The Self-Restraint of Power Must be Maintained:Germany's Role and Objective in the Globalized World of the 21st Century

Address by Joschka Fischer, then-chairman of the German parliamentary group Alliance 90/The Greens, to the German Society for Foreign Affairs Berlin, June 8, 1998

Note: The original version of this address and that of the chairmen of the various parliamentary groups is available in: Karl Kaiser, ed., Zur Zukunft der deutschen Außenpolitk. Reden zur Außenpolitik der Berliner Republik. Bonn: Europa Union Verlag, 1998.

Continuity and Change - an exciting book soon to be published by the American political scientists Andrei Markowits and Somin Reich about the German dilemma addresses this very question. Markowits/Reich understand the German dilemma as a barely soluble contradiction between two objective facts of the German situation: on the one hand the strategic power of unified Germany and on the other the power of the collective memory or, if you like, the curse of the German history. They consider both facts to be factors which will continue to influence and determine Germany’s role in Europe. The authors raise the question of whether there remains, post unification, a new and still open German question. And they ask: What will unified Germany do with its power in this situation? How will it orient itself? But in the view of current German domestic policy, these questions seem to be quite far-fetched. It is obvious that this Germany, with its increased power, is peaceful and democratic, this Germany is integrated into the West and into Europe. The fact, then, that two American experts on Germany who are inclined very favorably towards Germany raise this question is something which should give us pause. Will unified Germany remain the European engine for integration after the era of Kohl?

Before addressing this issue, I would like to comment on the historic ambivalence of German foreign policy as it was designed after the end of the Second World War, after 1949, in the Western Federal Republic. This German post-war foreign policy quickly wound up in a double-bind situation. It was marked by double mistrust, reacting to activity as well as to passivity. This will remain a constant of German foreign policy for quite some time, namely the contradiction between the power inherent in this country due to its objective strength and strategic potential, and, at the same time, the power of collective memory of our horrible, our catastrophic national history. This contradiction will keep alive a deep mistrust against Germany for a long time, a mistrust we should not shy away from. What is most important in this context is to face the core of Germany’s great failing in this century, namely the Holocaust and Auschwitz. This fact will remain the strongest power-political reality for unified Germany.

We will therefore be well advised to accept this first constant of the old Federal Republic as a basic foundation for the Berlin Republic. From this double-bind situation, West-German foreign policy concluded that it will follow a policy of self-restraint, in other words a constrained foreign policy which no longer directly pursues national interest politics and which includes a clear rejection of any power-state politics. It also includes a special relation and particular responsibility towards Israel. This is another constant ensuing from what has been said.

Will Germany remain the engine for European integration? And to what extent will the first constant of self-restraint determine German foreign policy in the future?

Once again I would like to point to the political difference between the fact that national interests exist, which I do not deny, and any insistence on national interests. This difference is of political significance. For if younger representatives of German mainstream parties, some of whom are already in important positions today, believe that they should increasingly use national interests as the scale for Germany’s Europe policy, then we in Europe will be in for a big surprise. That is, we will soon meet with a unified defence-front of our neighbors and we will come to realize that the European system of balance with its imperatives will continue to exist even under the cover of European integration. We will experience the whole misery of de-facto coalitions against German interest politics and against all the other things that were not overcome in the old Federal Republic, though they were controlled and restrained for the benefit of all of us.

Indirect interest politics, this is the second lesson that we must carry over from the Western Federal Republic into the Berlin Republic. Partnership and the priority of European integration are the lesson that will allow us to continue building the European house. If Germany was to formulate a direct interest policy, the existing dilemma of mistrust would be exacerbated. Thus my ceterum censeo, and here I fully agree with the Federal Chancellor, that we will entangle ourselves in the old contradictions of the European state system if the European unification process does not go forward or will not be concluded.

Another constant, in addition to the one of self-restraint, is the Western integration. This tie to the West has a domestic and a foreign policy dimension. In foreign relations, the Western integration was more a matter of the democratic Right or the „security community". The political Left had a hard time with that concept. In domestic politics however, the Western integration was more of a left issue: democratic principles, grassroots democracy, constitutional patriotism, those were issues not that easily embraced by the democratic Right in the past. The fact is that the integration into the West was our belated, civic revolution, though forced upon us from outside, it was our democratic revolution. It held true only for the Western part of Germany for more than 40 years, and now, after the great peaceful revolution of 1989, it has taken hold of all of Germany. We have no other democratic tradition than this one. To give up our Western ties, in domestic or foreign policy, would be much more than a new orientation of foreign policy. It would mean cutting off Germany’s only living democratic and revolutionary tradition. Despite all objections one might raise against it, Germany’s integration into the West is indispensable for this reason, be it in domestic or foreign policy.

