Speech by Foreign Minister Joschka Fischer to the German Bundestag on September 10, 2003 on the European integration process, the fight against terrorism and transatlantic relations

Madam President, ladies and gentlemen,

This debate centres on both foreign and security policy and European policy. Tomorrow being the second anniversary of the attacks of 11 September, they have also been at the centre of the work of the German Bundestag and the Federal Government for some time now.

I would like to divide the discussion of the Federal Government's foreign policy into three focal areas. One focus is the process of European integration which took a decisive step forward with the successful conclusion of the constitutional convention. We are now faced with another step. At the Intergovernmental Conference the representatives of the member states must write into law what the European Convention has prepared for them in draft form.

A further focus of the Government's foreign policy is the ongoing challenge of fighting terrorism and also - in the overall context of the European integration process, the process of Europe growing together and the shared new threats from terrorism, weapons of mass destruction and fundamentalism (which is indeed a new totalitarianism) - the redefinition of transatlantic relations.

The last focus of the debate relating to German foreign policy is the question of how to organize the world of tomorrow. In our view and that of our European partners a world of six billion people and almost 200 sovereign states will only be able to organize itself within a multilateral framework. It is also our view that the future of the United Nations is not behind it but, under such conditions, is very much still before it - as the deciding instance for an effective multilateralism like this.

The European integration process

Let me talk about Europe first. It is abundantly clear - as we can see from the present crises and as demonstrated by the entire debate this morning on economic renewal - that even the largest countries of our continent - Germany, France, Britain, Italy, Poland and Spain to name only the six largest - can no longer guarantee prosperity, security, education and training, social security and sustainable development without the European integration process, that is without being firmly anchored within Europe. To put it plainly: even the largest member states will no longer have the critical operating mass needed under the conditions prevailing in the 21st century. We would all be losers in this together if the European integration process failed to get off the ground.

Enlargement

Europe is now on the verge of enlargement. Enlargement means that we will have 25 member states. Many people, including here in Germany, are asking the question that I want to take up again: Why are we having this enlargement?

It is not only in terms of stability, peace and security that our situation following German unification has radically changed for the better due to the process of European integration. Today Germany is located in the middle of a Europe that is growing together - which, historically speaking, is a completely different situation to the one we had in previous years, decades and even in previous centuries. At the same time the fact that this Europe is enlarging provides an enormous opportunity both economically and politically. And it is one of the obligations that have arisen out of the end of the Cold War and the experience of the division of Europe.

I would like to point out something else as well. We also had to recognize that this Europe cannot pursue two different principles, that the Europe of integration cannot coexist with the Europe of nationalism. This was a terrible lesson that had to be learned by all of us Europeans in the Balkans at the beginning of the 1990s, in a conflict that cost the lives of many innocent people. It was absolutely imperative to understand that we could no longer be bystanders to such slaughter. The fact that today the western Balkans have a perspective which opens onto the Europe of integration is of central importance for our security as well.

Reform of the European institutions

For enlargement to be successful and for this Europe of 25 and more member states to function, three steps are necessary that are not formally linked but belong in a single political context. Following enlargement, the second step is the fundamental reform of the European institutions. These institutions were originally intended to serve six member states, later 12 member states and now they serve 15. With 15 it is already very, very difficult. But it will be extremely difficult, if not almost impossible, to picture a Europe with 25 and more member states that is efficient, transparent and effective on behalf of the people and the member states without a fundamental reform and without an overhaul of democracy in this enlarged Europe. This is where the real achievement of the European Convention is to be found.

The draft constitution and the Intergovernmental Conference

I would like to take up what the Federal Chancellor said this morning. At the same time, I have no idea what the Bavarian Minister-President is thinking of. Experience teaches us - and I say this out of my own personal experience, but you also saw this often enough during Kohl's term as Chancellor - that the likelihood of the different countries producing something better at the coming Intergovernmental Conference is very small given their respective legitimate national interests. However, should there actually be consensus over proposals for improvement then we will be the first to support them, because we are always in favour of improvements.

