Speech by Joschka Fischer, Federal Minister for Foreign Affairs,
at the general meeting of the German Society for Foreign Affairs
Berlin, 24 November 1999

In the context of the Government and Parliament move to Berlin a good many questions are being asked as to the role a united Germany is seeking to play or ought to play in Europe and the world at large. It is evident not only from the views expressed in certain London newspapers or various book publications in France but also from many recent meetings I have had that a united Germany in Berlin is watched still more closely than in Bonn, even if through its role during the war in Kosovo and dual Presidency of the EU and the G8 considerable trust has been built up.

Here at home the recent debates on the German operations in Kosovo and East Timor have revealed a deep-seated unease regarding the role of a united Germany in the wider world, culminating in charges that the Government is sacrificing German interests to America's quest for hegemony or, driven by "a missionary zeal for human rights, is succumbing to a new form of German megalomania". That is sheer nonsense and clearly has nothing to do with political realities, yet this kind of talk shows we do in fact need a broad debate on the fundamentals of our foreign policy, we need to give more thought to how we perceive our role - the principles and interests, the ties and traditions underpinning German foreign policy.

For us in a united Germany, more than in any comparable country in Europe, the way we relate to the wider world is a defining factor in our lives. The reasons are both historical and geographical. Thus in the past, from the founding of the German Empire in 1871 to the national catastrophe of 1945, there was deemed to be no alternative to the so-called primacy of foreign policy. Yet a democratic Germany, especially in the light of its now greater responsibilities in international affairs, should beware of such misconceptions. In democratic countries home affairs are clearly of key importance and rightly so. Thus the fact that Germany now shoulders greater international responsibilities does not signify any change in our fundamental national priorities, it highlights rather the need for a broad consensus on the nature of those responsibilities and the importance of support from Parliament and the public at large so that we can live up to them. Our task is to get across to our citizens what our international responsibilities are and how they relate to domestic matters here in Germany, not to invert the strategic hierarchy between domestic and foreign policy.

There has been no radical change since reunification in the basic parameters of German foreign policy. The fundamentals - geographical position, interests, values, history - are still the same. In no way has Germany become any less dependent on what goes on in the rest of the world. Indeed, its responsibility for Europe and building bridges to the East has if anything increased. European policy for peace, close partnership with Paris and Washington, friendship with all neighbours old and new as well as good relations with Moscow, in all these we have a crucial stake, for they bear directly on our most vital national interests.

Given the degree of Germany's dependence on the wider world and given our history, continuity and reliability in international affairs are indispensable attributes and no mere secondary virtues. Only if we continue a policy of wise self-restraint, mediating our interests through multilateral fora, will we be able to retain the trust and reputation for reliability and sound judgement in foreign affairs which the old Federal Republic and the new has earned in over 50 years. That, along with European union, is the most valuable asset we possess in this area. Only if we convincingly preserve this asset and are clearly seen to do so, will we find the scope we need to enable our foreign policy to make a difference in the wider world.

Over the past decade the world has experienced dramatic and fundamental change, with manifest implications in terms of foreign policy. The rapid pace of European integration calls for ever greater solidarity also in the field of foreign, security and defence policy. As former President Herzog rightly pointed out in this same forum in 1995, globalization inevitably means also the globalization of foreign policy. Given the heightened significance of human rights for peace and prosperity, the defence of human rights has become for all democracies a key foreign policy priority. The crisis in East Asia highlighted the link between democracy, the rule of law and economic progress, so that democratization has now emerged as the key issue for development in the age of globalization. For these and other reasons there is now an urgent need not for a radical overhaul but for a recalibration of our foreign policy.

There is yet another reason, to do with Germany's now greater weight in the international arena. A country cannot just opt out of the strategic potential it derives from its population, economic strength and national interests, nor can it ignore its geopolitical position. It will remain an objective power factor, whether or not it deems this politically desirable. To deny that unification has enhanced this potential would be both foolish and dishonest, sowing mistrust rather than trust. The question is therefore not whether a united Germany has more power and influence than before but how it can and should exercise that power and influence as wisely and responsibly as possible.

