Continuity more decisive for German foreign policy than change
Changes in Germany's role and responsibilities
Europe as a response to history and a requirement for shaping the future
Why still (more) Europe today?
Institutional reform and the Convention on the Future of Europe
Europe as a political subject
Europe as a "federation of nation-states"
Europe's growing role and responsibility in the world
Overcoming new global challenges
The situation in the Middle East
Completion of European integration as the most important aim of German foreign policy

It gives me great pleasure to have the honour of addressing you here today in Weimar's Nationaltheater. It is natural for any visitor to refer to the dual symbolism of this town which is so loaded with history, since there are few other places in Germany where the best and the very worst of our history come so close together geographically as they do here. Weimar: the home of the great poets, of German Classicism and the Enlightenment, the home of our country's first democratic constitution. And Weimar, in whose immediate vicinity the ideals of the enlightenment and democracy were buried at Buchenwald concentration camp. Thinking about German responsibility, the future of our democracy and of the nation-state presents a special challenge, particularly here. I was therefore very glad to accept the invitation to speak here.

Where does Germany stand now 12 years after reunification and the end of the cold war? What will become of the European Union half a century after its founding? What impacts will the geopolitical changes, whose witness we are, have on the fate of our country and of our continent? What responsibility does a united Germany have in view of its history and location and what opportunities do we have to help shape the destiny of our country and of Europe? What role should Germany play, and what role should Europe play, in tomorrow's world?

These questions are among the most important for German foreign policy at the start of the new century. If I make some observations about these questions, it is not because I am proposing an academic debate, but rather to take a look with you at the real world of foreign policy, because very specific, strategic decisions must be made in this and the coming years. We find ourselves in a formative phase of both European and German history.

Continuity more decisive for German foreign policy than change

Let us start with Germany. Despite all the changes and upheavals of the past several years, one cannot ignore the fact that the forces of continuity have remained much more decisive for German foreign policy than those of change. The fundamental constants – location, interests, values and history – have all stayed the same. In view of our history and the high degree of international meshing of German policy, continuity and reliability in foreign policy constitute primary and not just secondary virtues. The trust and predictability which the Federal Republic of Germany has built up with its neighbours and partners over the past 50 years can only be preserved by continuing with a responsible policy of cooperation and by facing up to our responsibility for our history.

Changes in Germany's role and responsibilities

At the same time, our country's role and responsibilities have changed noticeably. This development is most obvious in the deployment of German soldiers in Kosovo, Macedonia and Afghanistan. There is no doubt that these missions represent an historic turning point for our country, in that they have turned the long held demand for greater responsibility into concrete policy. And yet the military aspect is just a small, if highly visible and at times justly controversial part of the change that is political at its core. In Germany, as in Europe, the primacy of politics remains decisive.

The process of European integration, the chance to repeat in the east what was achieved in the west after 1945, globalization, the instabilities of a world in upheaval, and new world-wide challenges including international terrorism cannot but affect German foreign policy. The need for re-evaluation, for greater involvement within and also beyond Europe's borders, cannot be denied, and must take account of the increased weight of our country and the high expectations of our partners. Since reunification, Germany's importance has increased more than many Germans realize, even today. As Foreign Minister, I am reminded of this time and again. To deny that this objective potential has increased would be foolish, dishonest and would promote mistrust, not trust.

The question, then, is how the united Germany can deal with this increased influence as wisely and responsibly as possible. The starting point of my thoughts is that Germany, on account of its history, is not in a position to make independent initiatives or to play its own pro-active world politics. Our constants must remain prudent self-restraint, a clear rejection of any kind of renationalization of foreign policy and, in particular, dedicated commitment to completing European integration. It is obvious, too, that in the future Germany will be called upon more frequently when massive human rights violations occur and when peace and security are endangered. Military assistance can be called upon from Germany as a last resort. We have debated this point often and hard in the last few years. Yet Germany's key contribution must be political, and above all it must be made within the European framework. This is not merely a consequence of our history. It is also the pragmatic view that we will have a real opportunity to use our foreign policy for shaping developments only in cooperation with our European partners and only if we are genuinely committed to implementing peaceful policies based on human rights, democracy and social justice.

Europe as a response to history and a requirement for shaping the future

Nothing has changed the development of Germany or of Europe so profoundly and with such lasting effect as European integration, which began 50 years ago among the ruins of the Second World War. With it began an entirely new era in Europe, or, to be more precise, in Western Europe. It is even possible to say that European history underwent a complete about-turn.

