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Transatlantic relations: Challenges and opportunities. I would like to share some observations about German-American relations, about Afghanistan, about Iraq and the war on terrorism, and about power and the global system. Where does Germany stand today? The recent elections in Germany have brought about a number of significant developments. First of all, remember that united Germany is only twelve years old. We have had a difficult job not only in creating the same standards of living in the former East German „Länder“ as in the West, but we have also had the enormous challenge of uniting two societies that had been separated not only by a wall but by two very different political systems. The September 22 parliamentary elections demonstrated that today, East Germans vote more or less like West Germans. The disappearance of the PDS as a party from the German Bundestag is an indication of convergence of voter behaviour. That’s good news because it helps to complete the difficult process of unification. At the same time, this has produced a situation where there is neither an extreme right nor an extreme left party in the Bundestag: Germany continues to be governed in the middle. The election result is thus a demonstration of maturity and stability that is good for the country, good for our neighbours, good for Europe, and good for our international situation. Germany will continue to be committed to European integration, to EU and NATO enlargement, and to German-American partnership as well as to the close German-Israeli relationship we have been able to create over the past five decades. On this basis of continuity, I am optimistic that we will rapidly overcome difficulties in the bilateral relationship which arose in the context of the German election campaign. This relationship is so deeply anchored and so broadly based that disagreements about specific issues cannot and will not make us “drift apart”. Let me talk about some of these substantive issues. First: Has Germany been a good ally of the U.S. in the war against international terrorism since 9/11? A few days after 9/11, a year ago, Chancellor Schröder stated that the attack on the World Trade Center and on the Pentagon was an attack not only against the United States but an attack against the entire civilised world, an attack against ourselves. On that basis, he announced that we were going to be in solidarity with the United States. „Uneingeschränkte Solidarität“ was the German word. In November 2001, Chancellor Schröder requested - for the first time in post-World War II history - the deployment of German troops outside of Europe, including the deployment of combat troops. Actually, Chancellor Schröder, by linking the deployment to a vote of confidence in the Bundestag, was the only Western leader who took a personal political risk in siding with the U.S. at that moment. Earlier this year in Afghanistan, we had the first German military casualties since the end of World War II. Remember what the founding fathers of post-war Germany intended to do: Konrad Adenauer’s vision was that Germany should once and for all be anchored in the West and should no longer be allowed to oscillate - so to speak - between West and East. In my view, the German soldiers who died in Afghanistan as our first military casualties since World War II symbolize something very important in this context: These German soldiers died fighting on the right side of a war, and this is the first time we can say that with certainty about the wars Germans have been fighting for the last hundred years or so. That is a historic moment in the evolution of Germany as part of the West. In other words, the vision that Konrad Adenauer described fifty years ago has become a reality. Our journey to be truly and durably part of the West has been completed. Today, Germany is, astonishingly, the European country with the most soldiers deployed abroad, side by side with Americans. With approximately 10,000 soldiers, we have more troops deployed abroad than France or Britain. When you consider that as recently as 1995 we had none, you understand how far we have come in a very short period of time. Yes, Germany has been a very good ally of the U.S in the fight against terrorism, in law enforcement, in tracking terrorists, and in bringing them to justice. Second, why then is it that we have such a disagreement about Iraq? First, let me make one thing clear: we have no disagreement regarding the threat. We share the view that the proliferation risk is a real problem. And it is actually even more of a problem to Europeans than to Americans, because we are, of course, geographically a lot closer to Iraq. We are indeed concerned about stability, about weapons of mass destruction and proliferation in our own backyard. We do support the ongoing efforts at the United Nations to reinstall an inspection regime in Iraq, and we agree that Iraq mus comply with the demand for unfettered inspections. But we do not feel that there is an urgency that would require military action against Iraq at this time. We share George Kennan’s view that the current global and regional situation is such that military action against Iraq might cause more negative than positive effects: “I fear that any attempt … to confront that … situation by military means alone could easily serve to aggravate it rather than to alleviate it.” Some have argued that focussing on Iraq now would distract the United States from fighting the war in Afghanistan. I believe that the United States government “can chew gum and walk at the same time”, as they say. Washington can handle that. That is not the problem. What is the problem is that if we engage Iraq militarily now, the fight against international terrorism might become more difficult, maybe even impossible. The coalition would risk losing support in the Muslim world. By eliminating a real or a potential threat in Iraq, we might thus fail to eliminate the threat of international terrorism. In other words: it may well be that the U.S. can militarily defeat Iraq. But by winning a war against Iraq, we might lose the one on terrorism. For