In a speech in Frankfurt Fritz Stern called on Germans to play a larger part in international affairs and join in shaping the future. And that is objectively necessary. However, it is essential we define exactly what are and what are not the goals of such an enhanced commitment, lest we once again sow the seeds of suspicion and mistrust.

That means first of all we must state clearly that Germany has no urge either to go it alone - any such attempts have always caused great damage - or to be omnipresent at all times, in all places, not even in defence of values and morality. A stronger international commitment can mean only one thing: a commitment to strengthen multilateralism, European integration, the United Nations and regional organizations active in the international arena.

We regard multilateralism as supremely important not just because history has taught us its intrinsic value but also because we know from experience that Germany can achieve its foreign policy goals only in cooperation with its partners and also because we are convinced the only way to address the global challenges of tomorrow's world is by working together in a spirit of fairness and partnership. Multilateralism is in essence a choice in favour of cooperation and against hegemony. In concrete terms that means Germany must shun power games, the pursuit of hegemony or narrow-minded nationalism. We want to see a civilized give-and-take between different national interests sanctioned by law and underpinned by multilateral institutions. Even today it seems nothing short of a miracle that ever since Germany, totally defeated in its ruthless pursuit of power, opted for a policy of multilateralism abroad and democracy at home, our history has taken a very different and positive course. Without this radical change of direction, we would clearly never have achieved reunification with the consent of every one of our neighbours and erstwhile enemies.

In foreign policy therefore Germany's watchword should be: maximum support for all efforts to strengthen multilateral structures, foster integration and the rule of law, but also due restraint in the matter of interventions and clear rejection of go-it-alone ventures.

This points to three areas in particular on which Germany should focus its creative energies:

Firstly, the completion of European integration, a mission to which we remain committed, and which is our foremost concern. Overcoming nationalism by integrating nations and national interests into a larger whole has meant that after centuries of internecine strife and bloodshed Europe is now enjoying an unparalleled period of peace, prosperity and stability and has enabled Germany to regain its unity with the full agreement of its neighbours and partners. European integration does not signify the abolition of the nation-state or national interests. There is indeed no forum anywhere where national interests are as vigorously articulated as in the European Union. But the truly remarkable fact is the process by which national interests are translated into the realities of European integration. Europe remains - as the Kosovo conflict once again made clear - the most successful project for peace this century of bloodshed has seen and we Germans especially have everything to gain in bringing it to completion.

The European Union is founded on an accommodation between Germany and France, and that goes for the future as well. Together Germany and France are the driving-force behind European integration and in its European dimension their special relationship is indispensable. As neighbours with a shared history, they are nonetheless very different, yet herein and in the resulting tensions lies a source of productivity, a creative potential that is the secret of this motor for integration.

Today the first and foremost strategic objective is EU enlargement. The German Government is keen to make headway here as fast as possible. We would therefore like to see negotiations on enlargement start next year with all 6 countries in the second group of candidates and the EU in Helsinki make a political commitment to be ready for enlargement by the year 2003. Setting a date for the end of the negotiations is another item that must remain on the agenda.

The intergovernmental conference on institutional reform will be of crucial importance for the viability of the enlarged Union of the future. It has to be concluded on schedule during the French Presidency next year if the target date of 2003 is to be met. There must be no overloading of the agenda, for that would delay the process of enlargement. The German Government will energetically support France, our closest and most important partner, in its efforts to bring the conference to a speedy conclusion with a package of substantive reforms.

Only as a political union will Europe be able to stand up for Europe's interests in tomorrow's multipolar world. The war in Kosovo served to reinforce the view of many in Europe that a common foreign and security policy that is operational and has effective decision-making mechanisms is now an imperative. In this area we look to Helsinki to deliver further concrete decisions, especially on organizational issues.

With the decisions of the European Council in Cologne, the development of a European security and defence policy has become a key integration project. This is due in no small measure to the more active and open-minded stance taken by London. Collective defence remains the domain of NATO. Yet Europe must as soon as possible be given the means to resolve and manage crises and conflicts on its own. That is a contribution to transatlantic burden-sharing which also enhances Europe's capacity to be a valued partner for the United States.