The Western integration leads to the third constant: European integration. I never tire of stressing this point, because I believe that we will see, in the coming years, the beginning of a debate and the dissolution of a time-honored consensus regarding Germany’s European integration, especially in the democratic parties of the Right. This development will run parallel to the development of conservatives in Great Britain or of the Gaullists in France. The continuing European integration process has made visible, in my view, a looming fracture in the conservative camp in Germany as well, and this would of course have massive effects, speaking in domestic policy terms, on the legitimacy of Europe policy.

Germany has interests. They are defined by its security needs, the necessity of a democratic constitution, its economy, its welfare system and its basic principles. In view of Germany’s geopolitical situation, its political weight and its historic experience, the interests of our country have to be pursued within the European integration process. This decisive basic fact of German policy must remain valid for the Berlin Republic. The conclusion of the European Union is in our highest national, and also European, interest.

It is a fascinating process: The European integration process signifies a break in the European history of power states as it has existed until now. On the one hand, Brussels and European unification represent the escalation and implementation of national interests par excellence, on the other hand, they are being broken into a European integration pattern at a permanent and institutional level. Never before has the interest policy of European national states been shaped less by interests than in the context of integration, even though that is where they pursue their national interests vehemently. This integration process means in practice a transfer of power from the national state to Europe. This is an unheard of process in view of European history. This transfer of power has now, with the transition to the European economic and monetary union, reached a really new quality for the first time, since for the first time a key area of national sovereignty, the sovereign control over monetary policy and currency, has been transferred to a European institution. Rightly there has been criticism that this process was technocratic rather than democratic, that it was not initiated and accompanied by a European democratization process. Nevertheless, Maastricht has resulted in a new quality of European unification, and I hope that the transfer of the economic and monetary sovereignty to a European institution will, no, must, be followed by the next integration measure. Otherwise the economic and monetary union will fail, since the European Central Bank alone, in a real crisis, does not have the necessary political legitimacy to make appropriate painful decisions which are capable of gaining majority support in the national states. The indirect representation through the European governments, however, will not suffice. The common currency will have to lead to common responsibility, a common economic and social area, and especially a common political responsibility. If this is how one sees things, then the process must not be disrupted or even slowed, then the role of unified Germany as integration engine must be affirmed and one must try to achieve a national majority for unpopular decisions.

I would like to add a fourth constant of German foreign policy to the three already mentioned. In addition to the self-restraint of policy, Western integration and European integration, comes the lasting rejection of any form of „great power" thinking, a clear affirmation of peace as a principle and an unshakable commitment to human rights.

Our history and future demand from us that we further European unification on the basis of these constants. How could we even imagine the future of Europe, under the conditions of a globalized world economy, if we were to remain separate as national states? With all my best efforts I can only imagine it negatively as a declining development against the background of considerable dependency on foreign trade for our social transfers. What is needed here to maintain the welfare system and what will then rightly be invested by way of social transfers in social justice, must first be earned in the world markets and in international trade. Particularly if one wants to preserve this European welfare state under the conditions of a globalized world, one must give priority to the question of politics aimed at European integration and the capacity to conclude this integration so that Europe as a political entity will remain capable of acting, in a globalized world, tomorrow and the next day.

What lies in Europe’s future? The Eastern expansion of NATO has become reality. Eastern expansion of the EU, infinitely more complicated, will also have to happen eventually or else we can expect a „big mess" in Central Europe. The problems we are facing in former Yugoslavia today are possible in other countries as well. Without the possibility of European integration, including, by the way, the Yugoslav nations, I cannot imagine a durable solution to the conflicts there. That will take quite some time, but nevertheless we must offer this concrete European perspective.