At the same time, however, we should not repeat the mistakes of Nice. The major achievement of the Convention is that, for the first time, 28 delegates comprising the representatives of the parliaments and the governments of the current and future member states and the candidate countries, the representatives of the European Parliament and the Commission - in other words the four institutional corners of the European Union - have come together and cooperated. Following the failure to draw up anything more than a minimal consensus in Nice, a consensus on the draft constitution was achieved among the 28 representatives. This is why the Federal Government is so decisively in favour of accepting this draft. Otherwise we run the risk of being left with something inferior. Of course it would be excellent if, among the 25, we could make improvements. If not, we should have the strength to allow this draft, which I regard as a very good compromise, to be written into law at the Intergovernmental Conference.

The fight against terrorism

If you had asked me before 11 September 2001 what was driving European integration I would have listed three factors: enlargement; the pressure for further integration resulting from the introduction of the euro; and international crises. Today, international crises are almost at the top of the agenda alongside enlargement. Here too, we must acknowledge that the challenge is for all Europeans to make their contribution towards the fight against international terrorism. After the murderous attack on the people and the government of the United States of America it was wholly clear to us that we needed to do the utmost - and indeed we have done - to play our part in the fight against terrorism, and not just because of our duty as an ally but also because of the realization that this terrorism, which is based on a new Islamic totalitarianism, is not only aimed at the United States of America and its people but also at us. Therefore we must confront this danger together and where necessary use force to put a stop to terrorism and to destroy its structures.

However, it has always been clear to us as well that that must not be the end of the matter. If we take the fight against terrorism seriously we must also fight the causes and intervene to bring stability wherever it draws strength from intolerable conditions and finds save havens. This must be done for as long as it takes to create the conditions under which terrorism can no longer put down roots and to rip or starve out those that have been put down.

Afghanistan

For a long time the conflict in Afghanistan was a forgotten one. It was a case for humanitarian organizations, for the United Nations and for the humanitarian aid divisions of the relevant government ministries, but it also represented a great human tragedy especially for children, the sick and the old in winter each and every year. This conflict was forgotten just like others were. It was precisely because of such a forgotten conflict that a danger to international order and stability arose on 11 September. The consequence we must draw from this is that such conflicts must no longer be allowed to sink into oblivion. This is precisely the premise upon which the task of stabilization is based.

In today's world we have to work on three levels: on the lowest level of forgotten conflicts are states with failed institutions. On the second level are conflicts where regional players are involved. The conflict in the Middle East is one of the most dangerous but the Kashmir conflict and the conflicts in the northern and southern Caucasus and in many other places in the world, particularly in Africa, are also on that level.

The top level involves the great powers and their alliances. If we take our security and that of our children seriously, we Europeans will have to get involved, particularly in our strategic environment. We must not allow a new totalitarianism to emerge. This is why we are in Afghanistan. To be in Afghanistan means that we must implement what UN Special Representative Lakhdar Brahimi achieved, which was to bring about a consensus and formulate it accordingly in the Bonn Agreement.

Our commitment will also involve devoting additional efforts to areas outside Kabul. In practice this means that we must carefully examine the extent to which we can participate - now that NATO has taken over the command of the ISAF mission - and how far we can step up our involvement outside Kabul in the coming year with a so-called ISAF island or with a provincial reconstruction team when elections will be approaching following the convening of the Loya Jirga to write a new constitution.

Mr Schäuble, I didn't quite understand what I read in the Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung yesterday. You stated that the reasons given for the mission in Kunduz were wrong. I've read it twice now and still don't understand it. But that may be my fault.

But I want to tell you why the decision to send the mission to Kunduz is the right one. You said: Herat and not Kunduz. (...) I only want to answer you directly at this point. In Kunduz we have the approval of the regional leader, to put it that way. The security conditions are similar in Herat, but the question is whether there is consensus about our going there. This was ultimately crucial in choosing between Kunduz and Herat.

As important as the non-governmental organizations are, protecting them is not the main priority. The priority is the political process. Next year we will need ISAF to be more mobile so that voter registration and election preparations can be implemented accordingly. But that alone is not enough, another priority is the expansion of institution-building. By this I mean building up the police force, civil administration, infrastructure. Of course, in this context the role of the NGOs is not at all insubstantial. That is the overall approach.

There are two further alternatives: either we restrict our presence to Kabul - that would mean abandoning the Bonn Agreement at a certain point, something which no one in all seriousness can really want - or else we need a troop enlargement of 10,000 or more, something which I quite simply regard as both inconceivable and unfeasible in the international community for practical reasons. We also have to be careful that we don't end up superimposing the question of providing help for self-help and help for regaining sovereignty with something called occupation.

