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Remarks by
Dear Father O'Donovan, dear Professor Barnes:
Thank you very much for your kind introduction, which almost amounts to a fond farewell. I have said good-bye to so many colleagues in the diplomatic community over the past two years that I was beginning to think I was the everlasting Ambassador. Yet I am still far behind the record-holder among the German ambassadors to the U.S., the renowned Kurd von Schlözer, who served 11 years in Washington. In one of his letters, von Schlözer said that "The work here really is the only thing that gives me pleasure.“ I myself, however, subscribe to the American motto "Work hard, play hard". For me and my family, the past six years were wonderful and enriching. It was a privilege, and almost always a pleasure, to represent the united Germany vis-à-vis the U.S. And it is a particular honor for me to share with you today some observations and reflections as my six years in Washington come to a close.
If someone were to ask me to sum up my six years as German ambassador to the U.S., I would probably quote the title of Dean Acheson's memoirs: "Present at the creation." Today, more than 50 years after the foundation of the Atlantic Alliance, we are again "present at the creation" of a new transatlantic world, which looks much different from the Cold War world. A major transition is under way, one comparable only to the early fifties, when NATO and the European communities were created. The framework of the transatlantic relationship is changing dramatically. The days when American GIs defended the freedom of Berlin and the West against a common adversary are over. Indeed, today we are dealing with a new, complex reality — globalization, fragmentation, and multipolarity are its main features.
Not only the global framework of our relations is undergoing a major metamorphosis. The same is true of our countries themselves — Germany, the European states, and the U.S. I would like to mention only two telling examples. Our inability to stop mass killing and violence in the Balkans in the early nineties was among the most frustrating experiences in my professional career. Today, over six years later, the Europeans have become the main contributors to the political, military, and economic stabilization efforts in the Balkans, for which the U.S. contribution nevertheless remains crucial. Germany, in particular, is one of the largest providers of troops in Kosovo. How times have changed!
My second example: In the nineties, many American observers considered the idea of a common European currency just another European fantasy, which would never materialize. But the euro came, and its introduction in 1999 was a quantum leap in European history. For the first time since the Roman Empire, Europe has a single currency. We will not stop here. The introduction of euro bank notes next year will bring further visible changes in the political psychology of Europe. It will accelerate our efforts to move forward with political integration.
Finally, as we and the world around us are changing, so too is our relationship to each other. It is perhaps less emotional than during the Cold War; the tone has become more business-like — which is a normal and welcome development between partners. But the changes run deeper. Both my American counterpart in Berlin and I are confronted with issues to which almost nobody paid attention 10 years ago. Europe's strong criticism of the death penalty or the right to bear arms in the U.S. and its resistance to importing products made from genetically modified organisms (GMOs) sometimes gain more public attention than do questions of European security. Nor 10 years ago would German-American child custody cases have ever made it to the front page of the Washington Post and the briefing books of the German chancellor and the U.S. president.
The list of new controversial issues goes on. What these issues have in common is that they are related to our different "ways of life" and their underlying values. Is it, then, correct to say that the community of values quoted in countless NATO communiqués and speeches is an illusion, that Americans and Europeans follow different sets of values, and that, consequently, we will drift apart ? Are we still sharing one bed but dreaming two different dreams?
Any response to this crucial question must start with the observation that Europe and America are part of what I would call an Atlantic civilization. It is based on the belief in the freedom and dignity of every human being, as enshrined in the U.S. and European constitutions. And it rests on the conviction that only democratic institutions and the rule of law can ensure a truly civil society. It is this common philosophical heritage tracing back to antiquity, the Judeo-Christian tradition, and the Enlightenment which distinguishes our relationship from that of any other two regions in the world.
Having said this, it is obvious that Europeans and Americans do not always agree on the hierarchy of their common values. The triumph of liberty and the end of the Cold War have made it more evident that there are two Western interpretations of freedom, resulting in two clearly distinct forms of society. Americans emphasize individual freedom and responsibility and distrust strong government, whereas Europeans define the social responsibility of the state in much broader terms. While Europeans are proud of the achievements of the social market economy, Americans tend to consider it one of the reasons for Europe's economic problems in the age of globalization.
