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Article by Dr. Klaus Kinkel Minister of Foreign Affairs of Germany For the first time in the history of NATO, a ministerial meeting of the North Atlantic Council will be held in Berlin at the beginning of June 1996. The symbolism of the location lends particular significance to this spring session. Berlin owes a great debt to the alliance and the alliance owes a great debt to the people of Berlin. During the Cold War, Berlin stood for the defense of freedom. Today, Berlin, as the capital of a united Germany, is a symbol of the growing together of our continent into a free, unified Europe. In addition to the North Atlantic Council, the North Atlantic Cooperation Council (NACC) will be holding its spring session in Berlin the following day. The NACC was set up in 1991 to provide a security policy forum for the newly developing partnership in Europe following the historical upheavals which have taken place on our continent: by extensive and intensive cooperation with the forces for reform in Central and Eastern Europe, our aim is to improve the underlying conditions for stability, democracy and freedom throughout Europe. Cooperation in the NACC was further developed by launching the Partnership for Peace initiative at the NATO Summit in January 1994. Thus NATO demonstrated its resolve to assume new tasks and contribute to a new cooperative security order in Europe. At the same time, in Bosnia, NATO has taken an exciting step of fundamental importance into a new dimension of security, that is to say, one of progressing from dialogue to practical cooperation. Partnership for Peace (PfP) is no longer just a theoretical concept, but is turning into day-to-day reality as a Partnership for Peacekeeping. Thirteen PfP partners are joining together with NATO forces in the Implementation Force (IFOR) and, by means of joint operations in Bosnia, are putting into practice security cooperation of a new quality. The fact that most neutral European OSCE states belong to this partnership shows that NATO has long since left behind the old world of East-West confrontation and is moving flexibly and purposefully towards a new European security structure, characterized by an overarching European political and military cooperation in conflict prevention and crisis management. In Bosnia, PfP has proved to be a viable instrument for implementing cooperation in security policies, an instrument which has the necessary flexibility and fine-tuning and at the same time the ability to show success in practice. We are expecting the NATO meeting in Berlin to send out a strong message of commitment to the reform of the alliance, which continues to have a key role to play in ensuring the future security and stability of the whole of Europe. At the January 1994 Summit, the NATO heads of state and governments resolved to adapt further the alliance's political and military structures to reflect both the full spectrum of its roles and the development of the emerging European security and defense identity, and endorse the concept of combined joint task forces. In Berlin, we want to send out a clear signal that: - The transatlantic partnership remains indispensable; - The new NATO is addressing the new challenges it faces; - It is becoming more streamlined and flexible; - The European dimension in the alliance is becoming more evident; - The alliance is an anchor of stability for Europe as a whole. IFOR Berlin will also provide the first opportunity, midway through the 12 month mandate of Operation Joint Endeavor in Bosnia, to take stock. NATO will make it clear that IFOR, this grand coalition for peace, which includes pioneering cooperation with Russian forces, must bring to a successful conclusion the mission it has begun so well. In conducting this peace operation, the alliance has proved its ability to take joint action and its resolve to secure peace. With the greatest military operation in its history, in which Germany is also making its own contribution with a contingent of 4,000 troops, the alliance is laying the foundation for lasting peace in the former Yugoslavia. However, war and violence have not been conclusively eliminated in Bosnia. We must expect that the credibility of NATO's commitment will be tested again and again. It will therefore have to continue to oppose resolutely any attempts to erode or undermine the Dayton agreement. We have assumed shared responsibility for the military securement of peace. Certainly, the path to lasting peace is a difficult one. The civil components of the peace agreement must also be quickly put into place. Only through coordinated military and civil implementation can we provide a permanently anchored foundation for peace in Bosnia-Herzegovina. Without rapid reconstruction, the people in the war-torn country cannot gain a new perspective. Only people who regain the belief that they have a personal future are capable of working for peace and reconciliation. The presidential and parliamentary elections in the summer will be the key to establishing a democratic counterbalance in this devastated country. Just as important for the long-term stabilization of the region are effective disarmament agreements and confidence building measures. As democracies, we also bear responsibility for ensuring that the societies