Interview with Foreign Minister Joschka Fischer
in the "Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung"
of 17 March 2003

F.A.Z.: Mr Fischer, in 1919 Paul Valéry asked if Europe should be what it appears to be, namely a promontory of Asia, or if it should be what it is in our eyes, namely the cradle of human civilization, the home of our particular brand of spirituality and intellectualism. You yourself have recently pointed out that Europe is a peninsula protruding from Asia. Have you settled on Valéry's first option?

Fischer: I didn't have Valéry in mind when I said that, I was thinking in purely geographical terms. Europe is the West, together with the United States and Canada. There is no doubt about that and that is what is so special about transatlantic relations. But Europe has a problem in determining its eastern border. Right from the start this demarcation has been more or less cultural or arbitrary. Europe has clear boundaries to the north, west and south. But to the east we are part of the Eurasian continent, a fact which is reflected in the difficult debate about enlarging the European Union. I do not share the alternative set out by Valéry, because he pits a cultural Europe against a politically dependent Europe. Europe has emerged from its wars of hegemony that reached their dreadful, industrialized low points in the First and Second World Wars. We have entered a new phase. You could almost speak of a return to pre-nineteenth century Europe, in other words to the period before nation-states emerged and nationalist mass-movements left their deeper marks. When one looks at the European Union today its inner workings may well be compared with Goethe's pre-revolutionary Europe.

The conflict over Iraq is causing speculation that after the present crisis we will not be able to recognize the world and its intellectual infrastructure which has so far bound us to America. Instead, this reasoning goes, there will be new enmities and a redefinition of European policy.

I represent a more optimistic view of history than some neo-conservative American thinkers such as Robert Kagan, and I see no alternative whatever to the transatlantic relationship. The end of the Cold War marked the end of a struggle for global hegemony between America and the Russian Empire (which renamed itself the Soviet Union following Lenin's revolution) that reached far beyond the continent of Europe. Since then we have had a new world order, but this must not lead us back to the nineteenth century and a pentarchy, to power politics turned global where the balance between the great powers is sought in changing alliances. It would be terrible if it came to that.

What is the alternative?

A global domestic policy. A world with six billion and soon more people with the most diverse cultures, nations and languages cannot be organized peacefully by applying the old European great power rivalries at global level. Every power must be integrated into a multilateral system. I see no contradiction between the United Nations and the power of the United States, either. We need both.

The views coming out of America are very different however. It is said there that the United Nations is just a means of restricting America’s national sovereignty. A unilateral war against Iraq, which President Bush probably wants to wage, is part of this logic. Your vision of a balanced, multipolar world is perceived there as a threat.

The world is more complicated than easy-to-swallow simplifications or ironies make it appear. I do enjoy reading the culture section of newspapers but it is precisely on those pages that we are served this sugared wine. Politicians may get some ideas there, but they are faced with a reality that is much more complicated than that ...

... although it was Chancellor Schröder who served wine to interviewers from Der Spiegel, informing them about the secret Franco-German plan on Iraq named "Mirage", which you knew nothing about at the Munich Conference on Security Policy.

I utterly reject that. I have something else in mind. In my four years in office I have experienced how essential the power of the United States is for global and regional stability. I have seen it in the Indo-Pakistani conflict, in the Balkans, in the Middle East and in East Asia. The argument is not about that. It would be a major problem if the United States withdrew into itself. If the reasons for a war against Iraq are not adequate but it is nevertheless waged with all the negative consequences, then I am worried that in the medium term this could lead to isolationism, to decisions to that effect in Congress and to a corresponding mood among the American population.

So America never seems to be able to do the right thing. It is accused of imperialism if it plays a global role and of isolationism if it withdraws.

