"Transatlantic Relations after September 11"
Speech of the German Minister of Defense, Rudolf Scharping, at the American Enterprise Institute in Washington, D.C. on April 24, 2002

Ladies and Gentlemen,

Thank you for the kind words of introduction. I am very pleased to be here and to share with you some thoughts on the transatlantic relations after September 11.

Since September 11, our freedom, our humanity, our responsibility and our security have been challenged anew. We will respond to this challenge, with joint efforts and with determination.

As you may know, since my early years as a politician I have visited your country very often, and I have won many friends. Friends in politics, friends in science, friends in trade and industry. The spirit of freedom has impressed me again and again. We should not forget: Americans and Europeans are tied by common roots, common values, common interests.

So I was proud and moved when 200,000 Germans assembled spontaneously in front of the Brandenburg Gate on September 14 to express their grief and their solidarity with the American people.

They simply felt at that moment that there was more at stake than the security of a close ally:

They felt that the core values of the democracies of the Euro-Atlantic community of states were being targeted by an inconceivable inhumanity.

They felt that the emotional and cultural affinity of our peoples and our societies was still at the heart of the transatlantic link.

They felt and they understood that America had defended our freedom and our unity and should now experience our unqualified solidarity.

Germany and the other European nations acted swiftly to co-operate with the United States and to offer all kinds of thinkable support.

But this did not prevent the American-led campaign against international terrorism being accompanied by a new discussion on the transatlantic partnership. On the future of NATO. On Europe's role in dealing with a more demanding spectrum of security challenges.

Some commentators argue that NATO's alleged absence from the US-led war has underscored its growing irrelevance for our security in general, and for the United States in particular.

Others point to the complex political mechanisms in NATO, which make it less attractive for the US to involve NATO. The US allegedly wants to avoid waging "war by committee" and is thus prone to circumvent NATO.
The bottom line of all this reasoning goes like this: NATO's role is at issue because its military capabilities are insufficient, its decision-making procedures ineffective and its political and strategic missions unclear in the globalized world.

Well, this analysis is not right. It tends to overlook some hard facts and because it applies the wrong yardsticks.

First of all, you cannot discuss NATO without taking a look at the transatlantic partnership. This is still the bedrock of our security and of our approach towards dealing with new challenges.

The fact of the matter is that the transatlantic partnership remains built on a solid foundation: a common heritage, common achievements, common values, and common interests.

And there is clearly a common interest in countering destabilizing tendencies which can affect our security and prosperity.

Take the economic dimension. The share of the world's population constituted by Americans and Europeans is decreasing, but our share of the world's economy is clearly increasing.

America and the European Union are the two regions in the world with the strongest economic relations. Most global companies today are Euro-Atlantic companies.

Europe is the biggest investor, the biggest employer, and - after Canada - the biggest trading partner of the United States.

60 percent of the foreign investments in the United States come from the European Union. 45 percent of American foreign investments go to the European Union, 30 percent alone to Germany.
Every 12th American employee works in a company owned and managed by Europeans, and US firms employ more than 3 million Europeans.

The EU's share of the gross world product is just under 30 percent, as large as that of the USA. Around 25 percent of US exports go to the EU.

It is fair to say that America clearly has no better partner than Europe to attain the goal that both of us share: a democratic, peaceful and stable world order.

This close relationship for our mutual benefit also extends to the social and cultural dimension. We should not forget our common responsibility for free trade, for fair competition, for an unpolluted environment. In all these areas we have a global responsibility and common opportunities - and in all these areas we can get even better.

Ladies and Gentlemen,

Notwithstanding these facts, the invocation of Article 5 and the subsequent role NATO played in combating terrorism triggered an interesting and somewhat puzzling debate.

Some critics questioned the value of NATO itself.

Nevertheless, after September 11, NATO Europe offered military support and proved that the Article 5 commitment is real and reciprocal.

It would have been much more legitimate to ask what NATO was there for if Article 5 had not been invoked.

NATO quickly agreed on a range of specific measures such as enhanced intelligence sharing, blanket overflight clearances, increased security for US facilities in Europe, access to ports and airfields, the deployment of NATO standing naval forces to the eastern Mediterranean and the deployment of AWACS to secure US airspace.

The fact that the Europeans were queuing up to provide troops and equipment to their ally in America and to offer both political and material support is, in my view, more a sign of NATO's vitality than of its irrelevance.

We should have been more concerned about NATO if the Europeans had been reluctant to offer military assistance.

While NATO is not directly involved in "Enduring Freedom", European NATO allies are providing substantial military contributions to combating terrorism.

In Afghanistan, more than 90 percent of the 4,500 ISAF troops are NATO European troops.