We are just beginning to realize how small this, our Europe really is. We are realizing that Germany, suddenly enlarged, can no longer keep out of all these affairs. This is why the question of Europe’s finality has arisen now, in direct connection with the monetary union. We must begin the debate about the final shape of the European Union today. This must and will be, above all, a political debate, a constitutional debate. The key issue will be the relationship between national states and the European Union. Will there be a Federal State or a loose confederation? Or will the Union stop at the economic and monetary union? These questions belong on today’s political agenda since the economic and monetary union marks the beginning of the crystallization of Europe as a subject of international law. Whether we like it or not, this will occur for the first time with the common currency. The next steps will have to follow. How will a European legislature be constituted? How will we succeed, with the public of the national states remaining the same, to form a European policy out of the different domestic policies? I do not foresee the dissolution of the European national state, and I do not foresee a Europe of regions. I do believe that the regions will be of great importance, but the European national state will prove to be tenacious. And there will be a great argument in its favor, that is the national state is home to those living in it, a cultural, social, historical and political home. Europe as a super-structure will not be home, least of all the mega-structures of anonymous global markets. So if we do not want to lapse back into crude nationalism, if we do not want to open the way to new temptations, then the European national state, and especially national traditions and cultures, will remain of the greatest significance despite any coalescence of Europe and its peoples. That means that the political level of the national state, different, for example, from the states in the US, will continue to have a more dominant and greater role in a future European constitution.

How can you overcome the language barrier, how can you create the forum for a joint discussion? I can only imagine the integration of the respective political-parliamentarian elite of participating national states. These deliberations lead me to enhance the status of the European Parliament as a directly elected body, with all rights of sovereignty due to a parliament, and supplemented by a second chamber constituted not by the governments, comparable to our Bundesrat, but by the respective national parliaments. We have to bring the different political elites together to create a common European responsibility, or else there will be no European discourse, and without a European discourse, there will be no European policy.

An additional element of continuity now of particular relevance in our foreign policy are the close German-French relations. I do not believe that it is possible in the near future to transform this crucial axis into a triad including Great Britain, as was suggested by the Social Democratic candidate for chancellor. I would not be opposed to it should it work. Only I do not yet foresee the necessary preconditions, considering the British policy on Europe. In the end, this will result only in mistrust in Paris but no real European progress. Once Great Britain will make a definitive decision for Europe, then this debate will have to be reopened.

All these considerations lead to a resounding Yes to European integration, and therefore also to integration in terms of security policy. I approved the Eastern expansion of NATO for this reason, but also because I believe that Poland, the Czech Republic, and Hungary want to accede to NATO for two reasons, and this holds true particularly for Poland. One reason is Russia, and the other one is Germany. A rejection would be interpreted quite differently in Poland than the reasons one could raise here in view of German domestic policy. This was also a reason why I agreed to the Eastern expansion of NATO. Of course this expansion raises problems that NATO alone cannot solve. Where will the definitive borders be? Will a new line of confrontation arise there? Can the problem of the Baltics be solved within the framework of this NATO expansion? How will Ukraine be defined? What will happen to the democratization of Russia? Russia will remain an important security partner for Germany, for a unified Europe, for the West in general. And Russia will not continue in its present state of weakness forever. Those who know Russian history know that there has always been an up and down, and that it will continue to be so. All these questions cannot be solved within the framework of the existing security structure. In my view, then, a Yes to the Eastern expansion of NATO also means a Yes to changes towards a pan-European security system, including Russia in the long-run. I deliberately used the word security system and not military system. It will be decisive to see whether it is possible to develop, out of this military system, out of this military alliance, a pan-European security architecture in which the military components will play less and less of a role. If we succeed in this, then the NATO expansion towards the East will be successful. If it does not succeed, and if instead a new military structure will be created, then the Eastern expansion of NATO will prove to be a historic error. To raise this question is also to answer it, that is, to make every effort to ensure that this pan-European security architecture can be realized.

As far as transatlantic relations are concerned, Germany will for quite some time, until European unification has progressed, remain in a position between France and the United States. The most recent Gulf crisis has proven this. I warn against a bilateralism with the United States, as also against bilateralism with France beyond the European integration policy. One thing has become apparent since 1990, and especially since 1992: Europe is not capable of solving its own security problems. This is part of this terrible lesson Europe has learnt from the Bosnian War and the break-up of Yugoslavia. Only after the United States, for the third time this century, intervened in Europe, peace, or rather non-war, was established. Europeans were not able to achieve this.

If we speak about the pan-European security architecture, we must also speak about strengthening multilateral structures. We then have to develop instruments such as the OSCE and give new meaning to those that are even more rudimentary. In the area of implementing human rights, monitoring conflicts and monitoring democratic elections, the OSCE has achieved extraordinary results. I think it is of the highest importance to expand and strengthen it and maybe steer it in the direction of a European Security Council which should then also be equipped with the appropriate instruments to impose sanctions. That would mean transferring power a little bit, away from the national states and their interest-oriented policy, to a multilateral pan-European structure.

