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Lecture by Volker Rühe It is a pleasure to have the opportunity to share my thoughts with you on the future of the Atlantic Alliance. The Johns Hopkins School of Advanced International Studies is a well-known institution. As I look over the origins and history of the school - as well as your current faculty roster - I see a lot that I like. This includes the names of many old friends - Paul Nitze, who I understand was one of the original founders of this institution, as well as Dean Paul Wolfowitz and, of course, Professor Zbig Brzezinski. The further we get from the heady days of the fall of the Berlin Wall, the more evident it becomes to all of us that we have truly entered a new era. The Alliance has achieved great things over the past five years. It has redefined peace and security for Europe, and has adopted new strategic tasks. The Alliance has proved adaptable and able to pursue reforms, full of vitality and flexibility. The Alliance is a magnet for our neighbors in the East, who wish to participate in all this. The spirit of NATO corresponds with the new era. But its structure still reflects more the requirements of the Cold War than the challenges ahead. These challenges are: - Multifaceted security risks, crises and conflicts below the threshold of collective defense primarily on the periphery, but certainly not in the center of Europe. - The integration of new members, taking account of their requirements and striking a careful balance with regard to cooperation with other countries, primarily Russia.
Against this background, I think it is important to step back and define exactly what it is we want to achieve. Americans often refer to "the vision thing." My vision of the transatlantic relationship is that of a unified and integrated Europe - "whole and free" - in permanent alliance with the United States. It is a vision of the U.S. and Europe in a partnership of equals - a partnership devoted to the pursuit of common interests in Europe as well as beyond. The philosophy underlying this vision is as important as the vision itself. The age of balance of power politics in Europe is over. Yesterday's enemy has disappeared. It has been replaced by a plethora of new risks. The enemy today is instability - and our strategies to defeat it should not be designed to counter one another militarily, but rather to promote integration with each other. Stability requires healthy societies where human rights are respected, democratic structures function and a free market economy flourishes. If you look at the Balkans, the Caucasus, the Middle East or Northern Africa you can see that history has not ended. Deep-seated ethnic, religious and nationalistic forces can lead to devastating conflicts. If one adds the prospect of the spread of weapons of mass destruction, then it is obvious that such trends threaten us all. A grand strategy for the Alliance must harness our military might to the pursuit of stability and to the containment of instability. And let me stress that this is true not only for Central or Eastern Europe but for the Mediterranean as well. Stability along the southern rim of the Atlantic Alliance is just as important and European a task as stability in Central Europe. We can only gain the support of all Alliance members for our policy of integrating the states of Central and Eastern Europe into Western structures if we manage to assure our Southern European allies that their direct strategic interests are equally taken into account. The anti-terrorism summit in Sharm el Sheik last month provided impressive proof that stability in the Middle East is of concern not only to the states directly affected. It also has a strategic dimension that is vital for all of us. Let me underscore that this is a very different vision and rationale than the one that guided the Alliance during the Cold War. It is a vision of an Alliance based on the premise that the U.S. and Europe share vital interests - a vision of an Alliance based on a new transatlantic convent. Zbig Brzezinski and others captured the essence of what we are striving for with the concept of "double enlargement." The Alliance has to enlarge to the new democracies in the East. It also has to enlarge its functional scope and expand its mission. And it needs to do both at the same time. My friend Jim Thomson at the RAND corporation has posed the following question: If NATO did not exist, would we create it? My answer is: of course we would! We would be fools not to. And we would be fools if we did not take advantage of the fact that we already have a solid and functioning Alliance with enormous capabilities. We do not have to start from scratch. Rather, we have to adapt, modernize and transform what we have in order to meet the challenges of the modern era. Accomplishing the following four tasks is what the debate about a new NATO is all about:
As many of you know, I have been a strong proponent of NATO enlargement - or, as I prefer to put it, the opening of the Alliance to the East. When historians go back and write about the origins of this debate, the facts will show that the motivation of nearly all the early proponents of NATO enlargement was rooted in a desire to integrate and stabilize the new democracies of Central Europe and to help them join a Europe whole and free. Our goal is to extend eastward the same structure of values and institutions that enabled Western Europe to overcome its own legacy of conflict and division. This is not aimed against anyone. It is not a strategy of expansionists. The Alliance is responding to the legitimate right of all European countries to choose their own security arrangements. It is responding to the desire of those peoples who were suppressed and deprived of their natural rights of freedom, democracy and a market economy for decades. The question is whether we in the West keep the club closed - or whether we open it to those countries which have been artificially excluded in the past. To keep it closed would be apolitical, ahistoric and immoral. Since the debate started, I have repeatedly pointed out that stability in Central Europe is in everyone's interest. Let's not forget how destructive instability in this region has been in this century alone. As this century draws to a close, it is only fitting that we solve this problem once and for all - by offering those countries what they so desperately want and need, the opportunity to return to Europe. The opening of the Alliance to the East is a vital German interest. One does not have to be a strategic genius to understand this. You only have to look at the map. A situation in which Germany's eastern border is the border between stability and instability in Europe is not sustainable in the long run. Germany's eastern border cannot be the eastern border of the European Union and NATO. Either we export stability or we import instability. Fortunately, the Alliance has made the decision to be open for new members. The process of NATO enlargement has begun. It will continue in a manner that is gradual, steady and transparent. It is irreversible. Several milestones in this process have already been established, starting with the 1994 NATO Summit. In December 1996, the North Atlantic Council will decide on the next steps. 