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Interview with Federal Foreign Minister Frank-Walter Steinmeier in the Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung of 6 March 2006: The nuclear conflict with Iran, the situation in Iraq and European prospects
Minister, at the request of the Iranian side there was a final hurried meeting with you and the representatives of the two other EU-3 negotiating partners in Vienna; has Tehran now started to meet the international community's demands? We were prepared to meet Iran's negotiator Larijani again not least because we are in a critical phase – the IAEA Board of Governors meets from today. However, in spite of good and constructive talks, we unfortunately didn't hear any new and promising suggestions from the Iranian side. The situation is serious. What does this mean for the IAEA Board's consultations? Will Germany support the Board if it decides to refer the matter to the UN Security Council, and what aim will Germany pursue? As you know the Board already decided during its last meeting to inform the Security Council in New York about the Iranian nuclear programme, and Director General ElBaradei has now done just that. But the Council's involvement in our efforts in no way means the end of diplomacy – quite the contrary! Our aim clearly remains a diplomatic solution, and we hope Iran recognizes that a negotiated settlement is in its best interests. How do you think China, India and Russia will react now? We'll see what happens. In any case all the IAEA Board's decisions have been based on a very high level of international consensus. Our objective must be to maintain this solidarity, since I feel it is a major prerequisite for the success of our efforts. So up to now Russia, China, the EU-3, and the USA "from the sidelines", have all been pulling in the same direction? I haven't yet had any reason to doubt this. It took a great deal of effort to bring about this six-part constellation. It was a very positive experience to see that, even in conflicts where often quite different interests play a role in approaching a solution, we managed to define the overarching joint interest. And I'm confident that, if the Six stay together in this process, we will in the end achieve a solution. But I am enough of a realist to see that we will have to bolster this joint approach when consultations take place in the Security Council. Minister, the BND is alleged to have supplied the US military leadership with information and material. Are you sure that Saddam's secret plan and the sketch of the Baghdad defences weren't handed over by a German intermediary in Doha? We have drawn up a comprehensive report on the BND's tasks and actions during a special mission. This is unparalleled in Germany's history. This plan alleged to have been given to the Americans by the BND has not been found in spite of intensive research. Therefore I can and must assume that it was also not handed over by the BND. Did your staff examine the plan? This is the task of the intelligence services. Do you doubt the veracity of the document? One or two observers have pointed out that the "snail plan" is indeed a little "lacking in complexity". I'm not a military man, but even I have doubts about this sketch's value to a highly technological war operation. Whatever the result may be – I don't want to engage in speculation in my present function. In other words you don't want to even hypothesize on how this puzzle might be solved? You mean the question of whether someone in the USA is behind the publications? I'm not at all susceptible to conspiracy theories, and anyway I don't believe there is anybody "directing" all this in the background. So there isn't a recognizable, plausible aim? The US Administration cannot have any interest in hindering or indeed obstructing the necessary cooperation between the intelligence services. In turn, the German side has no interest in casting a new shadow over Atlantic relations or making anything impossible? No, not at all! If we look at the state of the world, we see a truly disturbing number of crises and conflicts ranging from Iraq, Iran, Afghanistan across to the southern Caucasus. To tackle these we need the closest possible international cooperation, which in turn requires stable transatlantic relations between Germany and the USA. Following the most recent attacks in Iraq there is a growing fear that a civil war could break out. Does the new German government see this as confirming its predecessor's policy, or do you have to take a new approach to this issue? It is true that our concern about the retention of Iraq's territorial integrity was a major reason for the decision we took at that time. But it is not a question of who will be proved right in the end. No-one in the region can have an interest in the complete destruction of the power balances in the Middle East. Right now, however, the first priority is the establishment of the government in Iraq. Only the most inclusive government possible, its legitimacy accepted by all ethnic groups, can in the final analysis succeed in permanently pacifying the situation and advancing reconstruction. The worst-case scenario would be the continuing estrangement of the ethnic groups, leading to the country's territorial integrity being called into question. For that reason the German government will do everything necessary and possible to ensure that the future Iraqi government gains international recognition. This is what we promised. What would our options be to influence this process from outside? Europe's and in particular Germany's options are of course limited. The main onus is on the leadership in Baghdad and on those also currently militarily represented in Iraq. What worries you more – Kurdish autonomy, which might lead to greater moves towards independence, or the creation of a larger Shiite province in the south? We have the impression that the Kurdish side is not questioning Iraq's territorial integrity. The Kurds seem not only to be interested in forming a joint government, but also to be actively participating in it. On the other hand, relations between Shiites and Sunni are of course characterized by the perception of violent conflict following the attack on the Shiite mosque and the subsequent violence and demonstrations. However, and this is the good news, there appear to be many Iraqi political leaders who see the danger of the country descending into civil war, and they have therefore decided not to aggravate the tensions between Shiites and Sunni but to continue working towards the establishment of a government. When a government is formed, would you then not have to support