now newly forming in the former Yugoslavia develop on the basis of justice. However, this also means that anyone wishing to cover up any injustice which has been perpetrated will be unable to overcome the hatred between the ethnic groups. NATO's intervention and the resulting Dayton agreement not only brought the breakthrough in the conflict in Bosnia. This major peace operation may also become a milestone on the path to a future European security order. IFOR is not mere theory. IFOR is the reality for which the alliance has long stood: for the democracies of North America and Europe standing closely side by side, for practical proof of the Partnership for Peace - in particular the security partnership with Russia and Ukraine - and for the performance of its new task of supporting peace. Alliance structure IFOR is proof of the adaptability of the alliance. IFOR also shows, however, the asset which NATO, with its 45 years of experience, represents. This benefit of political credibility and practical efficiency must be maintained. We have to do more: the historical changes and new tasks with which we are faced demand consistent continuation of the adaptation of the alliance's structures and procedures. The decisions taken by the French government in December 1995 to get closer to the military structures of the alliance have lent the debate an important additional impetus. The alliance's core function remains that of collective defense. NATO's military capabilities, in effectively ensuring the security of its members, constitute a prerequisite and necessary basis for any security role which the alliance may play in Europe. However, as graphically evidenced by the former Yugoslavia, the alliance is also expected to take on new responsibilities in the areas of crisis management and cooperation throughout Europe. Furthermore, the complexity of risks with which the democracies of Europe and North America are faced is no longer comparable with the dangers which existed during the first 40 years of the alliance's existence. Bloc confrontation has been replaced by diffuse conflict scenarios, with all the risks they entail, right up to the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction. To deal with these challenges, we need new mechanisms for swift decision-making and multifunctional operations. The new environment will also have to be reflected in NATO's internal planning, in its decision-making procedures and command structures. The following objectives must guide us in this endeavor: - We must strengthen the transatlantic security alliance and consolidate on a lasting basis the political and military partnership between Europe and America. - We must improve NATO's military capabilities to carry out its missions, in order to provide for collective self-defense, peacekeeping operations or crisis management in the new strategic environment. - We must strengthen Europe's ability to act in matters of security policy. For this purpose, the military structures of the alliance must also be available for missions under European command within the framework of the WEU, should the North American allies decide not to take part in a particular operation. - We must make it possible for new members to be introduced and integrated into the alliance, and similarly allow cooperation with non-NATO states to be extended. Within the alliance itself, this requires more flexibility and more task-sharing and also more streamlined structures in order to offset the growing pressure of costs. With all the adaptations under way, political supervision must continue to be maintained over all the alliance's activities, and efficient political-military coordination must be ensured. Transatlantic partnership Preservation of the partnership with the United States is crucial. The transatlantic alliance has proved to be the most successful of its kind in history. It was and is an alliance of reliability and trust in commonly held values. The common goal must be to preserve this successful partnership of the past 50 years as a potent force for security, well-being and global stability into the 21st century. This is far from being a question of security policy alone. It is a matter of fostering a stronger global partnership and sharing the workload in all areas, including economic and commercial policy and in the spheres of culture and science. In April last year, in Chicago, I took the initiative to consolidate transatlantic relations on a broad base, which was reflected in the EU Madrid summit the following December. The resolutions adopted there for a new transatlantic agenda and for the EU-US plan of action point the way ahead: in this respect, European integration and transatlantic cooperation are complementary. Europe is prepared to take on more responsibility. This will also become clear from the inter-governmental conference of EU member states, now in progress, which I expect to provide the fresh impetus which is needed. After all, consistently implemented consolidation of European integration - specifically in the area of the common foreign and security policy - will be a fundamental prerequisite for the future preservation of the transatlantic partnership. The new NATO will do nothing but promote this development. It remains the driving force behind the American-European partnership.