As for Germany, it has nearly 1,200 military personnel supporting ISAF, and more than 2,000 currently operating within the CENTCOM AOR.

The German Special Operations Forces in Afghanistan are employed side by side with the Americans.

The German Navy has eight combat units, support ships, helicopters and MPAs - a third of its assets - operating in the Gulf of Aden area in support of Enduring Freedom.

I am sure that you have a thorough understanding of Germany. The core of this development is: In the last three years our political leaders have acted with determination to renew the paradigm of German Foreign and Security Policy:

Germany is engaged in a comprehensive and preventive manner. Germany is engaged together with its friends and partners. Germany is engaged to counter crises and conflicts wherever they arise and does not confine itself to the security of its territory alone, even though this remains important. This is why Germany is engaged outside Europe, and, of course, in Europe as well.

For NATO still has more than 50,000 troops involved in 3 Balkans missions. And the Europeans are bearing the lion's share.

In Kosovo, more than 70 percent of the 38,000 troops are NATO Europeans. In Bosnia-Herzegovina, more than 65 percent of the 18,000 troops are NATO Europeans. In Macedonia, nearly all the troops are NATO Europeans.

All this would not be possible without decades of co-operation with each other and with the United States in NATO which has led to trustful relations, unique cohesion and outstanding skills for common action.

This would not be possible without decades of integrated force and command structures in NATO.

And it would not be possible without our common willingness to share risks, burdens and responsibility.

Nevertheless, some people think that the NATO Europeans are missing the boat. They claim that because of a widening technology gap and their dependence on US support, the Europeans would allegedly not be able

? to co-operate effectively with their American partners, and
? to act on their own in more limited operations in a NATO or EU framework.
Well, what are the facts and what is needed?

First of all, there can be no doubt that both NATO's and the EU's capabilities to deal with a more demanding mission spectrum, including combating terrorism, have to be improved.

Their adaptation to a new security environment is far from completed. For NATO, the forthcoming Prague summit will be of strategic importance for maintaining NATO's strength and effectiveness in the future.

First:
We will decide there on the enlargement of NATO. The logic of it remains unchanged: We will enlarge the stability area Europe constitutes eastwards and southeastwards.

Second:
NATO will also preserve the central role it plays in the defense of Europe's security and increase its importance for global security.

I would like to see us in Prague adopting a DCI follow-on program, clearly focused on just a few capability sectors, but the key ones, to render NATO stronger and more effective and to substantially improve interoperability within the Alliance.

One example I can think of is a step-up in effort in the key areas of command and control, intelligence and strategic transport, which are so essential for us. These are areas that also figure prominently in the future fight against terrorism.

The Strategic Concept adopted in 1999 provides a sound foundation for the requisite adaptations.

We must realize even more so than in recent years that NATO must be capable of defending the vital security interests of its members where they are affected.

Third:
Our analyses, plans and above all decision-making procedures are therefore in need of review. The aim must be to preserve and whenever possible indeed enhance political coherence and efficiency within NATO.

This is true for the 19 NATO members. It will become even more important when NATO has 26 members. We already have one OSCE. We don't need a second one. NATO is not a social club. NATO is the most successful political and military Alliance - and that is what it should continue to be.

Fourth:
We have to improve the quality of our forces, rendering them more effective and more deployable for the most likely scenarios of the future.
If the Europeans lag behind the Americans, it is not because there is a technology gap in the first place, but because there is a lack of determination to harmonize their forces better, to make more efficient and economic use of their defense investments.

In this context, it is also imperative for the Europeans to continue the defense sector reforms in their countries.

The comprehensive reform of the Bundeswehr, which we are implementing at high speed, will substantially improve our contribution to the common defense and the new crisis management requirements.

We are about to nearly triple our readiness forces to about 150,000 troops; we have streamlined our command structure; and we are modernizing our equipment in line with our international commitments and the changed global context.

The modernization of European forces is imperative. NATO and EU defense initiatives point in the same direction.

In fact, the development of a European Security and Defense Policy in the last few years is substantial.

Developing the political and military structures for EU-led crisis management operations is a necessary answer to a more complex security environment.

The growing capacity of the EU to take civil and military crisis management action will relieve the US and NATO of some of the burden they have so far borne in regions of Europe.

It will enhance the flexibility of both the Europeans and Americans to deal with crises and conflicts and to master their most important task: To safeguard effectively and comprehensively freedom and peace, human dignity and the rule of law.
The peace missions in the Balkans, in Macedonia or in Southern Serbia have shown that the practical co-operation between NATO and the EU works.

The EU has also reacted to the catastrophe of September 11.

In fact, the EU has at its disposal a unique mix of civil and military capabilities suited for the prevention of international terrorism and for the fight against terrorism.

Starting with the action plan adopted last September, the EU has set the right course for making use of its wide-ranging options to combat terrorism.