The renewal of transatlantic partnership is the second great task we face. The Asian crisis and the conflict in Kosovo have once again shown that, when the going gets tough, only Europe and the United States share and are profoundly committed to the same values: liberty, democracy, the rule of law and a functioning market economy. Even now the Cold War is over, the bonds between Americans and Europeans remain strong: a shared history and values, a sense of common challenge and a joint vision of how the world should look in the twenty-first century, a world of freedom and human rights, democracy and prosperity.

While there is much they share, there is no denying that, in a globalized, no longer bipolar world, both partners, the United States as well as Germany together with Europe, have undergone remarkable changes. As the world enters the twenty-first century, only the United States remains as a truly global power - in political, military, economic and cultural terms. It feels a responsibility to provide global leadership, it has global interests. Europe, however, is still a political power in the making.

Yet no one, not even a superpower, can solve the problems of tomorrow's world on their own. For that we all need partners - and Europe is America's key partner. It is a mistake to think a unipolar world is a more stable world. History teaches the opposite is true.

Europeans and Americans have a common interest in cooperating to ensure security and stability in Europe and neighbouring regions, with a special focus on Russia and the Middle East. We Europeans are ready, moreover, to shoulder international responsibility along with the United States. We are ready to make a specifically European contribution in the United Nations and other multilateral fora to promoting democracy and human rights, effective crisis prevention and peacekeeping as well as sustainable and more equitable development.

In the multipolar world of the future problem-solving will also have to be multilateral. That requires agreed rules. Germany - and that is our third major focus - is committed worldwide to a strategy of multilateralism and strengthening the role of the United Nations. An effective world organization is vital to tackle the three great problems facing mankind, safeguarding world peace, securing respect for human rights and achieving sustainable and more equitable development. The Security Council must adapt to meet the new political realities in the world, its composition must become more representative and above all it must be equipped to

respond to today's crises and conflicts. Peace policy in the twenty-first century will be largely UN-led. Germany therefore has a fundamental interest in seeing the world organization strengthened. It is for that reason - and not for reasons of national prestige - that we should be ready on a long-term basis to assume greater responsibility within the organization. On that point, however, we need first and foremost to build a broad consensus here at home.

In many parts of the world where there are "failing states" and power struggles with ethnic ramifications, armed conflict and humanitarian disaster threaten unless the international community takes prompt action to reduce the risk of violence erupting. One such instance was the grievous conflict in Kosovo. Creating a "culture of prevention" is one of the most important tasks facing both the UN and the OSCE. This is a task that deserves the fullest support from Germany, too, which is why I have invited my G8 foreign minister colleagues to attend a conference on the issue of conflict prevention in December in Berlin. This proposal has met with a very positive response.

Prevention has many aspects: promoting universal respect for human rights and democracy, the key conditions for peace both within and between countries, enhancing the role of law in international relations, making progress on disarmament and limiting arms exports, improving peacekeeping and peacebuilding mechanisms. In a wider sense EU enlargement, bringing Turkey closer to the EU and the Stability Pact for South-Eastern Europe are also examples of a preventive policy to make peace more secure. However, preventive diplomacy has a relatively small lobby and insufficient resources. The German Government is all the more dependent therefore on the support of the German Society for Foreign Affairs and the policy research institutes.

Clearly civilian conflict prevention must have priority over military responses to crises. Yet unfortunately the use of force as a last resort cannot always be avoided. Following the German involvement in operations of recent years, and after Kosovo and East Timor, there can be no more talk of any special role for us. Like other democracies Germany has an obligation to play its part in developing the international security architecture, strengthening international law and promoting respect for human rights.

The question whether force should be used to uphold the rule of law and in which international operations Germany should participate is one of the thorniest and most controversial issues in the field of foreign policy. The East Timor debate in particular made clear there is as yet no general consensus here as regards German involvement in peacekeeping operations and there is a manifest need for a fundamental debate on this whole area. I would like to contribute a few comments of my own to such a debate.

It is essential such operations are credibly sanctioned by international law. In principle coercive measures under Chapter VII should be authorized by the Security Council. Given the urgency of the situation and the particular circumstances, Kosovo was a justified exception, but it does not set a precedent.