European integration was the response to centuries of a precarious balance of powers on this continent, which again and again resulted in terrible hegemonic wars culminating in the two World Wars between 1914 and 1945. The core of the concept of Europe after 1945 was and still is a rejection of the European balance-of-power principle and hegemonic ambitions of individual states that had emerged following the Peace of Westphalia of 1648, a rejection which took the form of closer meshing of vital interests and the transfer of nation-state sovereign rights to supranational European institutions.

It is precisely the German perspective that shows us just how indebted our country is to European integration: along with a liberal, democratic order at home, the western part of our country was also granted, post 1945, what the historian and Nobel peace prize-winner Fritz Stern famously termed Germany's "second chance". "The new Germany is not alone. It is joined politically, economically and, at last, intellectually to the West, to Europe." This radical new policy of European integration paved the way for Germany's return to the international community following the darkest chapter of its history. German reunification would have been impossible without prior reconciliation with our neighbours. The answer to the question "Where is Germany?" was formulated by Konrad Adenauer and France in the West, and by Willy Brandt and Poland in the East. It is this question which brought so much violence and suffering to our neighbours and to ourselves in the first half of the 20^th century.

Since this Europe is the answer to our history and geography, completion of European integration is more than just one foreign policy project among many. It is inseparable from the correct response to the "German Question" and therefore has ultimate priority in the larger Germany of the "Berlin Republic".

Why still (more) Europe today?

But why – as is occasionally asked – do we still need Europe today, and maybe even more Europe? Haven't we long since achieved all our goals – peace, prosperity, stability? The answer lies not only in the division and self-destruction of Europe and in the lessons of our history. It can also be found in the present and in the future. In view of its location, size and importance, Germany can use its weight in a way that will not alienate it again from its neighbours only in the joint European institutions. Only the European Union can provide the framework for the historic opportunity of uniting Europe through granting membership to the Central and Eastern European democracies. The EU alone is in a position to develop effective responses to globalization, which was long underestimated here in Germany because it emerged parallel to German unification, but which has developed as a challenge for our democracies' capacity to steer and to act.

The crucial question that arises is whether we, as individual nation-states in the 21^st century, are able to play not just the economic but also the political role we will have to play in the interests of our peoples and our societies. My answer to that, shaped as it is above all by my experience as Foreign Minister, is a clear "No". If we do not come together, then, quite simply, we will not be in a position to play the role we must play in our own best interests. And so, for me, European integration is not simply a response to the failures and contradictions of the European system of states of the past, but above all else an essential means to shape the future, without the need for us to give up our individual identities, or for the nations to lose themselves in it.

So the question of why we need Europe seems to me relatively easy to answer. A much more difficult question is what kind of Europe do we want? In other words: how should Europe be organized?

Monetary union
The step we took on 1 January was without doubt epoch-making. The euro was introduced as a means of payment, and many national currencies were replaced by a single, European currency. For the people of Europe this is a hugely important experience. For the first time, "Europe" has become a tangible part of the everyday lives of hundreds of millions of Europeans, and is shaping their experience. But we have not reached the end of the story in this area either. Although, for the time being at least, a common currency clearly works without a common government, the existence of the euro will put considerable pressure on the European Union to integrate further. Following the euro's introduction, the EU must also come together on a common economic and social policy, so that its evolved model of society, with its unique combination of welfare state, market economics and democracy, can be preserved even in the global economy.

Eastern enlargement
The second great challenge we face is to overcome the division of Europe, through opening up the European Union beyond the old Iron Curtain. For all its phenomenal success, European integration has a decisive shortcoming, forced upon it by history: it was not the whole of Europe, but merely its free part in the West. For fifty years, the division of Europe cut right through Germany, and on the eastern side of the Berlin Wall and the barbed wire an indispensable part of Germany and Europe, without which European integration could never be completed, waited for its chance to take part in the European unification process. That chance came with the end of the division of Europe and Germany in 1989/90.

The final component of European unification, the formal accession of the countries of Central and Eastern Europe into the EU, must finally be put in place, 12 years after the fall of the Berlin Wall. This constitutes a great challenge for the candidates, because it is not merely about joining an international organization, but about gradually moving their economies and societies towards the European Union – an extremely complicated process which poses difficult problems of adaptation both for the candidate states and for the EU itself.