Most of these and other cultural differences are not new. They have always been essential components of our cultures. During the Cold War, however, they did not matter, because our top priority was to overcome the challenges of the East-West-conflict. Today culture matters again. The result is what I call the transatlantic paradox: As our societies become more intertwined than ever before, we are much more aware of our differences — thanks in large measure to the media. An American scholar and former diplomat has put it this way: Our societies are not growing apart, they are colliding with their different "ways of life".
I am deeply convinced that the success of our relationship will depend on our ability to better understand and manage these cultural differences. What is required above all is a new way of thinking and, not least, a new realistic approach to the transatlantic community of values. We therefore need a debate on our Atlantic civilization in the age of globalization. Rethinking the moral and philosophical foundation of our relationship means providing answers to crucial questions such as: What is holding us together? Where do our social values and moral imperatives diverge? Where do they overlap? Which contribution can the Atlantic civilization make to a more secure, more prosperous, and more stable world ? This task extends well beyond diplomacy. The media, lawmakers, churches, NGOs on both sides of the Atlantic, as well as academic institutions like the BMW Center, must make a contribution to this debate. It could be that, at the end of the day, we agree on a formula for the transatlantic relationship which, in the context of European integration, is often referred to as "unity in diversity".
Anrede,
The "cultural gap" is not the only hot issue in transatlantic discussions. Some people even talk of an emerging "strategic divide" between Europe and the U.S., 10 years following the end of the Cold War. Indeed, there is a widespread perception here that the Europeans are not carrying an appropriate share of the burden in safeguarding security and prosperity in Europe and worldwide, that they lack a strategic understanding of the new security threats emanating from "states of concern". Europeans, on the other hand, ask themselves whether the last remaining superpower is adopting a more unilateral approach and paying less attention to the concerns of its allies. The recent reaction to the U.S. decision on Kyoto was a good example of these concerns.
One cannot deny that there are, on occasion, diverging strategic views on either side of the Atlantic. The U.S., as a world power, is militarily engaged in regions where the Europeans have only economic interests — in particular, in Asia. Russia is another example. For Germany and its European partners, Russia is part of our continent and history, a framework from which we cannot escape. America has a more insular and, consequently, more detached view of Russia. The cover story of the latest Atlantic Monthly had the telling title: "Russia is finished. The unstoppable descent into social catastrophe and strategic irrelevance." For Europe, Russia will never be irrelevant; we simply cannot afford to neglect this huge neighbor.
Diverging assessments of strategic interests on both sides of the Atlantic stem not only from our geopolitical situation but also from our different approaches to foreign policy. For Europeans, multilateral cooperation and the transfer of sovereignty to supranational institutions have been an essential part of the new culture of cooperation in Europe. Indeed, this approach has become the foundation of the European success story after 1945. American strategic thinking, on the other hand, is largely influenced by the fact that the U.S. is a nation-state which is nearly a continent onto itself. Limiting its own sovereignty and engaging in multilateral cooperation does not seem to be a natural reflex in such a situation. This has far-reaching practical consequences as demonstrated by the U.S. position on multilateral agreements such as the Kyoto protocol, the International Criminal Court, or the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty.
We must be aware of these differences when we work together. However, they do not constitute evidence of a "strategic divide" between Europe and America. After six years as German Ambassador to the U.S., I am more convinced than ever that it would be a fatal mistake for Europeans and Americans to believe that they could go their own way. Despite our differences, we remain indispensable partners to each other.
The Europeans know that, without the U.S., we will never be able to establish a just and stable peace order for the whole of Europe which includes Russia and the other successor states of the Soviet Union. The history of the Balkans in the last decade has demonstrated that America's political and economic weight is indispensable to securing stability in Europe. At the same time, the rationale behind the U.S. decision in 1945 to stay in Europe remains valid. The U.S. has a vital interest in a democratic and stable Europe with open and vibrant markets.
In the age of globalization, our common agenda and our responsibility extend well beyond Europe. Only a strong transatlantic relationship can provide the backbone of a stable world order, which still does not exist and in which we both have a vital interest. The U.S. is the last remaining superpower. No major global issue can be resolved without it, and certainly not against it. On the other hand, it is clear that there is no such thing as a Pax Americana. America needs partners – and Europe is still its closest one.