There is a heated debate in America, heated, above all, because of the experience of 11 September. Following the attacks, the world’s status quo was strongly called into question, a view which I share. It is now a question of whether one attempts to create a new order within some countries from the outside, with military might and at great risk, or whether one chooses the cooperative approach favoured by us which is anything but toothless or powerless. Fortunately, the United States has a built-in pendulum that tends to swing back to the centre.

What then is the difference between the war against Afghanistan and the war against Iraq?

There was a direct link between 11 September and Kabul, leading us to realize that we must not forget regional conflicts nor tolerate terrorist hotbeds and new fundamentalist ideologies. The argument that we are currently having, which I regret to say has never really been an open one, concerns the question whether the strategy of essentially acting alone using military force will really lead to a sustainable solution to the problems. That is my main worry and objection since my trip to Washington on 18 and 19 September 2001 when the American Deputy Secretary of Defense Paul Wolfowitz told me at the Pentagon ...

... that Iraq should be taken on first and then Syria, Iran ...

I don’t want to go into details about that but just point out that this difference of opinion on a specific issue will not lead to a new world order, let alone with an "axis" Berlin-Paris-Moscow- Beijing (...). If Moscow or Beijing had the same position as America, no-one would think of talking about a new "axis".

But isn’t the American government, whose doctrine is to prevent any other country becoming a superpower, forcing the creation of new alliances, maybe even an alliance of the major powers of the Eurasian continent?

The old European system of states and the power games they played have their attraction from a theoretical point of view, a mechanism that worked under the conditions of pre-industrial Europe with its limited cabinet wars, its mercenary armies in the intermediate period between 1648 and the industrial revolution. But this will not be the world of tomorrow because there is the United Nations, that fascinating institution, and there are other multilateral structures as well. Today, we are far too dependent on each other economically and culturally for the nineteenth century system of powers to globalize just like that.

Where then do you see the greatest challenge, if not in the rivalry between the powers?

In the confrontation of open societies, states based on the rule of law and secure regions faced by an asymmetric threat. This is why I consider Iraq to be a distraction, at any rate not the main threat. If you look at the logic of 11 September, it is clear that the terrorists do not want to break the strategic power of America directly, because they would not be capable of this in any case, rather they were aiming to provoke a reaction from this great world power which was to have the desired impact in the Middle East. And they targeted the open nature of our society. A real danger emerges if the four elements religious hatred, nationalism, weapons of mass destruction and terrorism converge. All these elements are present for example in the Indo-Pakistani conflict which is why I consider it to be one of the most dangerous regional conflicts.

The last few months of outright confrontation between one-time allies have not made it look as if a return to the paradigms of the nineteenth century can be ruled out.

Such a return is not ruled out on ideological grounds, as we can see with Mr Kagan pursuing this objective right now! And he’s firing off all sorts of bizarre notions as he does so. The rubble and ruins of the Second World War were literally the adventure playgrounds of my youth. To portray our stance as the Blue Flower of the Romantics is thoroughly mistaken because that stance reflects the bitter experience of a continent. To claim that we in Berlin are from Venus is nothing short of bizarre. Look, I pass the Invalids’ Cemetery in the centre of Berlin when I go jogging. This is our Arlington. The Berlin Wall cut right through it. This cemetery was one of the saddest places along the border between the different political sectors of Berlin. Kagan’s claim that Europeans are from Venus and Americans from Mars suddenly came to my mind the other day, and I thought: no, we Europeans survived Mars and are now trying to adapt somewhat to the realities of Earth.

The Berlin Invalids’ Cemetery also contains the grave of one of Kagan’s forerunners, [the 19th century nationalist historian Heinrich von] Treitschke.

You know, maybe you should invite Kagan to have a look there. Seriously, though, the origins of the position on Iraq of an influential part of the Republican Party goes back long before 11 September. It contrasts with the position of many Europeans who share the viewpoint of the elder President Bush and Brent Scowcroft. You can read in the autobiographies of Colin Powell and General Schwarzkopf why they did not march on Baghdad at the end of the Gulf War in 1991. The argument still applies: you may know how to go in with superior military force, but not how to come out again. The risks are more terrorism and the balkanization of the entire region.