This arouses fear and anxiety in our citizens, particularly in border regions: will their jobs be at risk? Will enlargement make Europe even less transparent and comprehensible? How are the difficult reforms in EU agricultural and structural policies to be implemented? As seriously as we must tackle these questions, we must never lose sight of the historic dimension of eastern enlargement. For this is a unique opportunity to unite our continent, wracked by war for centuries, in peace, security, democracy and prosperity.

EU enlargement is in the vital interests of Germany. The risks and temptations objectively inherent in our country's size and central situation can only be lastingly and definitively overcome through EU enlargement. Moreover, enlargement, as experience from every accession so far and particularly from enlargement to the south shows, is a pan-European programme of growth. The German economy, especially, will benefit greatly from enlargement in terms of business and employment. The united Germany, which, after all, owes its unity not least to Poland, the Czech Republic and Hungary, also has a historic, moral responsibility for the realization of eastern enlargement, the true reunification of Europe.

The Federal Government is therefore committed to negotiations on accession being concluded as soon as possible. In Nice and Gothenburg, the presidents and heads of government of the EU member states called for the first round of accession talks to take place before the next European elections are held in early summer 2004. In accordance with Commission plans, ten states could then join the EU as new members. A further opening of NATO to the east is already on the agenda for the end of this year. So in a good two years, we might have reached the point where the vision of the whole of Europe united in peace, democracy and prosperity has become reality. Even if there will still be much to do, especially in South-Eastern Europe, it will be an enormous and historic advance.

Institutional reform and the Convention on the Future of Europe

The European Union will only be successful in this, the biggest enlargement in its history, if it also finds the courage to carry out fundamental reforms on its internal, institutional structure and so develop further in the direction of deeper integration. Thanks to an intense debate in all the European countries, this insight has now become common knowledge throughout Europe. In fact, there is only one alternative to such fundamental reform, and that is the loss of Europe's capacity to act – and that would be disastrous, above all for Germany.

Internal reform is at the core of the work of what has been designated the "Convention on the Future of Europe", which commenced its work on 1 March. The establishment of the Convention is an important and unprecedented step. By taking it, the EU has not only entered new procedural territory and integrated the parliaments more than ever into a central reform project – itself a significant step –, but it has also taken on the responsibility of answering fundamental questions, such as: how can decisions be made effectively in a Union of 25 or more member states? Which decisions must be taken at the European level, and which by the member states? What roles should be allotted to the national parliaments and to the European Parliament, and how should power be balanced between the various European institutions? We have expressly set ourselves the objective of a constitution for the European citizen, nothing less in fact than the creation of a genuine European democracy.

Three issues are central to the Convention's work:

1. The so-called distribution of competences between the EU and the nation-states: this only superficially deals with responsibilities and questions of power and bureaucracy. It is not my intention to devalue the significance of these, but the debate on competences actually goes much deeper. At its root is the question "Does the nation-state still have a future?" Particularly here in Weimar, which of all places stands for a failed attempt at a German nation-state, it is important to me to emphasize that the European nation-state has by no means served its time. No-one wants to abolish it. No-one wants to homogenize the precious heritage of European languages, traditions and cultures, and no-one wants to create a European super-state. But the changed world situation will force the European states into deeper integration in key areas of common interest – external and internal security, the single currency, the single judicial area.

2. More democracy in Europe: today, "Europe" is involved ever more directly in the everyday lives of citizens, without them knowing who has decided what, and to whom they should attribute these decisions. The EU today is no longer merely a union of states, but also of citizens, in other words a union of states and citizens. Nevertheless, European decisions are still almost exclusively made by the states. Thus there is a democratic deficit in the EU which needs rectifying. This can be achieved by strengthening the rights of the European Parliament and improving the integration of the national parliaments into European decision-making.

3. The reform of the decision-making mechanisms: this may sound dry but behind it is political dynamite. If there is no real reform, the EU's capacity to act will, to put it pointedly, be limited by enlargement. As a result, the Union will be left with only an erosion of its continued existence, or further integration. Standing still is not an option. In a Union enlarged to 25 or more member states, the existing decision-making mechanisms, which long ago reached their working limits, must undergo fundamental reform or an enlarged EU will very quickly cease being able to function. This is true for the Commission, the European Parliament, but above all for the European Council.