In the light of our history as well as our political and economic weight, Germany has a special responsibility to serve the cause of peace and human rights. The world expects from us a basic willingness to work for peace and act to prevent humanitarian disasters, genocide and deportations. We are expected not just to join in ongoing efforts but also to play a major role.

Here, it is not only values but also interests that are at stake - a fact sometimes lost sight of in the debates on Kosovo and East Timor. In both cases the ethical dimension was clearly important but in Kosovo the primary issue was regional security in South-East Europe, directly impinging on the continent as a whole. Had we done nothing to counter the aggressive nationalism of Milosevic, where would we stand today, a year after the start of Operation Horseshoe? We would be facing the possibility of yet another war, in Montenegro or even Macedonia. That is why back in 1992 the then President Bush and Secretary of State Baker drew the red line in Kosovo.

By the same token, in East Timor values as well as interests were involved. Our purpose was to provide humanitarian aid but also to contribute to strengthening the mechanisms that preserve and safeguard world peace. Those who call on others to play their part in multilateral structures must be willing to do the same, even when their own country is not directly affected. Like Japan in Kosovo for example, Germany must be ready to contribute to operations also in distant parts of the world not for reasons of prestige or because we are moral zealots, as some have charged, but when, as in East Timor, the operation in question is of crucial importance for our strategic goal of strengthening multilateralism and the role of the United Nations. What would have been the reaction of international opinion if, after all the effort Germany had put into the Kosovo operation, we could not bring ourselves to make even a minimum effort in East Timor?

In all such operations there remains, however, what I call a "European preference". The reason has to do partly with Germany's history as a non-maritime and non-colonial power and partly with the way our interests and security needs intermesh. As far as commitments outside Europe are concerned, the principle of self-restraint must, if only on grounds of limited resources, continue to apply. There can therefore be no question of a new, global "humanitarian" interventionism, although the debate prompted by Kofi Annan in his brilliant speech to the Human Rights Commission in Geneva certainly needs to be pursued. National sovereignty must no longer serve as a licence for mass murder and grave violations of human rights. Nevertheless, more often than not Germany will still have to say "no". But a "European preference " can never be taken to mean "Europe only".

Solidarity with our partners is the wellspring of the trust we enjoy abroad as well as the basis on which we seek to strengthen multilateralism. Non-participation may result in self-isolation, with a corresponding loss of trust and influence. Here the European Union is our most important frame of reference.

In the final analysis it is not just principles as such but also what scope we have to give them practical substance that is important, as the war in Chechnya demonstrates. While we well understand the need to combat terrorism, waging a war against a whole nation can never be deemed a "an anti-terrorist operation". Russia risks making a grave mistake in the Northern Caucasus that could result in dangerously destabilizing the whole country as well as the entire region. The German Government together with its partners has repeatedly pressed Russia to seek a peaceful solution to the problem. Clearly, however, there is no way we can compel a major nuclear power to follow our advice.

The OSCE summit in Istanbul, overshadowed as it was by the war in Chechnya, produced mixed results. The war continues, but at least Russia has for the first time recognized that the OSCE has a role to play in the search for a political solution. We intend to hold Moscow to its word. The signing of the CFE Treaty was also of major significance, especially given the lack of headway in the disarmament process worldwide. So, too, was the Charter for European Security, whose long-term impact, like that of the CSCE documents, should not be underrated.

We Germans, more than other nations, must learn to live with contradictions and to reconcile different interests. Bismarck sought to keep relations between states in a constantly changing, precarious equilibrium, ever ready to play off one against another. Yet his model, like all such models, was inherently unstable and ultimately led to the disaster of two world wars. The strategy of multilateralism Germany has now pursued for wellnigh 50 years, based on European integration along with transatlantic partnership, the development and expansion of institutions as well as the strengthening of the United Nations and the OSCE, has been shown to be an incomparably more stable model, one that Germany will continue to pursue with the utmost vigour.

A sense of balance and proportion, of which self-restraint is an important aspect, has thus proved crucial to the success of German foreign policy. Also as we contemplate greater multilateral commitments in the future, that will be a valuable lesson to take with us into the new century.

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