1997 promises to be an exciting year. Our friends and partners in the new democracies in Eastern Europe can rely on us. Secretary of State Warren Christopher made it crystal clear in his remarkable speech in Prague on March 20, 1996, when he said: "We are determined to move forward. NATO has made a commitment to take in new members and it must not and will not keep new democracies in the waiting room forever. NATO enlargement is on track and it will happen." When the time is ripe to answer the question of who and when, the political eligibility of prime candidates will be our guiding principle. However, our decision cannot and should not address the prime candidates only. What we need is a comprehensive concept that combines integration of new members and intensified cooperation with others. In this context, the Partnership for Peace still has a lot of growth potential. We have to take full advantage of the inherent conceptual interrelation between EU and NATO enlargement - leading to synergetic effects in giving Central Europe a Euro-Atlantic perspective. Even if some countries join NATO earlier than others, it must be clear from the outset that the others remain part of the process. The NATO I envision is one which guarantees stability in Central Europe, a stability which is just as much in Russia's interest as it is in ours. Russia's place is quite clear: We want a Russia that will successfully reform - and will become a privileged strategic partner for the Alliance. I cannot envision Russia as a member of the Alliance. This country is simply too big, too different, spanning nearly half the globe. I cannot imagine the Alliance being willing to extend an Article 5 collective defense guarantee to Russia's eastern or southern borders. And it is doubtful whether Moscow is really interested in assuming the obligations and responsibilities of NATO membership, including the requirement to subordinate Russia to a consensus rule. But I can envision Russia as a close, active, and valued partner of NATO, a partner that we invite to have a strategic partnership with us. Russia would be an important participant and contributor to the kind of future coalition efforts that may be required in managing security both in and beyond Europe. But it is up to the leaders and people of Russia themselves to make the proper choices. The Alliance has offered Russia a privileged partnership based on a NATO - Russia treaty or charter that would actively integrate Russia into the new European security structure. This is the very opposite of exclusion. NATO and Russia are already closely cooperating in Bosnia. We hope that this is not a one-time affair but the start of a long and stable relationship. The cooperation between members and non-members of the Alliance in the former Yugoslavia illustrates in a nutshell what future European security could look like.
NATO has come a long way since the 1990 London Declaration. But the process of renewal must be continued. The Alliance's current structures are still too static and oriented towards the defense requirements of Central Europe, a legacy from the Cold War. We have not adequately adapted them to take account of the multiple and multifaceted new tasks we face. The new NATO must be based on more than rhetoric. It must have substance and profile. The necessary structural reform of the Atlantic Alliance must have a strategic, an Atlantic and a European dimension, and, at the same time, it must allow for the accession of new members. The strategic dimension of the reform must draw the consequences of the new strategic policy setting following the end of East-West confrontation. Cooperation, the transfer of stability, and crisis management have become Alliance priorities, even though a collective defense capability remains essential. We must focus on those tasks which are most likely. Above all, we need a different approach to planning and decision making. Crises whose location, intensity and duration are difficult to predict call for different planning and decision making than in the past. The future structures must be designed flexibly so that they can accommodate the broad spectrum of new tasks and that all NATO tasks can be planned, controlled and monitored. The Atlantic dimension of the structural reform aims at harmonizing the future transatlantic relationship with an emerging European ability for strategic action. It has become obvious that the traditional willingness of the U.S. to get involved in European security is increasingly being called into question in the U.S. Congress and throughout the country. I very much admire the courageous decision taken by President Clinton to make 20,000 troops available for the former Yugoslavia to implement the Dayton peace agreement. But I am well aware that this decision was not easy and that it would be even more difficult to make a similar one in the future. In this context there are two messages to be read. One is a message to the people in the former Yugoslavia which is absolutely clear: NATO gives them one year to build peace from within. The other message is a more general one for the European allies concerning their future role in the Atlantic Alliance: Only if Europe is willing and capable to take on a greater share of the burden and responsibility for common security interests can it expect a renewed transatlantic partnership to carry into the future. At this point we can draw some important conclusions. The new NATO has to be used in a flexible way. We have to utilize NATO's structures for different purposes. In the future, the Alliance must reflect a transatlantic partnership based on the understanding that the U.S. remains committed to Europe's security but takes advantage of organized European solidarity. The new NATO must cope with a broad spectrum of missions and it must provide the basis for European-led operations. The European dimension of the Alliance's structural reform must be designed both to permit and support the emerging European capability to act strategically. NATO structures must be reformed in such a way that headquarters, European forces and resources of the Alliance structure can, with the approval of the North Atlantic council, be used for European purposes. European-led operations within NATO's command structure would be a logical consequence of the desire for a European security and defense identity. NATO's future peacetime responsibilities therefore need to include preparing for such operations through planning, exercises, training and staffing. In the months ahead, we must spell out this approach so that the North Atlantic council can adopt political guidelines for the structural reform of the Alliance at its spring meeting in Berlin. This will also provide a foundation on which NATO's 16 defense ministers can build when they meet this fall to discuss the baselines and cornerstones of the new military command structure. A look at the calendar shows that we have a unique window of opportunity. France will actively take part in the Alliance's efforts to create a new NATO. At the same time, the enlargement process is on track. This means that we face not only the need but also have the opportunity to put our house in order before new tenants more in.