Only together can the EU and America — both islands of stability and prosperity — provide the critical mass necessary to shape globalization according to their interests. Together, we can function as an engine for progress and peace and find viable answers to new challenges, such as the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, organized crime and terrorism, global warming, and migration. Our joint efforts to foster democracy and a free market economy in Central and Eastern Europe, to promote nuclear safety in Russia and the Ukraine, or to fight AIDS and other diseases are impressive examples of what we can achieve. In this sense, the Euro-Atlantic partnership is truly an enabling partnership. If we do not cooperate, however, we will block each other. Kyoto and the WTO are striking examples of this. Moreover, transatlantic disagreement would send the wrong signal to the enemies of democracy, human rights, and market economics.
Our joint success will decisively depend on our ability to adapt our instruments and institutions to new challenges. Let's start with NATO. NATO will remain indispensable as long as we have not achieved the Alliance's main political goal: a sustainable peace order for the whole of Europe. But since the geostrategic situation in Europe and the world has fundamentally changed, NATO too must change. The threat of a major European war has faded away. Russia and the Ukraine are seeking access to Europe. NATO has accepted new members, and its door will remain open in the future. At the same time, we are being confronted with new security risks and threats, such as ethnic conflicts, terrorism, and the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction. We must react to these new scenarios. Whether we like it or not — operations such as peacekeeping in the Balkans will be an essential part of NATO's mission in the future. U.S. participation in such operations will continue to be vital to NATO's success and provides an important signal for America's continued engagement in Europe. That is why the new U.S. Administration's commitment to stay militarily engaged in the Balkans is so important.
There is a growing sense in Europe, however, that the EU must assume more responsibility also in the security and military field in order to fulfill its role as an anchor of stability in Europe. That is why the EU has decided to set up a common European Security and Defense Policy, including a rapid reaction force totaling 60,000 troops by 2003. Although it is clear that this force will be deployed only where NATO as a whole decides not to engage, I still sometimes find it difficult to convince our American friends that we are not setting up an independent army outside NATO. To all the skeptics, I would like to say that the U.S. will profit from a strong, effective European pillar. Only a EU capable of taking military action will make it possible to achieve the balanced burden-sharing within the Alliance called for by the U.S. A united, democratic Europe has been a major goal of America's Europe policy for 50 years. Now that the EU is preparing to realize this goal and place its security and defense policy on a common basis, there is no reason for the United States to change its position.
Anrede,
The famous German foreign minister Walter Rathenau once said that the economy is our fate. More than 80 years later, globalization has made this all the more true. None of my predecessors probably has spent as much time on economic issues as I have — not because I have a special interest but because these issues are so important. The U.S. and the EU make up a huge economic area, which last year had a trade volume of over 350 billion dollars. European companies are the most important foreign investors in 41 of the U.S. states. In the past years, German companies alone have created over 600,000 new jobs in the U.S. On the other hand, the U.S. is the largest investor in eastern Germany. Never before in history were the economic interests of Germany, Europe, and the United States as interwoven as they are today. Some people even talk about a new emerging economic continent called "Transatlantica".
"Transatlantica" offers enormous opportunities, but transatlantic economic integration can also lead to trade conflicts on bananas, hormone-treated beef, Airbus subsidies, and other issues. Problems like these make up only 2 percent of transatlantic trade – but given the great media attention they arouse, trade conflicts can cast a shadow on transatlantic relations. That is why we need to manage our transatlantic market more efficiently with better early warning mechanisms. Some of the problems with which we are dealing — such as the hormone-treated beef issue — result from the "cultural gap" I mentioned earlier. Europeans just do not like hormone-treated beef. For the most part, however, trade conflicts stem from regulatory issues involving important business interests. Finding reasonable compromises on these issues will be one of the major challenges facing us in the years to come.
Anrede,
Relations between the EU and the U.S. extend well beyond transatlantic trade. In the new millennium, we have a common global political agenda, as already laid out in the New Transatlantic Agenda of 1995. We have made considerable progress towards tackling this political agenda. We are coordinating our efforts to fight international crime, terrorism, and drug-trafficking. And we are cooperating to prevent nuclear proliferation on the Korean peninsula. There are many other positive examples — but there is always room for improvement. I sometimes ask myself whether the existing cooperative structures are adequate to deal with the challenges we are facing and whether a review of our bilateral political structures might not be in order. Efficient institutions alone, however, are not enough. Much depends on the mindset of those who run them. And — in particular the Europeans — must learn to think globally and strategically. And we must recognize that multilateral action is the only solution to problems that do not respect national, or even continental, borders.