Europe as a political subject

How does a Union of 25 or more retain its capacity to act under the conditions of globalization? The answer to this vital question for our continent and our country depends on whether we can succeed in creating Europe as a political subject for those things which must be decided and implemented at the European level. A subject which is democratically transparent and legitimate, which is understood and accepted by its citizens and which is fully capable of acting in the 21^st century world.

Europe as a "federation of nation-states"

The future shape of Europe is not yet set, but a particular form must be found for Europe which is based on a grand compromise between Europe on the one hand and the nation-state on the other. What form could it take? A confederacy of states? But then the European level would be too weak. A federal state? This will not be practicable for the foreseeable future. Thus there is much to be said for a middle way, for the idea of a "federation of nation-states", a genuine division of sovereignty between the federal and national levels. It could ensure the EU's capacity to act following its enlargement, without casting doubt on the evolved diversity of the European nations. At the same time, it would be a fruitful compromise between the various political traditions of the European states, which must be preserved.

Europe's growing role and responsibility in the world

Allow me, in this context, to talk about another area of European policy which is no less important for our future: Europe's growing role and responsibility in the world. Virtually nowhere is the need for common action so clear and so uncontroversial as in foreign policy. Europe's response to globalization, which affects not just business and finance, but every area of life, must be to redefine its place in a changing world. The European nations, including the largest among them, will only be able to bring their interests to bear in the world effectively if they act in unity. There are countless examples of this, from trade and environmental policy right through to the Common Foreign and Security Policy.

But it is not just about interests. Europe is a continent of values which have evolved over centuries, of human rights, democracy, the rule of law, and a unique social system founded on the principle of the social market economy. We want to preserve this legacy in Europe, and we want our convictions and values to have a chance throughout the world in the 21^st century.

At the start of the new century, the challenges and priorities for German and European policy have changed dramatically. Today, the most important, almost utopian goal of uniting the old continent of Europe in peace, freedom and stability is about to be achieved with the imminent eastern enlargement of the EU and NATO. Even in the Balkans, which throughout history have repeatedly been the scene of bloody conflicts and were also the starting point of the First World War, peace and democracy have taken root – in Serbia and Macedonia now as well. There is still a long way to go on the road to Europe, but crucially, the people of South-Eastern Europe can finally hope for a better life, as equal members of the united Europe.

Overcoming new global challenges

Parallel to this truly paradigmatic turning point in Europe, however, new threats and dangers have emerged, creating completely new challenges for us, mostly from outside our continent. This fact, which essentially had been evident for some time, was made brutally obvious to everyone by the dreadful terrorist attacks of 11 September. This tragic day now stands as a symbol of the fact that we now well and truly live in one world, that no country, either in America or Europe, is invulnerable any longer, and that we can no longer afford to close our eyes to "failing states" and "black holes" within the political and social systems of our planet. Notwithstanding the tragedy of 11 September, the realization of our existential interdependence offers us a chance to start a new era of global cooperation and multilateralism. Who, if not the united Europe, can and should lead the way on such a mission?

Overcoming these global challenges must increasingly become the priority for European policy. Allow me to mention only some of the most important tasks:

Tensions and conflicts in the Third World
- 11 September made clear that the First World will not be able in the long term to live in security and without danger unaffected by the tensions and conflicts in the Third World. Almost a quarter of humanity is starving. 95% of those infected with AIDS live in developing countries – Africa is especially badly affected. Worldwide, only a minority is able to benefit from the opportunities for growth offered by globalization or to participate in the new information technologies. The rich countries, including those in Europe, cannot accept this state of affairs, both for reasons of morality but also on the grounds of simple self-interest, since tensions and conflicts today spread much faster and wider than ever before.

We will therefore have to redouble our efforts. The most important aim must be to help the developing countries to overcome poverty and to strengthen their capacity for good governance, which in turn will help them take responsibility for themselves. A further debt reduction for the poorest countries, consistent opening up of markets; support for the United Nations AIDS fund, and the goal of halving extreme poverty by 2015 – these are all initiatives which the developing countries urgently need.

Preservation of the natural bases of life
- The fight against poverty cannot be won if we are not just as committed to preserving the natural bases of life. At the coming environment summit in Johannesburg we must take a quantum leap forward towards sustainable development, towards fighting poverty more effectively, and towards improved conservation of our resources. The Kyoto Protocol must enter into force next year so that catastrophic warming of the earth's atmosphere can be prevented.