One of the key lessons learnt from September 11 is the need to go ahead with a comprehensive program to strengthen the European capacity to act in security matters.

But no matter how determined Europe is to invest more in its military potential, no-one should believe that the Europeans are able to match the enormous defense investments the US is currently undertaking.

In fact, the Europeans should not enter a kind of arms race among friends. This is neither realistic nor in any way desirable.

But it requires the Europeans to spend their investment funds more wisely and on a more co-operative basis in order to rapidly improve their capabilities on the basis of DCI. I think it would be best if the Europeans agree on corridors for their investments. They should increase their investments within agreed margins.

In addition to many projects and new military capabilities we have been developing military co-operation by multinational corps like the Dutch-German Corps, the Euro-Corps, the Multinational Corps Northeast, by the European Air Defence Task Force, the European Airlift Co-ordination Cell and other projects.

On the other hand, the Americans are required to share the relevant technology, to facilitate European defense modernization, to remove barriers to technology transfer and to support a more open and competitive NATO defence market.

This will make European forces both more capable and more interoperable with the US.

Ladies and Gentlemen,

There is one more important aspect we should take into account when we discuss September 11 and its consequences for the transatlantic relations.

Modern security policy is more than deterrence and defense. It cannot be confined to a territory and cannot be ensured by military means alone.

Stability today can be endangered by a plethora of new challenges and risks: Ethnic and religious conflicts, economic and social problems, the population explosion, humanitarian disasters, international terrorism, organized crime or the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and their delivery means are among them.

To master these challenges

we firstly need to
? base our policy on a comprehensive, broadened concept of security that is founded on the multidimensionality both of the causes of crises and conflicts and of the necessary answers to the security challenges of today.
We secondly need to
? draw up a policy that is aimed equally at changing structures in the long-term and eliminating the deeper causes of conflicts as well as at developing the capability to pursue a policy for preserving peace now.
And we thirdly need to
? frame a policy combining regional action with global thinking and global action with the necessities of a regional stability policy.

Let me say a few more words at this point in view of the occasion. The resolution of conflicts by political means is an integral part of any comprehensive concept of security.

Co-operative structures in the various regions - in the Middle East, in Central Asia, in the Caucasus, in the Maghreb and elsewhere - are important both in regional and in global terms.

In particular progress in the Middle East is key to isolating terrorism, especially in Arab or Islamic countries.

Developments in this region over the last months have been nothing less than a disaster.

The Euro-Atlantic states, in particular the US and also the EU, but also the UN and Russia, have to engage in a constructive
and determined way.

Otherwise, if the use of force prevails, the conflict will destabilize adjacent regions and can be misused as a catalyst for international terrorism and for undermining the political support in the whole Arab and Islamic world against terrorism.

Prevention is key to any successful foreign and defense policy.

A wise crisis management policy comprises the whole process of prevention, effective crisis reaction and post-crisis rehabilitation. These elements cannot be separated from each other.

An effective military peace mission is equally a successful preventive measure to avoid a military escalation of conflict. This is true for an operation like Fox in Macedonia or ISAF.

But successful prevention goes further. In the world of growing interdependence and cross-border risks, investing in the political and economic future of a country or a region, in democracy, in the rule of law, in the conservation of the natural environment, equals investing preventively in one's own security.

In this respect the Europeans are making enormous contributions to strengthen common security in Europe and around the globe.

Just to give you a few examples:

From 1991 -1999, the EU provided more than 4.5 billion € for the western Balkans alone. From 2000 to 2006, five countries in the region will receive 4.65 billion € under the EU's "Community Assistance for Reconstruction, Development and Stabilization" program, with Germany accounting for 25 percent.

On the subject of the Stability Pact, the EU alone is putting 530 billion € into the "quick-start package" agreed on in March 2000.

Germany's contribution to the Stability Pact totals 0.6 billion €. Its willingness to provide refuge in Germany for hundreds of thousands of refugees from Bosnia-Herzegovina was an earlier major German contribution towards stabilizing the region.

Between 1990 and 1999, the EU spent a total of 39.5 billion € towards integrating the states of central and eastern Europe.

Another 80 billion € have been appropriated for the period 2000-2006, 22 billion € alone as pre-accession aid.

Altogether, EU aid for central, eastern and southern Europe adds up to over 136 billion €.

Then there is the bilateral assistance provided. For instance, Germany alone has put 70.9 billion € into the reform process in Russia since 1999.

But the European states are also an indispensable partner of the USA outside Europe when it comes to enhancing common security.

The EU states account for almost 40 percent of the UN's regular budget, similarly 40 percent UN's peacekeeping operations budget and a total of 50 percent of the UN programs budget.