German support for this transformation of the Alliance is more than only rhetorical or political. Our current participation in NATO's Implementation Force in the former Yugoslavia is the best example of our commitment to the building of this new NATO. There are no longer any legal restrictions on Germany's ability to take action in solidarity with others. German forces are now able to perform the same tasks and face the same risks as their fellow soldiers in NATO and the WEU. For many years our allies provided us with security in our own country. Today, we are preparing to help our allies in order to contain conflicts where and when they arise and to stop them spreading like wildfire. The Bundeswehr is being developed into an instrument commensurate with the conditions of our day and age - capable of defending our country, of reacting to crises throughout the Alliance territory and of serving in and beyond Europe under a mandate of the United Nations if needed. The future Bundeswehr will have a peacetime strength of 340,000, of which 50,000 will be in the reaction forces. We will retain the system of universal conscription. It shapes the character of the Bundeswehr. Right now we are devoting priority attention to the most likely future scenarios. We are establishing a reaction capability step by step. As I speak, first units are being created which will be fully operational and ready to go. Over the next three to four years, the Bundeswehr will gradually assume its new structure. It will enable us to participate effectively in all Alliance tasks with well-trained, well-equipped forces held in appropriate readiness according to their mission. Moreover, the new force structure will provide crisis reaction forces on a scale similar to that of the United Kingdom and France. At the same time, Germany will be maintaining substantial main defense forces - forces that no other country in Europe can provide in such quality and quantity. In the light of recent developments in national defense planning - I am particularly thinking of France and its recent decisions with regard to the future structure of its armed forces - the German Bundeswehr, with its capacity to mobilize to a wartime strength of about 700,000 troops, will remain the European cornerstone of NATO's collective defense. Thus, Germany's value as a strategic partner of the United States is increasing, not decreasing. The U.S. Role What about the U.S. role in this new Europe? It is, of course, up to you and the American people to decide your own interests and role. But, speaking both as a German and as a European who is also a convinced Atlanticist, please allow me to make several remarks about how we see the U.S. role in the context of a new NATO. First, in Europe today there are no signs of anti-Americanism and no political forces of any significance questioning the U.S. presence or calling for Europe to develop a security identity separate from the United States. The contrary is true. Support for U.S. involvement in the affairs of the continent has never been stronger in Western Europe. And if you travel to Eastern Europe, you will quickly discover that support for American engagement and presence is just as strong - and maybe even stronger. All of Europe has truly accepted the U.S. as a permanent European power, not just a temporary protector during the Cold War. Second, the history of the 20th century has taught us that the fates of Europe and America are intertwined. To each of us, events in Europe are just as important today as they were ten or 20 years ago. Europe may no longer play the central role it used to in U.S. defense planning as an endangered continent, but it has become more important as an ally and a partner. I cannot think of a single major strategic issue where U.S. and European interests are opposed. And there is hardly a problem either of us faces that we would not be much better off facing together. Third, the vision of a new NATO that I have laid out today is not only a vision for managing future European security. It is also a vision for creating a Europe that is a more interesting, active and capable partner of the United States. Of course, you have your own debate in this country about the future of the Atlantic Alliance and the transatlantic relationship. It is a debate that we in Europe watch with great attention and curiosity. And it is hardly a secret that some Europeans are wondering about the voices they are hearing. But, in the final analysis, I am confident that we will achieve the new NATO, for one simple reason: It will afford strategic benefits for both sides and will create the very basis for carrying the Alliance into the next century. Common sense tells us we will be a lot better off with the Alliance than without it. As President Clinton has put it, the U.S. and Europe have "little to fear and much to gain." German Information Center |
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