These are the choices that the Federal Government is faced with. I would be glad if, following an intensive debate on the questions that are still open, we are able to depend on the broad support of the Bundestag.

Iraq

Allow me to touch upon two further points: Chancellor Schröder has already spoken about Iraq this morning. I don't want to conduct this debate in retrospect, because we have to win the peace together. But it is pointless to conduct another debate reduced to military issues. Obviously - and I say this in the direction of the Opposition - we were accused for a long time of maintaining a stance that was essentially driven by election tactics. I said repeatedly that it was not an election tactic. (...)

The second point would be about regional stability. What are the consequences?

The third question that we have always asked is: can the reasons put forward withstand tough examination? In democracies it is essential to have good reasons for the majority of the population to give its support, i.e. for the required staying power particularly when it gets difficult. Our concern was always that this might contribute to a development which would do everything but bring stability to the region. Should our repeatedly reiterating that point be referred to as instrumentalizing? Or were these not compelling reasons after all, particularly in the light of bitter experience?

I will mention a further point which I fear we will also have to deal with, namely the issue of Iraq's territorial integrity. This is also of no little consequence for regional stability. We based our position on such reasoning, and I think it involves very good and compelling reasons.

Now I don't wish to discuss the stance of the Opposition on this matter - this is not about looking back. But you should at least learn from this experience for the future. The crucial question from my point of view is whether foreign troops in Iraq are perceived as an occupying or liberating force. That is the fundamental political issue.

In other words it is not primarily a question of whether further troops should be sent to Iraq, and certainly not whether they should be western or German troops. The principal question is whether or not the strategy which has proved to have brought about a development which, to put it diplomatically, cannot be described as good, needs to be altered as a matter of necessity.

This is why we welcome the initiative of the American government to introduce a new draft resolution, for this is a very good element. We are of the opinion that the highest priority must be given to reconstructing Iraqi sovereignty and authority as fast as possible. The Chancellor pointed this out in his speech this morning.

Before that there needs to be a period of transition. The immediate withdrawal of forces would leave a vacuum which would be highly dangerous - to put it mildly.

We believe that the United Nations should play the central role during this transitional period. Commendably, this is what Kofi Annan said himself in public yesterday. I regard this as very important in view of the priority attached to Iraq's liberation and regaining its sovereignty. By the way, this is one of the key differences to the process in Afghanistan. In that country it was possible to reach a consensus which, while it is fragile and masks enormous difficulties, does at least exist. There is a political process of recovering Afghan sovereignty and this is of crucial significance.

I also regard it a matter of urgency that moderate Arab and Islamic states are involved in matters relating to both reconstruction and of security.

In addition, we are ready to participate actively in humanitarian assistance, as the Chancellor has said, as well as in reconstruction. We are ready to get involved when the conditions have become clear. There must be transparency and international control. This is a fundamental point for us.

The Middle East conflict

At the same time I observe with great concern the threat of a dramatic escalation in the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. The terror must stop. Israel's right to exist is a decisive factor for us in the Federal Government.

Its people must be allowed to live in peace. For that to be possible the Palestinians will also have to be given their own perspective. They need their own democratic state and their own future.

Thus in the end there will be no alternative to such a compromise. I therefore appeal to the parties to this conflict, particularly the Palestinian side, to do all they can to stop the terror. At the same time, I also appeal to the other side to do its utmost to enable a return to the negotiating table.

Transatlantic relations

It is these crises that make it clear just how important transatlantic relations are. Transatlantic relations are a cornerstone of peace and stability - this is crucially important to me. This means that we must treat each other as partners.

Yet it also means that we must take account of the new conditions, the new challenges and the new dangers. For our friends in the United States it means that a Europe which is growing together is, on the one hand, raising concerns, but, as we have seen in the Balkans, is also bringing an increase in partnership. We have to learn how to deal with this dynamic aspect. Thus we need a new strategic debate, a debate about basic policy issues in the transatlantic relationship.

If this can be done in partnership and on the basis of shared interests and shared values we will, I think, be able to make an important contribution to an effective multilateralism, a multilateralism to which the Federal Government is consciously committed and which is closely tied with both the integrating Europe and the transatlantic alliance.

Thank you.

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