The EU states are the provider of forces for UN peace missions, accounting for 17 percent of all UN forces, police and observers deployed.

Germany is the third largest contributor, behind the USA and Japan, towards the UN's regular and peace mission budgets.

The European contribution to our common security is important and substantial.

Only democracy and sound economic and social perspectives provide for stability and a peace-oriented national foreign policies in the longer term.

It should be seen as an integral part of any debate about burden-sharing among partners and about what is needed in today's complex security environment.
Ladies and Gentlemen,

When we think about how the transatlantic community and its institutions should cope with the new challenges, another aspect springs to mind.

Complementary advantages of all security organizations must be used in order to strengthen Euro-Atlantic and global security.

National solo efforts or approaches that rely on just one institution soon reach their limits when comprehensive crisis management is required.

Crisis management in Bosnia and Herzegovina, in Kosovo and in Macedonia, the implementation of the Stability Pact for South-East Europe, and the fight against international terrorism have clearly demonstrated one thing:

Interaction between the UN, NATO, the EU, the OSCE, other institutions and the NGOs has acquired a significance of its own in security affairs.

Co-operation is the name of the game when it comes to mastering the tasks of today.

On the global level, we need a United Nations Organization which is able to assume its indispensable role in preserving world peace.

By declaring international terrorism to be a threat to international peace and security, the UN Security Council has codified an important and far-reaching change in international law.

We should make use of this new momentum and push forward with the necessary UN reforms.

NATO, for its part, can build on unprecedented mechanisms which it established in the last decade as it underwent its forward-looking political transformation.

The Partnership for Peace Program, the EAPC, the world largest permanent coalition, the NATO-Russia PJC, the NATO-Ukraine Commission or other co-operative patterns like the Membership Action Plan (MAP) have changed the European political landscape.

The fight against multi-dimensional threats like terrorism underlines the need for states and institutions to work together in order to make maximum use of the respective resources.

This, incidentally, also applies to cooperation with Russia, and uniquely so.
Russia is a strategic partner of the Euro-Atlantic community due to its geography, its size, its resources and its political and societal transformation.

This is not yet reflected in the substance and the mechanisms of NATO's co-operation with Russia. There is still too much thinking in NATO along the lines of "no veto, no influence" on NATO's decision-making.

I am convinced: NATO's future role will also be determined by the way it handles its relations with the largest European neighbor.

Russia's solidarity in combating terrorism has paved the way for a new phase of co-operation.

NATO is now determined to intensify this relationship, reflecting the new spirit of co-operation. This is fully in line with the new quality in US-Russian relations which has become evident over the last few months.
Our instruments must match our interests and our objectives. Instead of wasting our time discussing the most unlikely development - Russia's membership in NATO - we should rather focus on broadening the political, strategic and military platforms for common action.

Ladies and Gentlemen,

We are now - and not only since September 11 - in a new phase of international relations.

The task of ensuring Euro-Atlantic and global security has to be performed under changed strategic conditions. It has on no account become less urgent, and it is by no means any easier.

On September 11, we witnessed once again what horrific things the human brain can bring about.

We also were confirmed in reorienting both NATO and the EU to the new strategic conditions at the beginning of the 21st century.

We finally experienced quickly the chances that arise for co-operation whenever mankind faces a threat to its existence.

While there is still some way to go before all the conclusions of September 11 have been drawn, some are certain.

The USA must realize that the days when it was invulnerable are gone for good.

The USA has also had to realize that no matter how strong it is militarily, it can only achieve lasting success in dealing with the complex threats and conflicts in the globalized world together with allies and partners.

Anyone who wants to successfully wage war on terrorism on a global basis needs partners - a whole lot of partners.

Anyone who wants to resolve complex regional conflicts like the one in the Middle East can only achieve his aims by involving all parties concerned.

The Europeans have equally had to realize that oases of peace can no longer be established in "one world".

In New York and Washington, more Germans, more Britons, more Indians, more Pakistanis, more Muslims, and more Christians were killed than in any terrorist attack since World War II.

We Europeans once more became aware that Europe has also global interests it must defend and a global responsibility it must shoulder.

This is why it is so important for the EU to maintain and indeed further improve its capacity for taking action in foreign and security affairs as it enlarges.

For both transatlantic partners, it has become clear that there is no alternative to an alliance of democratic nations.

And we have realized that security matters are still very central to the transatlantic relations.

Having said this, let me add that people tend to neglect a simple fact: There is no automatism with regard to sovereign states establishing common political positions.

Common values and interests do not lead automatically to identical political attitudes.

Common policies must be found by making steady mutual efforts and by engaging in trustful political dialog.

The basis for our future success in this has undoubtedly improved on account of the threat posed to our very existence by the events of September 11.

Thank you for your attention.

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