Anrede,
I have talked a lot about ideas and institutions. The core of our relationship, however, was and is interaction between the people on either side of the Atlantic. Never before in history have so many individuals in Europe and the U.S. been interacting as they are today — owing to our business relations, tourism, and, last but not least, the Internet. More and more Germans and Americans are working together in transatlantic companies that can no longer be defined as American or German.
Yet, the debate about the cultural gap indicates that there is still a considerable lack of understanding. The picture Americans have of Germany is still dominated by the Third Reich, some aspects of Bavarian culture, and luxury cars. But that is certainly not all there is to Germany. I would be pleased if we could convey a more modern picture of Germany as a country with a stable democracy, a country which is committed to the cause of freedom and lives up to its greater responsibilities.
Misperceptions also still exist regarding the EU. Time and again, I have been astonished at how few Americans really understand the new culture of cooperation in the EU, with its very special form of decision-making. Most people continue to view the EU mainly as a free trade area and tend to neglect its political dimension. Only very few people here in Washington fully appreciate that the EU's contribution to stabilizing Central and Eastern Europe — 136 billion euros from 1990 to 2006 — amounts to a European Marshall Plan.
On the other hand, the picture Germans and Europeans have of the U.S. is often shaped by clichés that have nothing to do with reality. To give you one important example in the context of the "cultural gap" debate, most people in Europe are not aware of the overriding importance of religion in American politics and society or the significance of the First Amendment.
There is no doubt that we need to invest more in transatlantic public diplomacy, more in dialogue and contacts, in particular, between decision-makers and opinion leaders. Such an approach is essential if we are to succeed in learning to see the world through each other's eyes.
Take, for instance, our parliamentary contacts. In my view, it would be important to give more Congressional staffers the opportunity to spend some time as interns in European institutions in order to gain a first-hand impression of the EU. In Germany, we still lack a think tank focusing on policy-oriented transatlantic studies. Why not set up such an institution, which would cooperate closely with think tanks here in Washington?
The Euro-Atlantic zone is a fantastic laboratory of what will or will not be possible in the world of the 21st century. We are facing so many similar challenges — the future of social security and Medicare, the aging of our societies, the ethical limits of genetic engineering, migration, energy policy, and so on. Even if we do not always find the same solutions, we can learn much from each other — from our successes as well as from our failures. The "cultural gap" is not only a burden — our diversity is also an opportunity. We need to take advantage of it.
Anrede,
At the beginning of my speech, I pointed out that we are "present at the creation“ of a new transatlantic world. Together, we won the Cold War; together, we have the chance to build a stable world based on cooperation, not confrontation. My advice after six years as German Ambassador to the U.S. would be: Let's not lose sight of this big picture; let's put our controversies in perspective and relate them to our vision. I am sure that they will look smaller and much more manageable than many people would have us believe. In order to be able to modernize the Euro-Atlantic partnership and live with our differences, we need strong political leadership and a constant effort from both sides. But if we keep the strategic wisdom and patience we have shown over the last 50 years, we do not need to worry about the future of the Euro-Atlantic partnership in the new millennium.
Anrede,
In a few weeks, I will leave Washington and take on my new job as state secretary of the Foreign Office. It will not be easy to say good-bye to so many good friends. I am grateful for all the support so many people have given to me during my tenure in Washington. I can assure you that the BMW Center and Georgetown University will have a special place in my heart.
At the same time, I am looking forward to living in Berlin, my birth place. You can be sure that I will not forget America there - not only because it will continue to be part of my work. In some respect, Berlin is the most American of all European cities — without America there would be no free Berlin and no united Germany. Berlin's openness, its drive, its zest for life, its multicultural character — all this reminds me of America. Berlin is a work in progress — just like America. I am sure, therefore, that it will be easy for me to keep America in my heart. Thank you very much. |
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