You gave a speech two years ago in an unofficial capacity at the Humboldt University in Berlin in which you sketched out a different Europe to the one of recent months which has been chaotic and divided. How differently would a truly united Europe have dealt with the conflict over Iraq?

Looking at it from today’s perspective, I can only underline what I said then: that the pressure from outside, which makes it necessary to change the European structures, is important. This pressure has become the dominant factor today. It is clear that the point of view of the young democracies of central and eastern Europe is different from that of the old member states whose people have been able to witness on a day-to-day basis how Europe has continually developed and who have become older in the process, like my generation. When Charles de Gaulle came to Ludwigsburg I lived only a few kilometres away. I was only a little boy in short trousers then, but this visit remains a vivid memory for me and marked the beginning of a continuous process of watching Europe grow closer together. Naturally, the people of Poland and the Czech Republic have a completely different perspective. They spent fifty years trying to resist de facto foreign domination.

A representative of this other Europe, György Konrád, the writer and President of the Academy of Arts in Berlin poured you some sugared wine in our newspaper's culture section writing that one should not give free rein to oppressors like Saddam ...

He had a different view during the Kosovo war.

He said that he had learnt from you.

I hope that he will continue to do so ...

Is it now just down to your "I am not convinced" statement at the Munich Conference which was repeated endlessly on American television? Is it now only about being convinced?

I learned from America about the stubborn nature of democracy. Democracy is stubborn even when it errs, although it errs less often than other political systems. This stubbornness becomes most visible when it comes to fundamental matters of principle, and these fundamental principles include war and peace. Twice - in Kosovo and in Afghanistan - Chancellor Schröder and myself led this country into war, and twice we had to put the very existence of our Government on the line. But I cannot advocate a war I do not believe in, especially when I see how the justifications for it are constantly changing. I may be wrong, but I am not convinced about this war and the priorities that have been set.

Since it is now likely that this war will take place, what is going to happen afterwards?

We can only hope that when it happens the casualty numbers are relatively low. The United States has the might to win a war like this. I am worried about the humanitarian consequences, about an increase in terrorist attacks, about regional stability. Through this war, America would be assuming responsibility for [Iraq's] territorial integrity and the entire region - this will be a commitment that will last for years or even decades. Here in Germany, the commitment - under quite different circumstances - lasted for five decades.

Is one of the reasons that you might concede you could be wrong the possibility that a war against Iraq might end quickly and victorious for America and that neither the United Nations nor NATO would suffer substantial damage in the medium term?

I have never said that these institutions are in a substantial crisis. The idea that such proven institutions might be doomed is not one that I share.

How unimportant has Europe become for the Americans in the last few months now that even the idea of renouncing British support has been raised?

Only a few people claim that Europe is irrelevant. Richard Pearle says five times a week that Germany is irrelevant. That is exactly four times too many to take him seriously. Incidentally, I have a problem with you talking of "the Americans". OK, let's say the American Government ... But even there I would take a closer look.

Fine, but hasn’t the American empire made us feel how unimportant it considers us?

Oh, please, the United States is really not an empire. I know of no less imperially-oriented political culture than America's. Rather, it is a culture that looks in on itself, which wants to get away from the rest of the world. The idea of a European country, and ours in particular, or Russia or China having a similar degree of power would give me nightmares. The more one gets to know this democracy with its fifty states, the less I would speak of an empire. But to answer the point of your question, Europe is unimportant from America’s perspective in military terms, but not economically or politically.

What does this say then about Europe’s military strength?

America’s military superiority is not the result of some great strategic master plan cooked up by dark forces to rule the world, but a fact which has emerged in the course of history. Thus I am not stirring up anti-American sentiment when I say that we Europeans must also become stronger in this area. We must strengthen these capabilities, too, although we should certainly not try to compete with America and we will certainly not reach the same level as America in this respect. We must strengthen our military power so that we can be taken seriously in this area as well. We must set new, different priorities together with our European partners and undertake even greater efforts to this end. Naturally, the issue of security cannot be narrowed down to the military dimension.

