|
Foreign Minister Steinmeier: German-American Friendship and European Integration are Cornerstones of German Foreign Policy
In an interview with The Atlantic Times, Foreign Minister Frank-Walter Steinmeier stresses the importance of the German-American friendship and European integration in German foreign policy and discusses numerous current international issues. The interview was conducted by Theo Sommer and Rafael Seligmann, executive editor and editor in chief, respectively, for the December issue of the monthly newspaper and is re-published here with permission.
Friendship With America
Interview with German Foreign Minister Frank-Walter Steinmeier
By Theo Sommer and Rafael Seligmann
The Atlantic Times: Since the birth of the Federal Republic, German foreign policy has seen a great deal of continuity through all the country’s changes in government. How would you describe its main features today?
Steinmeier: German-American friendship and European integration must remain the two cornerstones of German foreign policy.
Continuity doesn’t mean naively „always doing the same.“ Continuity means adjusting to new situations and new challenges and searching for creative solutions. However, finding new positions doesn’t mean questioning the transatlantic partnership between Europe and the United States and especially not German-American friendship.
Where do you see changes in the substance of our foreign policy, or the style in which it’s implemented? Can one say: More Bush, less Putin? More London, less Paris? Or less Paris, more Warsaw?
This question didn’t play any part during my conversations in Washington. I was very happy to see that on both sides of the Atlantic, we are in perfect agreement with regard to the tasks ahead of us: After the end of the East-West conflict, we have to gear the existing structures to the new situation and the new challenges. This goes, for instance, for the relationship between NATO and European security and defense policy, as well as for shaping of our partnership with Russia. On both sides of the Atlantic we are working on these questions with the same energy.
Was the „axis of peace“ among Germany, France and Russia meant to create a counterweight to the United States?
One precondition for the development of Europe is a very close neighborly relationship between Germany and France. At the same time, since the end of the Cold War, a totally new relationship has evolved with Eastern Europe and Russia. That’s not a process that has reached its end yet. The Americans don’t see this any differently. They’re also searching for a way to further integrate a basically Western-looking Russia into our common relations.
Two-thirds of the American people now share the German government’s view about the permissibility or necessity of the Iraq war. Is there any movement in Washington as well in that direction or do they expect us to change our position?
I don’t think Washington expects that.
Has it been accepted that we won’t be sending any troops?
Washington accepts our „red line.“ That was also clear in statements made by President Bush during his visit to Mainz in the spring of 2005. Then he publicly said we should try to leave our differences in the past and look to what we can accomplish together in the future. That is the perspective we should adopt in our stances toward each other regarding Iraq. Germany is also helping in many different ways to rebuild Iraq economically and democratically: in training, which means strengthening security structures; and in reducing Iraqi debt through the Paris Club, totaling €4.7 billion. That’s acknowledged in America. Nationally and within the framework of the EU, Germany will continue to contribute to the economic and political stabilization of Iraq. As matters stand, we have been able to agree on a sustainable base even in questions which posed difficulties for one side or the other.
What kind of influence will the kidnapping of German archeologist Susanne Osthoff have on Berlin’s position toward the Iraq problem?
The kidnapping shows that the Western community of states is involved in the events, no matter whether countries are militarily present there or not. We shall not send any soldiers to Iraq in future, either. But we will continue helping rebuild the country’s economy, inasmuch as the security situation permits such reconstruction efforts.
As German foreign minister, you will have to invest much energy to get the stagnating European project moving forward again. This applies first to the stalled debate over the European constitution and, secondly, to the deadlock over the EU’s Financial Perspective for the period 2007-2013.
In the longer term, the constitutional debate is certainly the more important of the two, but after the referendums in France and the Netherlands, the situation can’t be changed anytime soon. That is why it was wise on the part of the European heads of government to opt for a „reflection period.“ In my visits to my European counterparts, I’ve seen that they are burning to come to grips with the problem. All the same, at the moment we must aim our whole effort at securing Europe’s financial framework. The basic question is whether the ambitious enlargement process of 2004 with the accession of 10 mainly Eastern European states will end in formal membership only or whether we can get a process going which will let the new member countries grow into Europe. That will succeed only if we have the necessary financial means available.
The Germans want to cap expenditures at 1 percent of Europe’s GDP, while the British want to keep their rebate, and the French refuse to cut agriculture subsidies. Where do you see a line of compromise there?
We have agreed not to reopen lasts summer’s bitter dispute over the proposals of the Luxembourg presidency and not to pillory anyone. Rather everybody is called upon to support the British presidency on the basis of everyone’s generally known interests. Our British partners have announced that they are going to present a proposal now that will do justice to these different interests. I’m counting on the necessary readiness to compromise among all members in mid-December. We must reach a result that will meet the requirements of budget discipline but at the same time will send a signal of European solidarity.
Is Washington indulging in any schadenfreude or is it rather concerned over the EU’s current troubles?
My interlocutors, too, do know that not even the U.S. can fix all global problems alone. America needs strong partners, one of which is a strong EU. For this reason, schadenfreude would be quite the wrong attitude. I did not, incidentally, notice it in Washington.
During your talks, was the subject of alleged CIA flights and stopovers at German airports raised?
The United States understands that the European governments have a strong interest in clearing up these questions. I have repeatedly said that we will not comment on newspaper reports. In the end, only facts count. British Foreign Secretary Jack Straw has sent a letter on behalf of the EU to U.S. Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice. I hope the answer she promised will soon come and clear up the whole matter.
