-door policy.
Given the strategic importance of this question, we hope here, too, there
will first be comprehensive consultations, not foregone conclusions -
on either side of the Atlantic.
5. Our relations with Russia, China, the Middle East and other regions
For decades now, the shaping and further development of relations with
Russia has been the classic topic for transatlantic consultations par
excellence. Admittedly, the Russia question has fundamentally changed
over the last decade - from one of strategic threat emanating from the
then Soviet Union to a Russia seeking its way into Europe in 2001. Thus,
as far as the US Administration is concerned, we hope we can take coordinated
action and pursue common approaches, not just on security policy within
the North Atlantic Alliance as has been the case to date, but also in
a wider sense on general, economic and financial policy. We now face the
great strategic task of accompanying Russia on its long journey to becoming
a democratic state based on the rule of law with market economy structures.
It is all about strengthening the institutions based on the rule of law,
supporting the economic reforms launched last year and Russian debts including
the role of the IMF. Surely it can only help if Moscow receives similar
signals from Washington as it does from Berlin or Brussels on issues such
as Chechnya, human rights and banking reform for example.
We hope for a joint political approach to Moscow borne by the spirit
of partnership and which does justice to Russian's understanding of its
own status and the dignity of the Russian people. We would like to see
readiness on both sides to make more intensive use of the potential of
the NATO Russia Founding Act which has yet to be fully tapped.
Unlike Russia, China has only seldom been on the traditional transatlantic
agenda. I believe, however, there is good reason to engage in more intensive
transatlantic dialogue in the future on Asia, not just because a stronger
US security policy focus on the Pacific rim would presumably have repercussions
on US commitment to Europe. It is important to introduce European positions
into the domestic debate in the US on whether China is to be defined as
a future partner or a future strategic rival and to keep this debate open
for transatlantic input from the beginning.
Moreover, to a certain degree, the same can be said of Iran, Iraq and
Afghanistan, for example. But I am not in a position to go into this further.
Regarding the Middle East, I would like to air a specific request to the
US Administration, and one which will surprise no one. We would like to
see the European offer to become directly involved in the Middle East
peace process, as demonstrated by the participation of Javier Solana,
the European Union High Representative, at the Sharm El-Sheik Summit in
autumn last year, to be accepted by the conflicting parties and actively
supported by Washington.
6. Economy, environment and development
In extending the transatlantic economic partnership, we hope that we will
not be lead astray and leave our joint course due to isolated trade conflicts
between Europe and America. The debate on the admissibility of financing
modalities for the Airbus A380 is a prime example of US-European competition
in the high-tech field of aircraft construction, but we must not allow
this to escalate into a political confrontation.
We believe such cases should be dealt with by the so-called early warning
procedure or through WTO dispute settlement. Here we hope for dialogue
on the basis of trust with the new US Trade Representative Robert Zoellick
whom many Germans remember as a very good friend from the days of the
Two plus Four Treaty. In my opinion, this dialogue should not be limited
to current problems but also cover longer-term visions such as the transatlantic
free-trade zone project.
What all this comes down to is the classic transatlantic interest of Europeans
in American readiness for comprehensive consultations with Europe. Despite
a European Union which is in a better position to act, despite a reunified
and stronger German partner and despite the disappearance of strategic
threats in Europe, this is just as true today as it was ten or twenty
years ago. Our objectives are clear. We want a politically and economically
integrated European Union which makes Europe stable on the inside and
able to act on the outside. European unification and the transatlantic
partnership are not two alternatives, but rather two complementary processes.
A stronger Europe is essential for a transatlantic partnership which is
mature for the tasks of the future.
But as long as we Europeans remain unable to give America one single telephone
number for Europe, the fundamental need for European coordination with
the world power America can only be satisfied if the US President and
his foreign policy team are prepared to take seriously not just consultations
within NATO, but also the EU-US summit meetings and their substructure,
and especially the broad-based bilateral consultations between Washington
and the European capitals, instead of making them take second place to
other priorities. For US-German relations, this means in particular:
- Firstly, the Federal Government and German Bundestag will, of course,
continue to seek out and foster dialogue at all levels in Washington.
- Secondly, alongside the classic transatlantic coordination mechanisms
in NATO, coordination and cooperation between the EU and the US are constantly
growing in importance. However, these mechanisms, just like NATO itself,
have to be oiled well, otherwise things will jam.
- Thirdly, we would like not just the US Secretary of State, Defense
Secretary, Trade Representative and other secretaries to visit Berlin
soon, but above all the new American President, the Vice-President and
as many members of the US Congress as possible. In more than one sense,
we call out to Washington: Berlin is worth it!
At the end of his contribution to the Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung on
US-German relations on January 19, Chancellor Schröder pointed out
a number of shared global challenges: bridging the divide between rich
and poor, meeting ecological challenges, the over-exploitation of natural
resources, climate change, the spread of epidemics, desertification, forced
migration, crime and terrorism. All these issues are on the agenda in
the United Nations, the G8 and other international and regional organizations.
Only if we strengthen the United Nations and increase its ability to act
will we be able to successfully tackle these tasks on a global scale.
We also want close cooperation with the US on the German commitment to
multilateralism, and to the strengthening and reform of the UN system.
To close, I will quote Chancellor Schröder: "These challenges
constitute the global agenda for the 21st century. I am sure these challenges
can only be met in close partnership between America and Europe. Consolidating
and developing transatlantic relations is a central prerequisite for the
peace and prosperity of people all over the world. ... Germany and America
can and will successfully master the great tasks of the 21st century.
President Bush and the new Administration in Washington know that they
have partners and friends in Berlin whom they can rely on."
That seems to me, Ladies and Gentlemen, to be a fitting conclusion.
Thank you very much.
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