What should Europe learn from the rift which opened up recently over messages of solidarity and counter-statements?

We Europeans will not give up the stubborn nature of our democratic nation-states. We feel at home in them. We will always be Germans and Europeans, Greeks and Europeans, Poles and Europeans. There will not be Europeans as such, but always only in the dual form of belonging to a nation while also belonging to Europe. Anything else defies reality. This also means that we Europeans will always have differing opinions, differing points of view, differing political cultures and so on. What counts is the method that brings us together ...

... in other words that no country goes public with positions without prior consultation?

If the eight had informed the presidency it would have been more correct.

But the Chancellor was the person who started it by proclaiming global policy from the market place.

Well, everybody takes national positions. But the European Convention now provides us with a major opportunity to look towards the future and draw our conclusions. The Convention has now become more important than ever. Naturally, we should not pursue a homogeneous position at all costs, but we need a commitment to act jointly if there are serious changes in strategic relations.

The opposition accuses you of being responsible for the biggest breakdown in transatlantic relations since 1945.

There is no breakdown, and repeating this claim does not make it any more true.

This is in the same vein as the words of President George W. Bush: "Either you are with us, or you are against us. Was this mere propaganda?

That is not the attitude of the US Administration in its dealings with us. There are harsh tones in the American media, and "French fries" become "freedom fries", but this has not carried over into dealings between the Governments.

Bush has also said that others had written the history of civilization so far, now we are writing it. You can’t ignore that ...

The United States has been writing world history since its arrival on the world stage and even during its creation. Think of the Declaration of Independence and the development of American democracy. This great country has an impact far beyond its own borders and has an impact on Europe. And it’s the same the other way around: the United States is unthinkable without Europe. At Mount Vernon, the house of George Washington, the informed visitor notices something particular. There is a key that hangs there, the key to the Bastille - a present from Lafayette.

Will Germany participate in nation-building in Iraq after the war?

We are concentrating on trying our utmost to keep the peace. Any further decisions will be made when the time comes. The United Nations will always be able to count on us. That has been the case in the past, and that will remain so.

Iraq is only one conflict among many and in America there seems to be a revised concept of prevention in the light of 11 September.

I understand the trauma of the Americans after the attacks of 11 September very well. But the concept of prevention cannot be stretched in any which way you please. What I very much regret is that we did not have a strategic debate across the Atlantic in good time and that no genuine exchange of views took place.

How significant is the current turning-point in world history?

I am paid among other things to think the unthinkable but the emphasis is on thinking and not speaking. It is pointless to speculate about this, because everything is in flux. The intellectual debate conducted on both sides of the Atlantic will, in the end, when all the excitement has died down, make it clear again just how important transatlantic relations are for both sides, also in the future. As a good leftist who has become a reformer, I have learnt to orient myself to interests. If I look at the world of the 21st century, I see no fundamental changes in the interests of North America and Europe. But I see a constant reminder that we must not forget, repress and ignore experience. Beyond the big party that took place in the First World in the 1990s, there loomed forgotten conflicts, and that’s why a new totalitarianism raised its head in Afghanistan. That cannot be allowed to happen again.

You are not afraid of a new world order?

If it is designed to be cooperative and multilateral, then I consider such a world order to be more urgent and more necessary than ever. Put it this way: the correct notion of a new world order put forward by the father of today’s President has not so far been understood. As well as international security, we will only be able to solve such major problems as over-population, the earth’s climate, unemployment, globalization and bioethics if we act together. Thus, we are truly moving towards a global world domestic policy, but as always when history moves, when the interests of millions or even billions of people are re-oriented then this does not happen without frictions.

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