example: if military action were taken against Iraq today, instability in Pakistan might follow. Pakistan is a country which has deliverable nuclear weapons. What if those fell into the wrong hands? Unfortunately, millions of Muslims are bound to interpret a military conflict with Iraq as yet another humiliation for the Arab world. That is why we would like to see a more comprehensive Western approach to the entire region, and to the issue of how best to deal with the challenge of disarming Iraq. Such a comprehensive and credible Western strategy for the greater Middle East has, however, so far not been developed. Let me suggest just a few elements of such a broader strategy: First, if you want to put pressure on someone, the first thing you want to do is to isolate him to the extent possible. Have we made a joint and intensive effort to work with Saddam’s natural adversaries in the region to isolate him? Have we, for example, developed a coherent Western strategy on Iran? Iran happens to be a militarily ambitious country with aspirations of hegemony in the region, and Iran is a natural adversary of Iraq. But there is no coherent Western strategy on Iran, and that is the first element of a comprehensive approach that in my view is missing. Second, military action against Iraq might cause a further deterioration of the Israeli-Palestinian situation. The feeling of humiliation, of frustration, of defeat on the Palestinian side would intensify. And an Israeli military reaction to an Iraqi attack might lead to a military exchange with even worse reactions in the Arab world. I would feel less uncomfortable with the idea of addressing the Iraq issue today if we had a well-functioning negotiating track between Israel and the Palestinians which would provide at least some incentive for both Israel and the Palestinians to exercise restraint. Today, in the absence of a negotiating track, there is not much of such an incentive for both sides. And that worries many Europeans. Third, there are many unresolved questions associated with “the day after”. Who would govern Iraq, and who would be responsible to create such a government? For how long would there be a need to maintain military occupation of Iraq? How would we prevent Iraq from exploding into ethnic strife which in turn would draw Iraq’s neighbours into confrontational positions? What about the implications fo the entire region? Fourth, what about non-proliferation? This is a region where everybody is fearful of everybody else. India and Pakistan went nuclear just a few years ago. From a German point of view, the global and regional non-proliferation regime needs to be strengthened. Counterproliferation alone, I am afraid, will not work. Is enough attention being paid and support being given to the CTBT, and to the implementation of the Biological Weapons Convention, just to name one or two examples? Those are just a few of the questions which lead many in Europe to believe that there would be significant risks associated with military action against Iraq in the absence of a strategy for the entire region, and that we should work together to create such a comprehensive strategy first, as we pursue our joint objective to fight international terrorism, and before we turn to Iraq. In addition, of course, Germans tend to worry far more than Americans when the question of war arises. In German, the word for war is „Krieg“. And when you mention „Krieg“ in Germany, it creates extremely negative reactions. No one in Germany can be elected in a parliamentary election on a pro-“Krieg“ stance, because Germans remember what war did to them, and to their families and neighbors. For Germans, war means disaster, catastrophe. In America, it’s different. Americans believe that war can be a good thing. You have been fighting wars overseas for the purpose of helping others to get rid of dictators, to bring peace and stability, and to make the world a safer place. Thus, the recent debate about war in Iraq has created a huge perception and communication problem between this side and the other side of the Atlantic, intensified through the election campaigns in both countries. That brings me to my next point: Power and global order. A few months
ago, Robert Kagan published an article about strength and weakness. Kagan
argues America is strong, and Europe is weak, and because Europeans are
weak they are not of much use, and only those who have military power
can and will actually influence the course of events in the world. When the United States defeated Nazi Germany in 1945, the decision was made that the U.S. Army would not leave after the victory. They could have gone home and left the rest to the Germans. Instead, they decided to stay and help the German nation get back on their feet. When I was a little boy in post-war Germany, my heroes were the American GIs in my home town. They were our heroes not because they had won the war, but because they were recognized as those who were going to help us to live in a better world in the future. America made an enormously important decision in those years to instill in the nations it had defeated the awareness that America was actually their big and good friend. That is the secret of the success of America in shaping the post World War II world: not only defeating your enemies, but also winning their hearts and minds. And that is a lesson to remember as we confront the challenges of terrorism and fundamentalism! This is why nation-building in the Balkans and in Afghanistan is so important, and this is why my Government has been a very strong supporter of these programs, both in terms of military peace-keeping personnel and in providing resources for relief and reconstruction efforts. Today, there are roughly as many non-American as American troops in Afghanistan, and most of the reconstruction costs in the Balkans are borne by the European Union. My final point leads me unilateralism and multilateralism. The idea of multilateralism, the idea of building international institutions, the idea of having a coherent and strong international system was an American vision created after World War I and World War II. American