France and Germany together have long been the engine of European integration. Can they take up this role once again without coming under suspicion that they want to establish some kind of directorate that imposes its will on others?
Close German-French cooperation was the beginning of the European integration project. It was and is a necessary precondition for Europe’s success. But it is up to us to convince all partners that this cooperation is not directed against anyone. Especially since I also always experience that any spluttering of the German-French motor generates concern among other EU partners.
Some Eastern Europeans often feel neglected by the close German-French relationship. Would reviving the Weimar Triangle – Paris, Berlin, Warsaw – be of any help?
In the coalition agreement, we agreed to actively use the Weimar Triangle as a forum. It will be especially important that we make sure that our meetings have substantial content.
The Poles and Baltic States demand more respect for their interests, which they consider compromised, for instance, regarding the issue of the gas pipeline through the Baltic Sea. What is to be done here? Can we grant others access to it?
This pipeline that has been planned by a private consortium doesn’t compete with any land pipelines at all. It complements them by recognizing that energy flows in Europe and the world are changing and that we need to tap into new resources. Neither is this an exclusively German pipeline. It is European. The neighboring states will be able to build branches in order to tap into this central pipeline. That was never in question.
Is the security of our energy supply the dominant interest in our relations with Russia?
No. A good relationship with Russia is important to us for many reasons. Economically, but the primary factor is that Russia develop into a stabilizing factor in Europe and the world. We would like to maintain and develop this giant country’s Western ties. This is the aim we pursue in our strategic partnership. I am happy that the U.S. shares this view.
The Schröder government was accused of paying too little attention to democracy and respect for human rights, and of not pushing hard enough for an end to the Chechen conflict, in its relations with Moscow.
I have never understood that accusation. The purposeful and sustainable championing of human rights does not require megaphone diplomacy. The Chechen conflict has spread to other regions of the Caucasus. Terrorism is part of the picture there. Discussions regarding human rights problems must take place, but we should not close our eyes to the complex and difficult situation Moscow is confronted with on Russia’s southern border.
Iran’s nuclear problem is another source of concern.
The most pressing problem facing the international community is the nuclear ambitions of Iran. We must find a satisfactory solution.
Do you take seriously President Mahmoud Ahmedinajad’s threats of wiping Israel off the map?
In Iran’s opinion, this declaration was not intended to be taken literally, but that cannot reassure us. That is why the German government responded emphatically to this speech, expressing its outrage and pointing out, in particular, that no one has the right to question Israel’s right to exist. Also against this background, the joint initiative of France, Britain and Germany - the EU-3 - is to prevent any development of nuclear weapons technology in Iran.
...and therefore also eliminate the threat to Israel?
In this way, we want to prevent Iran from becoming a new factor of strategic uncertainty in the Middle East. I think a negotiated settlement under the auspices of the IAEA would be the best solution. That would demand prudence on the part of the Iranian negotiators. I can only hope that they will not succumb to a miscalculation.
What kind of future is Kosovo headed for?
The special U.N. emissary Ahtisaari is still at the beginning of his efforts. What that means is shuttle diplomacy lasting months, during which, with plenty of patience and even more delicacy, he is trying to maneuver the various interests in Pristina and Belgrade into something approaching a compromise. He will succeed only if the EU maintains its interest in the Western Balkans as a whole. The Grand Coalition agrees that the Western Balkans should have a European perspective.
Will you invest as much time and energy as your predecessor did in seeking a permanent seat for Germany on the U.N. Security Council?
The new government has included the U.N. reform as well as the issue of a seat on the Security Council among its political goals. I recently had the opportunity to discuss that with the U.N. General Secretary. He sees Germany as a reliable partner and recognizes that we are among those countries dedicated to multilateralism in foreign policy. We support the reform efforts in all areas. If, in the course of reform, the number of seats on the Security Council is enlarged, then we would be interested.
Where do German interests abroad have to be defended, besides in Afghanistan?
I would hope that decisions like those regarding the military operations in the Balkans and especially in Afghanistan do not arise again. However, German soldiers and police remain in demand for peacekeeping and border missions. The first proposal I sent to the cabinet was about German participation in the EU border mission at Rafah, controlling traffic between Palestine and Egypt.
Joschka Fischer is esteemed both in Israel and Palestine as a trustworthy friend. Are relations with Israel also a heartfelt matter for you?
Steienmeier: The region and Israel itself will be just as much a matter of the heart for me as they were for my predecessor. And I think that in Israel one knows that!
Is there complete agreement within the new German government over the main features of the country’s foreign policy?
I myself negotiated this topic during the coalition talks. We made a point not to obscure matters by just agreeing on terminology. That was necessary, for instance, regarding the issue of Turkish EU accession. There we reached an agreement based on the existing European resolutions. Negotiations with Turkey have begun. They will be conducted with the outcome remaining open, but with the goal of Turkish accession.
Within the Grand Coalition, how can conflicts between the broader policymaking authority of the chancellor and the foreign minister’s own responsibilities be settled?
It is obvious that there can be only one single German foreign policy. Its basis we have formulated jointly in the coalition agreement. Whenever there might be differences of interpretation in the future, they will be resolved in close dialogue between Foreign Minister and Chancellor.
December 5, 2005
|
Printer-Friendly
Page
Email This Article