The threat from weapons of mass destruction
- Today, the threat from weapons of mass destruction is a deadly one. The international community must do all it can to counter it, by making another attempt at non-proliferation and global disarmament. The dangers of such weapons passing into the hands of terrorists and of new regional arms races call for new responses and effective, international counter-measures under criminal law.

Enhanced concept of security and conflict prevention
- The response to global challenges must be based on an enhanced concept of security and a comprehensive strategy aimed at dealing with the causes of conflicts. Above all, it must be based on prevention and not on repression. This means nothing less than drafting the fundamentals of a cooperative system of order for the 21^st century, a policy which no longer permits zones devoid of order, and which aims for a world order that enables full and just participation for all peoples.

The foreign policy of the EU will never have as strong a military orientation as that of the USA. Our experiences of history - centuries of bloody wars and civil wars in very small areas - are very different to those of the United States and they will continue to determine our thinking in the future. For this reason, both European and German policy will continue to be characterized by a greater reticence towards military action. We will always look first for a political solution, but without excluding the use of force as a last resort. This was the case with Kosovo, with Macedonia, and with Afghanistan. The EU has decided to give itself its own security and defence capability. This fits the logic of a Common Foreign and Security Policy. Clearly, Europe will never be able or want to rival the United States militarily, but alongside a civilian crisis management capability it must also possess its own self-sufficient, independent military capabilities, if it wants to be in a position to practise effective conflict prevention and to secure or even enforce peace, alone if necessary.

The situation in the Middle East

The dramatic worsening of the situation in the Middle East in the last few weeks has deeply shocked the whole world and all of us. The daily images of dead or injured Israelis and Palestinians – among them more and more innocent civilians, and more and more women and children – have revealed the actual scale of the hatred and desperation on both sides. For months we have been witnessing how every attempt to agree a ceasefire and to return to political negotiations has been foiled by terrorists. One side says: "Terror must not pay", while the other says: "Occupation must not pay". The consequence is ever more victims and ever more suffering.

One thing must never be forgotten, however: Israel is the only country in the region whose very existence is in question. It cannot afford one single day of military weakness.

The tragedy of this conflict lies in the fact that both sides claim legitimate rights and that all the elements for a solution are on the table: Security Council resolutions 242 and 338, Madrid, Oslo, Camp David, the Clinton parameters, and Taba are all stages of these efforts. Everything has been talked about, hundreds of times, thousands even. And yet it has all been to no avail, and the spiral of violence is spinning faster and faster. The "security first, then a comprehensive political solution" approach has obviously not worked. We have therefore put out a discussion paper in the last few days which turns this logic around and provides a perspective for resolving the political questions at the start. It is to be discussed at the EU Council of Ministers this coming Monday. Obviously, such an attempt is ambitious, but in this desperate situation it seems to me the only way to give the people hope again and break out of the vicious circle of violence and terror.

A legitimate question is what can Europe and what can Germany do for peace in the Middle East. Would we not be overreaching ourselves if we were involved more? Is not the United States the only country which can really achieve something there? This is certainly the case, which is why President Bush's most recent speech and the sending of Secretary of State Colin Powell to the region have met with so much international support. We are following his mission with high hopes and best wishes. The words of Schiller, "The strongest is most powerful alone", may have rung true in the 18^th century, but are no longer valid today. Even the Americans can bring about a turnaround in developments in the Middle East only if they do not try to tackle this task on their own, but include other actors – the European Union, the Secretary-General of the United Nations and also Russia – as was also discussed during the German-Russian intergovernmental consultations here in Weimar.

Completion of European integration as the most important aim of German foreign policy

"What kind of Europe do we need?" In my opinion, the answer to this question is a Europe that is democratic, fully able to act politically, successful economically, and orientated to the yardsticks of social justice and ecological sustainability. A Europe that can effectively assert and realize the values and interests of its member states both internally and externally.

The responsibility and weight – or power, if you prefer – of a geographically enlarged and united Germany is best at home in Europe. Solo efforts should never again be an option for us. The completion of European integration in the form of a federation of nation-states is therefore the most important goal of German foreign policy by far, as German values and interests will be best looked after in this way. To put it another way, Europe is our most important national interest.

Recent political events on the world stage have shown us once again: if the Europeans stay divided and if we do not create a European democracy, then we will not be in a position to shape, but only to be shaped. I believe that it is in all our interests to become, and to remain, together with our partners, a shaping factor in the 21^st century.