Presidents and statesmen invented the UN, and the rules that come with this global system. To this day, this is the backbone of the existing international system built on the ideas of cooperation, of integration and interdependence, of international organizations and institutions, and of rules applicable to all. Some have suggested that these international institutions and rules constraining U.S. power are out of date in the post-9/11-era. I disagree: a few weeks ago, I signed a German-American agreement on container safety with the U.S. Customs Commissioner. What does container safety have to do with multilateralism? Let me explain: This agreement provides for American law enforcement personnel to be able to inspect containers as they are being loaded on ships in German ports destined to go to this country. In other words: U.S. law enforcement agents can make sure in the port of Hamburg that no container with weapons of mass destruction will ever arrive in the port of New York. Thus, this agreement helps America defend itself against the new threat of international terrorism. As a matter of fact, a new global process, a new international organisation which checks people and cargo around the world, using uniform standards and sharing databases, might offer the only sustained protection against terrorism for all of us. The point is that you cannot do it without international cooperation. We need more and more effective, not weaker international institutions. I do not believe that it would be a good recipe for a super power to rely exclusively on its own military power. If I were an American policy maker I would want the world to see the U.S. as a “benevolent hegemon”, not as a power that defines its policy on the basis of narrowly defined national interests, but as a power that strives for global stability, prosperity for all, and the rule of law as a vital element of world order! This has actually been a guiding and extremely successful principle of American post-war leadership. It is important that the United States lead not by domination but by giving a good example. If the U.S., Germany, and other great nations do not sign and implement international agreements, how can we expect others to sign such agreements? If we do not do it, no one will. If America would be perceived as not respecting the UN charter, others might find themselves much less constrained to violate international law and international obligations. If America does not lead by example, others will not follow. If America does lead by example, others will follow. That is America’s global responsibility, and that is what the less powerful nations are looking for as they turn to American leadership in maintaining a global system based on fundamental values, on institutions, on rules, and on cooperation. Europe does not want to be a rival of the United States. Dick Holbrooke, one of the best U.S. diplomats, wrote an article some years ago entitled „America as a European Power“, and that is exactly what we would like to see: We want America to remain committed to its role in Europe. We want enlightened American leadership based on common interests and values. Henry Kissinger expressed this as follows: “America’s special responsibility, as the most powerful nation in the world, is to work towards an international system that rests on more than military power, indeed, that strives to translate power into cooperation. Any other attitude will isolate and exhaust us.“ And Tom Friedman of the New York Times expressed a similar idea: „America is not just about disarming rogues although we will if we have to, but also about inviting others into our future.“ It is in that sense that I think there is a bright future ahead for America and for Europe. I often hear Americans speak about the need to develop revolutionary new approaches to international security as we confront the threat of terrorism. Don’t forget that what we are doing in Europe - giving up sovereignty, creating a huge area of stability, prosperity and peace - is also truly revolutionary. The EU will be a union of 500 million people in a few years. It is a historic project, and it is of a revolutionary nature, transcending the notion of the classic nation state. The process of progressive European integration is, in my view, a striking embodiment of multilateralism and a major and lasting contribution to global stability. The EU’s progressively closer relationship with Turkey is but one example of the EU’s role as a global strategic actor. Jessica Mathews wrote some months ago: „When the U.S. and Europe see eye to eye, there is little they can not accomplish. When they do not agree, however, there is little they can achieve.“ I think that is very true. For Germany, close transatlantic cooperation is and will remain an essential element of our foreign policy. Let’s not forget: together, as Americans and Europeans, we are the only engines of growth that can drive the world economy forward. Together, we have built a multilateral trading system which is in our interest and which we need to improve and build upon. Together, we pursue the strategic aim of just and durable peace for Europe, including Russia. America and Europe should use this historic opportunity to reshape and to strengthen the international system, not to go it alone, to lay the foundations for a more stable, more cooperative, world and to consolidate a healthy transatlantic relationship. In fact, as we work together to create and to maintain a global coalition against the threat of international terrorism, we are actually moving beyond the globalization of the economy towards the globalization of politics. I am convinced that if we work together in this spirit, on the basis of our joint values, only the sky is the limit. In closing, let me remind you of what Mark Twain said during a trip to
Europe, when he was introduced to the music of Richard Wagner. When, after
the performance, someone asked him: “How did you like this music?“,
Mark Twain’s answer was: „It is not as bad as it sounds.“
In a way, that can also be said about the transatlantic relationship. |
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