"Reconciliation Instead of Rifts"

by Wolfgang Ischinger German Ambassador to the United States

Ambassador Ischinger

This essay appeared in the August 25, 2005, AICGS Advisor. It was first published on July 28 in German in the Rheinischer Merkur weekly newspaper.

While official government relations are on track (again), public opinion on each side of the Atlantic is judgmental, in part almost hostile, toward the other side. Only about 40 percent of Germans now view the U.S. as a positive force in the world. Two-thirds of surveyed Britons think that America does not take the interests of others enough into account. The ability of the U.S. to lead morally and politically is largely disputed.

On the other side, things are hardly much better. Europe does not enjoy a good reputation in America. It is viewed as ossified, incapable of reform, and hopelessly committed to the principle of social welfare. The current crisis in the European Union - with reports of virulent disputes, battles over which direction to take the EU, and budget impasses – has only served to strengthen this impression. It is perhaps an irony of history that just at the moment where official Washington has rediscovered the virtues of the European Union and President Bush is publicly praising the partnership with Europe, Europe is slipping into a serious crisis. Particularly among U.S. conservatives, there is evident gloating over the failed EU referenda in France and the Netherlands. The world power asks itself whether Europe is relevant to its interests, "Do we even need Europe?" The Iraq crisis has left scars on both sides of the Atlantic.

Moreover, during the past decade the basis for the overwhelmingly identical interests that America and Germany have almost compulsively pursued have disappeared. To the U.S., there is no longer a need to protect Germany. And Germans, for the most part, no longer want to be protected by the U.S. Economic interdependence across the Atlantic has grown ever stronger, but our political reliance on each other has weakened. We are more secure today but also less interesting on the world political stage, at least in the view of the U.S.

So the relationship has become more complex, difficult, and cumbersome. Despite the negative experiences in Iraq, many Americans still consider the use of military force a tried and tested means to bring about change in the world. Europeans, after their experiences during the 20th century, see military means as a last resort. Americans love their military; American foreign policy is profoundly shaped by the military and often seems "militaristic." For years, the United States has been "at war," rapidly approaching 2,000 dead and tens of thousands of wounded or maimed American soldiers in Iraq. Germans, on the other hand, have never defined the fight against terrorism as a "war." This represents a deep difference that promotes tendencies among the transatlantic partners to disengage from each other. This difference is also exacerbated by the fact that Washington remains committed to the stance that the Iraq intervention is an integral part of a strategy against international terrorism - a stance which is disputed even in America. We agree in the case of Afghanistan, but not in the case of Iraq.

Now that the transatlantic political dispute over the Iraq war has been left to historians, President Bush's recent rhetoric on freedom has been met with skeptical criticism in Europe. At the same time, our fundamental goals are not so different. Let us not forget that the very first line of our own national anthem refers to freedom. And, by the way, "freedom" was the one word that East Germans called out over and over again when they came over to the West in 1989 on the trains from Prague.

So let's not leave the concept of freedom to the U.S., as though it were secondary to us or as though we did not have the same fundamental goals. It is not necessary to engage in a debate about "whether," but about "how" - about the priorities, instruments, and methods of a foreign policy committed to freedom, democracy, and human rights.

Let us confidently discuss our European approach, without letting ourselves be put on the defensive by Washington. Nowhere in the world has there been so much peaceful transformation in the past fifteen years as at the center of Europe, with Berlin as its symbol; mostly far-reaching political and economic transformation without war. With our experience, we have more to contribute to the debate about transforming the Near and Middle East than do many others!

Our views differ not only in the relationship between war and peace and in the use of military power, but also what responsibility the government has to society. The American understanding of government and society is based on personal freedom and responsibility. By contrast, many Germans skeptically ask whether citizens can even reasonably be expected to assume additional responsibility or whether the government should not bear the responsibility for the citizenry. Providing for society is not universally accepted as a government task in the U.S., but ensuring security certainly is, both at home and abroad. Kurt Biedenkopf once aptly captured these differences when he said, "In America, even the poorer classes rally around the flag; in Germany, even the middle class rallies around the social welfare state."

What should we conclude from all this? German-American relations in the future will no longer be "self-sustaining" as they once were during the Cold War era, when our interests were more or less automatically aligned on the basis of our shared threat analysis. In the future, our relations will work well only when they are actively nurtured by both sides on an ongoing basis. We need a "managed relationship;” that means we have to work on our transatlantic relations. Here are six proposals to achieve that end.

1: Political and Moral Authority

The first foreign-policy priority in the transatlantic relationship should be for the U.S.-led community of Western states to regain political and moral authority. The U.S. image has suffered world-wide, especially due to questionable incidents such as those surrounding the detention camp at Guantanamo Bay. Such installations and the policies they represent are counterproductive, as is now being ever more clearly and bluntly stated in the American debate. Instead of fighting the root causes of terrorism, these actions are creating new incentives for extremism in the Muslim world. America's image is further suffering; out of their own interest, Europeans have to say this in a frank manner to the Americans.

The West cannot afford to have its moral authority called into question - not just because its image would suffer, but also because it would threaten the unity of the West, which is defined by shared values. Unfortunately, the sad truth is that the U.S. seems to have already squandered away some of this authority – not just in the Muslim world.