its international recognition by visiting Baghdad? I could imagine several methods of support, perhaps an invitation to a member of the Iraqi government to visit Germany or, at some time in the future, a visit by the German foreign minister to Baghdad. Do Iran's recent political activities have anything to do with Iraq's weakness? The regional environment surely plays a role, but I see the real cause in Iran's domestic developments. Think of the disappointment at former President Chatami's reform policy expressed in the last elections, and of their domestic political consequences. The reformers were no longer able to count on a parliamentary majority. Is there any kind of reformist group left in Iran today? Who can still give us a reliable answer to this question? The fact that the domestic political spectrum in Iran has shifted can be seen in that, during the last Presidential election, even former President Rafsanjani was being counted as a reformer. But there is something else in the foreground. There are at least two processes in Iran which possibly reinforce each other – the domestic political pressure for change on the one hand, and on the other the perception of change in the region, in Iran's neighbourhood, the presence of the "coalition of the willing" in Iraq and of the international community in Afghanistan. Of course, in Iran, a role in this perception was played by the fact that the success of the military intervention in Iraq did not take place as quickly as initially expected, and that it has led to growing rejection in the Arab world. The next problem is Israel. The Europeans and Americans agreed on their often-repeated three demands vis-à-vis the Hamas extremists following their victory in the Palestinian elections. Does the EU's recent decision to continue its financial assistance to the Palestinian Authority not clash with the demands for rejection of violence, recognition of Israel's right to exist and acceptance of the progress achieved in the peace process? No, we are acting on the basis of and within the scope of the Middle East Quartet's decisions. We said, firstly, that the three conditions you just mentioned have to be met; secondly, until the government in the Palestinian territories is formed, we have an interest in ensuring that in particular the Authority and President Abbas are not weakened. The recent EU decisions follow that line. These are expressly decisions which do not extend beyond the dates on which the government is formed and the government's programme is announced, but which are designed to accompany this transitional period. The Israeli government will not and indeed cannot have an interest in the EU completely withdrawing its humanitarian aid. Do you share the hope that a Hamas-led government will, given time, adopt a moderate and democratic line of conciliation with Israel? I haven't yet seen any real basis for this hope. I learned from my talks with President Abbas that in his view Hamas has to decide from the word go what direction it wants to take, whether it regards itself as being part of a political process or as a resistance movement. For that reason Abbas was not worried by the fact that we stated our three preconditions for cooperation so clearly. How strong, or how weak, is Abbas? Some people feared that if Hamas won the elections in the Palestinian territories, President Abbas would decide relatively quickly to resign. I got the impression from talking to him, however, that the opposite is true. He is more courageous than ever, and he is willing and hopefully able to put the government on a course which is in accord with the principles we envisage. We want to give him every possible assistance in achieving that goal. The joint efforts in the Middle East are meant to also reinforce transatlantic relations. Do the varying reactions in America and Europe regarding the "cartoon debate" not show that there are differences of opinion within the West? I don't think these differences are fundamental. I got the impression that what was said on the other side of the Atlantic was fairly similar to here. The American partners were agreed that freedom of opinion and of the press not only have a role in Western democracy but are at the very heart of our constitutional order. There were people there, as here, who stated that the basic rights and freedoms include freedom of religion and therefore precisely other people's right to exercise their religion, something that has to be respected. It would be naïve to think we could now return to business as usual in the dialogue of cultures and religions. However, after extensive talks with my colleagues in the Arab world, I felt that not only here but also there, partners are interested in helping to calm the situation and now in particular in intensifying the dialogue. But there does seem to be one difference between the Americans and ourselves – Washington is prepared to advance the democratization of the Middle East using external stimulus or pressure. In Cairo US Secretary of State Rice said that in this region America had for too long worked towards stability and concentrated too little on freedom. Is the European position not rather that movement in the Arab countries must come from within? I don't accept that there is a difference in approach here, along the lines of "Americans want democracy and Europeans want stability". Of course we must allow the Arab countries to choose their own route to democracy. Western paternalism leads to the opposite of what we want. But that doesn't mean we are forced to be passive. Our task is to work out how, in a process of mutual opening, we can help make our models of democracy, our open societies, known in the Arab world. We also want to help strengthen a process of open dialogue within the Arab and Moslem societies themselves. If they begin a debate about, say, the relationship between freedom of opinion and religion, this could have a greater impact than discussions along the lines of "Islam versus the West". While this is not quite the same as the American concept, it doesn't mean a total confrontation between a US and a European position. Do we have to accept that, as a result of free elections, Islamist parties can also come to power and remain there for a while at least, or perhaps even longer? The risk can never be ruled out, and therefore we cannot attribute it to one approach or another. The only important thing is that, apart from orientation towards democratic elections, we place equal emphasis on the establishment and consolidation of rule-of-law structures and institutions. We Europeans can, I'm sure, do even more in this regard! Let me return to the