When I look beyond Europe, I also see great tasks ahead. Globalization is a reality which this country cannot escape. Globalization, however, will change the basis for human rights. The East Asian crisis has shown that a country which suppresses information, which prosecutes environmental groups, which makes information regarding environmental destruction a state secret, which responds to the publication of such information with criminal prosecution, that a country, which does not respect minorities and human rights, which makes arbitrary use of its constitution, that such a country is also a bad country as far as the safety of investments is concerned. This triad in the East Asian crisis, contempt for human rights, environmental destruction and the corresponding investment debacle, shows that globalization also presupposes a democratic culture. This is not about a so-called -"human rights imperialism" of the West. To the contrary, especially the rich Western industrialized countries will have to disarm ecologically speaking, so that others can take advantage of urgent development. It is also not about fixing salaries through international agreements to be earned in India or other threshold countries, but it is only about enforcing their human rights. The rest will be done in free self-organization, as in other places. The freedom to organize and constitutionally attested rights for the individual and democratic organizations are an integral part of a globalizing world. Otherwise, as can be seen in the East Asian crisis, suppression of human rights will lead to failure at an economic level as well. And this is exactly why I find that the human rights policy presently pursued by our Government not only leaves something to be desired, but is also plain short-sighted. I think it most likely that the next big surprise awaiting the West will come out of China. The problems facing that country, the social problems associated with the transition from state economy to market economy, the environmental problems, the suppression of human rights and democracy, going hand in hand with corruption of gigantic proportions, all these problems will make many investments appear short-sighted. That will not help to improve the situation. Don’t misunderstand me, I am not saying that we should completely isolate China, that would not solve the problem. I just wish for a different emphasis, and that means a different emphasis in dealing with the opposition. This is not just a question of politics but also an economic question. I remember some praise in the past about how things are done in East Asia, referring to Asian values and how in Asia investment efficiency has priority over democracy and similar views. Business circles here at home were until recently quite approving of such things.

They must have soon forgotten the lesson from the so-called Eastern block and East Germany, that is how important the dissident factor proved when it came to implementing democracy and a stable market economy. Some members of the business community seemed quite impressed, at the beginning of the East Asian crisis, by the more relaxed way human and freedom rights were dealt with. But this kind of thinking is short-sighted, because human rights and environmental protection will be the power-political questions par excellence of tomorrow. The distribution of resources will be charged dramatically if we continue with the blind use of resources. The North-South question will therefore come back with a vengeance in international politics in the 21st century.

It is disturbing that at present the security discussion seems to be narrowing. Once a situation calls for soldiers to intervene in a conflict, it is most often too late already. It will not be NATO or any other military alliance that will be able to reach a balance between North and South, but it will be the United Nations. To achieve a substantial reform and to bring to bear the weight of Germany is more important than a permanent seat on the Security Council. Germany should do everything in its power so that the seats of the European nuclear powers will be Europeanized step by step. This is a difficult task, but it will be no more difficult than getting a permanent seat for Germany on the Security Council. The UN should be used much more than now as a venue for international reconciliation and more emphasis should be placed on its instruments to achieve North-South harmonization. In other words, in view of the problems facing the world of tomorrow, I think it is high time for a power transfer to multilateral structures, for a transformation of classic power into the rule of law, for a balance of interests and the civilization of international political systems.

Classic and military power politics will continue to play an important role for quite some time, but it will not really be able to contribute to the solution of urgent global problems, such as the climate problem, the waste of resources, overpopulation and unfair distribution of opportunities. Globalization is thus not only an economic question, but it entails the responsibility for the solution of global problems. This is the real globalization we will have to deal with in the 21st century. To find answers here will not be possible, I believe, in the framework of classic European nation states, but only in the framework of a strengthened international structure, with a power transfer to international organizations, with the United Nations on top. In the era of globalization, we can achieve all of this if Europe will become a concrete reality and if the foreign policy of the Berlin Republic will seriously use Germany as an integration factor and an integration engine of a unifying Europe. This is our most important task lying ahead.

German Information Center

Advanced Search    Help

Statements & Speeches

Subscribe Here You can also read the current issues here.

Printer-Friendly Page