I therefore welcome the fact that the links between NATO and the WEU have increasingly been strengthened on the basis of the agreed principles of complementarity and transparency. NATO will support the WEU in developing its operational capabilities, but this must not lead to a duplication of structures and bureaucratic procedures if only for reasons of efficiency and cost. The concept of the Combined Joint Task Forces (CJTF) is the key to this. Here, too, Berlin must set the course for the future.
The reform of the alliance has also practical effects on the relationship between NATO and the Russian Federation. In Berlin - two weeks before the presidential elections in Russia - we will have to assess the state of the alliance's relations with Russia. In doing so, we will also highlight the collaboration between the new NATO and democratic Russia in the combined operations in the former Yugoslavia. When NATO and Russian soldiers establish peace side-by-side under extremely difficult conditions, that says more about the new Europe than any declarations or communiqués. The common mission within the framework of IFOR gives us the opportunity to set relations between NATO and Russia on a new pragmatic basis, characterized by mutual trust. Russian participation in IFOR may be the beginning of a fundamentally new partnership. Aside from declarations of intent, reality has been shaped here, allowing a momentum to be established on a long-term basis for a broad network of political dialogue and practical cooperation with Russia. We want to set the security partnership with Russia on a solid and firm basis, for example by means of a charter between Brussels and Moscow. Only together with Russia can there be security in Europe, not without her and certainly not if we oppose this great and important country. It is conversely true that Russia will find security, stability and well-being only together with Europe, not without Europe or by opposing Europe. It is important that Russia continues on its path of economic reforms and political democratization. The people of Russia will come to realize that the West does not wish to exclude this important country and that a reformed NATO means increased stability and security for all and poses a threat to no one - another reason why the new NATO is so important. This must also be demonstrated in our relations with Ukraine, where we want to find closer forms of cooperation. To provide political support for Ukraine on its rocky road to reform, Berlin must send out a clear signal: Ukraine has a permanent place of its own in the European cooperative alliance. Our partnership will reflect this.
Part of the new NATO is a readiness to open up to new members. The decision adopted at the 1994 NATO summit to open up the alliance to new members remains valid. Military cooperation with our partners in Bosnia graphically illustrates how we envisage the enlargement of our organization: not by confrontation but by cooperation. The alliance threatens no one, but creates stability far beyond its territorial boundaries. The admission of new members to the alliance will serve the cause of stability and security throughout Europe. For Berlin, this means that we will steadfastly maintain the calm, considered policy of opening up NATO. We will continue the intensive individual dialogue with our partners on opening up NATO to new member states, initiated at the December 1995 ministerial meeting of the NATO council. In Berlin, we will underline once again that the inclusion of new members will be part of the development of a security structure based on cooperation. And an essential part of this is to develop a security partnership with Russia. Our policy must remain unerring and predictable. Today, Europe is in the middle of a decisive phase in shaping its future. The task is to secure peace and freedom on the principles of close transatlantic cooperation and the resolute continuation of the European policy of unification. In addition, however, we must also exploit all possibilities for consolidating security in Europe by using and strengthening tried and tested institutions such as the OSCE and the Council of Europe. In this increasingly interlinked security network, the new NATO will assume more than ever the function of an anchor for stability. This also includes seeking dialogue and cooperation with all neighboring regions, not just in the East. That is why I expressly support NATO's Mediterranean initiative, which is designed to complement the extensive EU initiative and existing OSCE contacts. Its continuation will be an important contribution to the further development of NATO's cooperative approach. Since the wall came down, Berlin has reflected the growing together of Germany and of Europe. The reform of NATO is also a contribution to the building of tomorrow's security policy, with the goal of a structure which embraces the whole of Europe. I am therefore confident that the genius loci in Berlin will play a decisive part in making this a venue where NATO adopts key decisions for its internal adaptation. German Information Center |
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