cartoons; you used the key phrase "dialogue of cultures". Did this not in reality constitute above all a collision of cultures, quite apart from the radicalization and instrumentalization of the protests by interested parties? If I have often stated that I hope the cartoon debate and the reaction to them by the Arab world does not mean that we are already in a clash of cultures, this statement also contains the fear that we may end up in one if there is no responsible policy on both sides to prevent it. But because I had the impression, in my talks with my European and Arab colleagues, that there are sufficient people willing to work towards a de-escalation, I hope that we can prevent a self-escalating process. Just recently you visited Ukraine, where you underlined that it was solely up to Ukraine to decide how far its rapprochement to the EU progressed. How far can Ukraine progress – to EU membership? I said in Kiev that we should not place each other under time pressure. I recommended that Ukraine welcome the fact that the EU has included it in the European Neighbourhood Policy mechanisms. This is no small matter, and it is in any case a necessary process with a view to Ukraine's desires regarding EU membership. Without a development which includes both economic upswing and rule-of-law reforms it will not be possible for Ukraine to get closer to membership or even candidate status. The speed at which it gets closer to the EU is determined by Ukraine itself; this applies equally to its rapprochement to NATO. The Balkan countries are in a similar position. French Interior Minister Sarkozy recently said in Berlin that referendums in France were essential before these countries, also including Croatia, joined the EU. Are we not building castles in the air by offering the Balkan countries the prospect of membership? We discussed this issue at the December European Council meeting, where the question was whether to give Macedonia candidate status. France agreed with this, and along with other countries pointed out that possible membership for the Balkan countries must be linked to a discussion on Europe's borders and identity. We will have to conduct this debate, and France will have to contribute towards it. But it is a fact that all members of the Kosovo Contact Group, which includes France, are agreed that the clarification of Kosovo's future status will be difficult or even impossible if the Western Balkan countries are deprived of a European perspective. In Berlin Sarkozy stated, more generally, that Europe needed to be sure of its borders if it wanted to become more dynamic. Would you agree? During the past thousand years Europe has never been sure of its borders – they have been laid down for religious, ethnic and political reasons and have constantly been discussed over the centuries but seldom accepted for longer periods. But we can of course discuss the borders of a supranational organization such as the EU and ask ourselves how large can Europe become and still be able to take decisions, shape events and take action in terms of its institutions? For this reason a debate is sensible, but it must be clear that the accession negotiations with Turkey cannot be the yardstick against which to measure the whole discussion about Europe's identity and borders. Since the EU has already decided to start accession talks with Turkey, we will in the long term have to take Turkish membership into account as a possible part of the enlargement process. It is a strange paradox – the EU remains attractive to countries outside, while inside, after the failed referendums on the constitution in France and the Netherlands, signs of crisis and isolationism can be seen. Looking at Europe we find it easy to describe the EU's development as a series of minor and major crises, and then, at regular intervals, as a hectic joint search for the "great European project". It isn't wrong to search, but I can only say that what Europe needs most are successes. This is why during the December European Council meeting we spent so much energy on reaching agreement on the EU's Financial Perspective. This is a success for Europe. Now the constitutional issue remains open, and the solution is unclear following the two failed referendums. But my French and Dutch colleagues both know that the question of the European constitution will arise with new urgency in particular prior to the next enlargements with Romania and Bulgaria. The current Austrian and subsequent Finnish EU Presidencies will now have to carefully sound out member states' interests, wishes and suggestions and discuss them – without making them public. And I advise them to avoid making premature proposals. I strongly advocate that we use the one-year reflection phase, stay with the project, not pronounce it dead in spite of some prophecies of doom, but revisit it in a new procedural proposal next year during the German Presidency. You've travelled the world … No, by no means all of it … … but a large part of it. You've visited the areas of relevance to German foreign policy, as has Chancellor Merkel – is there a new German foreign policy? It is obvious that a new government, containing different parties and people, will have a new approach. The decisive aspect for me – and my phrase about the "continuity of German foreign policy" refers to this – is that the basic tendencies of Germany's foreign policy are maintained. So would you say that the new approach is also a new style? Could you be more precise? The previous government pursued foreign policy with greater rhetorical effort. Now, it seems, a certain pragmatism, a more sober, solution-oriented approach is being used. Politics – and this also means foreign policy – has to be presented in a manner appropriate to those responsible for it and representing it in public. I therefore try to find the way in which I help shape foreign policy which best suits me. This also has to do with the way in which Germany can and in my opinion should pursue foreign policy in the world. We must bring the high degree of recognition we have into line with our options. This results in what I call "self-confident humility". We should participate in the processes going on in the world with this in mind, and this participation need not be minor. I believe this is particularly true at the moment, in a situation where the hard work definitely comes before the show, where we must overcome a series of crises ranging from the Middle East via Iran to the "frozen" conflicts in the southern Caucasus. This is indeed not a situation where one could sell nebulous plans about how to reform the world.
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