It is a core task of the transatlantic community to show not only that the West knows how to defend itself - against terrorism, illegal immigration, nuclear proliferation, and drug-trafficking - but also that it is capable of "doing good" in a politically and ethically responsible manner, for the future of both the transatlantic community and the globe. Particularly on this question, the question of its fundamental values, the West must not allow itself to be divided.

2: Act with More Self-Confidence

European foreign policy will only truly be taken seriously in Washington when it systematically defines its own goals and links them to clear and concrete demands. This principle has long applied in transatlantic trade policy - and the EU is accordingly recognized and successful in this field.

As a partner of the U.S., I think the European Union should act with more self-confidence in Washington. We need to rethink the way we conduct transatlantic summit meetings. There is hardly a more pronounced contrast than the one between the U.S. president's visits to European capitals and the visits of European leaders in Washington. The U.S. presents itself in Europe with all its sense of power, while the European leadership - which, after all, does represent 450 million people - enters Washington more or less through the backdoor.

3: Set Concrete Goals

Generally speaking, there are two types of foreign policy: declarative and operative. Declarative foreign policy is when one complains repeatedly about the situation in county X, without, however, having a plan of how to change it. Operative foreign policy goes further. It defines concrete goals and implements them. A good example of operative foreign policy is the European-American policy in Afghanistan, which includes the use of joint military, political, and financial resources. In the EU, there are a handful of states, among them, the so-called EU-3 (Germany, France, Great Britain), that are capable of pursuing operative foreign policy and can make available appropriate resources. The majority of the (smaller) EU states generally limit themselves to declarative foreign policy and participation, at most, in operative foreign policy within the context of NATO or the EU.

Europe will only realistically be seen as an equal to the United States - as we so often claim to be - when the EU consistently avoids declarative foreign policy and develops an operative foreign policy. Washington neither respects nor is interested in EU communiqués without consequences.

The office of EU foreign minister, which is provided for in the EU constitutional treaty, should help in this matter. Until this office becomes a reality, we have to work around it. The EU member states capable of "operative" foreign policy must assume an informal role, together with Javier Solana and the EU Commission. The EU-3 negotiations with Iran are an interesting test case for European-U.S. cooperation in this type of operative foreign policy, regardless of whether the goal of the negotiations - namely to prevent Tehran from developing military nuclear capability - can be achieved.

An operative EU foreign policy will work only if the smaller EU member states are able to participate and are not marginalized. It has always proved beneficial to German European policy when Germany has offered to coordinate closely with the smaller member states, to listen to them, to speak for them, and never to ignore their views. It requires considerable statecraft to balance these two aims: informal leadership by some and the political participation of all - beyond any voting rights and coordinating modalities set forth in treaties.

4: Economic Reforms

Pursuing foreign policy goals means gaining influence over the decisions of others. Influence requires power - either military power, political-economic power, or power of persuasion - or a combination of all three. Europeans will want to exercise military power only in exceptional cases; therefore, we will generally have to rely on the use of political-economic means.

If Europe stagnates, then Europe's influence also stagnates; if our economy grows, so too grows our power. It's that simple, especially in the view of Washington. From this perspective, the continuation and further strengthening of a resolute economic reform agenda deserves support, not only for economic reasons. It is also in our foreign-policy interest, particularly vis-à-vis the United States.

5: Do Not Create a Counterweight

NATO and the EU must not be allowed to drift apart politically. In Washington, some continue to fear that the European Union will grow to be a global counterweight to the United States. After the experiences of the Iraq crisis, the United States should actually know by now that there is no consensus in the EU on a foreign policy directed against the United States, but the United States could always divide the EU.

European foreign policy without transatlantic coordination will always be a foreign policy that places EU unity at risk. Here, we need to think creatively about new ways of linking cooperation between NATO and the EU. Over the past few months, the German Government has made various proposals on elevating NATO to a forum for strategic dialogue and on intensifying cooperation between NATO and the EU, for example, through joint ministerial meetings.

In terms of institutions, we could go a step further and think about the European Union itself as a "member" of NATO. With the EU at the table, the necessary constant coordination between America and Europe could be achieved in a more systematic manner than before - the EU already now participates in an informal manner. Another interesting prospect is the proposal to combine future NATO summits with EU-U.S. summits, thus elevating both in importance. Such a "dual summit" could take place as early as 2006.

6: More Optimism

While Germany was holding commemorations in spring 2005 - above all, to mark the end of World War II sixty years ago, Germany's membership in NATO fifty years ago, the establishment of diplomatic relations with Israel forty years ago, and the Holocaust, through the new memorial in Berlin - America was enthusiastically planning the future. We look back a lot, America mainly looks forward.

However, Germans should learn to complement necessary retrospection with forward-looking vision and clear objectives. Let it not be misunderstood: we must not forget the terror of war, dictatorship, and the Holocaust. Particularly for Germans, that cannot be an option. But we need positive goals.

Washington would like a Germany that is excited about the future, and, in light of scarce resources, is prepared to help lead and shape the future in Europe and in the world. It cannot hurt to let ourselves be inspired just a little bit by the future-oriented optimism of our American partners and their readiness to assume personal responsibility.

Wolfgang Ischinger has been representing Germany in Washington since 2001; this article represents his personal views and not those of the German government. This essay originally appeared in the Rheinischer Merkur.

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